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Cover; India's Late, Late Industrial Revolution; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Figures; Tables; Acknowledgments; Preface; 1: Vent for growth; Outside-the-box thinking; India's unique industrial revolution; Recent growth performance in India; Industry in the second half of the twentieth century; Little details supporting the big picture; Insights from the big picture; 2: Industrial revolutions; Origins; India's role in motivating the industrial revolution; Britain and the industrial revolution; The American experience with industrialization; The democratization of invention

The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the fiscal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budget negotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and they are more late, when fiscal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period 1988-2007. For this period, we find 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses of the model.

The budget forms the legal basis of government spending. If a budget is not in place at the beginning of the fiscal year, planning as well as current spending are jeopardized and government shutdown may result. This paper develops a continuous-time war-of-attrition model of budgeting in a presidential style-democracy to explain the duration of budget negotiations. We build our model around budget baselines as reference points for loss averse negotiators. We derive three testable hypotheses: there are more late budgets, and they are more late, when fiscal circumstances change; when such changes are negative rather than positive; and when there is divided government. We test the hypotheses of the model using a unique data set of late budgets for US state governments, based on dates of budget approval collected from news reports and a survey of state budget o¢ cers for the period 1988-2007. For this period, we find 23 % of budgets to be late. The results provide strong support for the hypotheses of the model.

The globalization of production (and finance)—which emerged along with neoliberalism out of the economic stagnation of the mid–1970s and then accelerated with the demise of Soviet-type societies and China's reintegration into the capitalist world system—has generated a more generalized monopoly capitalism, ushering in what can be called late imperialism. Late imperialism refers to the present period of monopoly-finance capital and stagnation, declining U.S. hegemony and rising world conflict, accompanied by growing threats to the ecological bases of civilization and life itself. It stands at its core for the extreme, hierarchical relations governing the capitalist world economy in the twenty-first century, which is increasingly dominated by mega-multinational corporations and a handful of states at the center of the world system. Just as it is now common to refer to late capitalism in recognition of the end times brought on by simultaneous economic and ecological dislocations, so it is necessary today to speak of late imperialism, reflecting the global dimensions and contradictions of that system, cutting across all other divisions, and posing a "global rift" in human historical development: an epochal crisis posing the question of "ruin or revolution."

Intro -- LATER LIFE -- Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION DECONSTRUCTING 'LATER LIFE' -- GERONTOLOGY AS "SCIENCE" -- GERONTOLOGY AS SOCIAL THEORY -- MAPPING OUT THE TERRAIN: MODERN AND POSTMODERN THEORIES OF AGING -- Chapter 2: THEORIES OF AGING -- INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF AGING -- WHY SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF LATER LIFE? -- THE GAZE OF FUNCTIONALIST PHILOSOPHY -- SOCIAL CLASS AND AGING: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OLD AGE -- AGING, MASCULINITY AND GENDER -- CONCLUSION -- Chapter 3: POST-STRUCTURALISM AND AGING -- INTRODUCTION -- WHAT IS STRUCTURALISM? -- WHAT IS POST-STRUCTURALISM? -- ARCHAEOLOGIES AND GENEALOGIES OF AGING: POST-STRUCTURAL 'TOOLS FOR THINKING' -- THE LEGACY OF FOUCAULT'S POST-STRUCTURALISM AND AGING -- Chapter 4: NARRATIVE, AGING AND CITIZENSHIP -- INTRODUCTION -- THE STATE, THE INDIVIDUAL AND CITIZENSHIP -- SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEMATIZATION OF AGING -- CONCLUSION -- Chapter 5: THEORIZING TRUST AND AGING -- INTRODUCTION -- WHAT IS TRUST? -- TRUST, AGING AND HEALTH -- GOVERNMENTALITY, TRUST AND SELF-ACTUALIZATION -- CONCLUSION -- Chapter 6: CONCLUSION -- REFERENCES -- INDEX.