Exit polls from the 2014 midterm election suggest that 4% of the electorate identified as lesbian, gay, or bisexual, representing the highest recorded LGB turnout in a midterm election since 1998. These LGB voters, 75% in fact, overwhelmingly supported Democratic candidates in key congressional races. If LGB people had not voted in the 2014 election, Virginia Senator Mark Warner and Vermont Governor Peter Chumlin would have both been defeated by their Republican challengers. The strong LGBT support for Democratic candidates becomes even more decisive during close races. This research brief considers the impact of the LGBT vote in the 2014 midterm election.
Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals (LGBs) in the United States are strikingly more likely to vote for Democratic presidential candidates than heterosexuals. LGBs are one of the Democratic Party's most loyal voting blocs, despite the absence of one of the most important mechanisms for creating party identification: intergenerational transmission. We use the 2000 Presidential election to examine whether LGB voters overwhelmingly chose Al Gore because they viewed him as superior to George W. Bush on LGB‐related policy issues or because of their greater overall liberalism and Democratic Party identification. We also examine the impact of socialization within the LGB community for generating political liberalism, Democratic Party identification, and interest in LGB policies. Using logit analysis on a 2000 Harris Interactive poll of 13,000 Americans, including 1,000 LGBs, we find that concern for LGB rights, policy liberalism, and party identification all played a role in the LGB vote.Lesbianas, hombres gay y bisexuales (LGB) en los Estados Unidos son mucho más propensos a por votar candidatos presidenciales Democráticos que personas heterosexuales. Los LGB son uno de los grupos electoral más leal del Partido Democrático, a pesar de la ausencia de uno de los mecanismos más importantes para crear identificación partidista: la transmisión intergeneracional. En este artículo usamos la elección presidencial del 2000 para examinar si los electores LGB eligieron a Al Gore porque lo consideraban superior a George W. Bush en políticas relacionadas con asuntos LGB o debido a su mayor liberalismo e identificación con el Partido Democrático. También examinamos el impacto de la socialización dentro de la comunidad LGB para generar liberalismo político, identificación con el Partido Democrático, e interés en políticas relacionadas con asuntos LGB. Usando un análisis logit en una encuesta interactiva Harris 2000 de 13,000 estadounidenses, incluyendo 1,000 LGB, los resultados muestran que interés por derechos para los LGB, liberalismo político, e identificación partidaria juegan un papel importante en el voto LGB.
AbstractResearch on the political preferences of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) voters shows that they are more progressive than heterosexuals. However, few studies consider differences between heterosexual, gay/lesbian, and bisexual men and women. Furthermore, little is known about how these preferences have changed as society has become more accepting of diverse sexualities. We offer an analysis of Canadian LGB voters' political preferences a decade and a half after same-sex marriage was legalized. Consistent with prior research, we find that gay men, and, to a lesser extent, bisexual men, are more left-wing than heterosexual men. A more novel finding is that bisexual women are the most left-wing group. Lesbian women are only slightly to the left of heterosexual women. While left-wing bisexual women are growing in number, the overall gap between LGB and heterosexual voters has remained stable across generations, because marriage narrows some of the preference gaps.
Emerging evidence points towards the existence of a "sexuality gap" in the political preferences and behaviour of lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) voters and that of heterosexuals in Western Europe. Very little is known, however, about how this gap is moderated by socio-economic status. This paper tests the conditionality of the sexuality gap by analysing how the effect of LGB status is conditioned by income and education. Empirically, we rely on data from the European Social Survey (2002-2017) to analyse the marginal effect of sexuality in determining ideological placement, vote choice and support for economic redistribution across different income and education levels. The results demonstrate that the divergence between LGBs' and heterosexuals' preferences only emerges amongst those with higher income and education. The findings also suggest that the sexuality gap may be the result of the asymmetric effect of these socio-economic variables for LGBs and heterosexuals.
In the quarter century since the Stonewall riots in New York City's Greenwich Village launched the national gay-rights movement in earnest, LGB voters have steadily expanded their political influence. The Lavender Vote is the first full- length examination of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals as a factor in American elections. Mark Hertzog here describes the differences in demographics, attitudes, and voting behavior between self-identified bisexuals and homosexuals and the rest of the voting population. He shows that lavender self- identifiers comprise a distinctive voting bloc equal in number