Suchergebnisse

We have analyzed the political legitimacy of democracy in Latin America with Latinobarometro's data, which is a survey about attitudes and values that has been applied annually since 1996 in 18 countries of the region, in two axes: one methodological and the other theoretical. On the one hand, we contribute to the empirical validation of the concept and its differents operationalizations, while aligning our results to the wider debate. And, in the theoretical field, our results allow us to broaden the debate on the relationship between legitimacy and democratic stability.

The aim of this article is contributing to a great variety of theoretical perspectives and empirical settings to generate cumulative evidence about the influence of historical legacies and organisational ability for managing the past. In a continuation of critical perspectives that challenges the dominance of Anglo-Saxon onto-epistemologies in management and organisation studies (MOS), we conducted an empirical study on a multinational airline company whose past successes depended on the North/South, Anglo/Latin American borderlands. We analysed the grand narratives of Pan American Airways' (PAA) corporate archival material to determine its dominant discourses about people from Latin America. Based on the three themes of politics, economics, and culture, we present three grand narratives, or official stories, that we argue summarise PAA storytelling about Latin America between 1927 and 1960. Following decolonial feminism, we aim to recontextualise the past and the hegemonic storytelling embedded in PAA's grand narratives. ; peerReviewed

In the 80s, Latin America experienced the worst economic crisis since the world-wide depression of the 30s. A common link running through this crisis was external indebtedness with the international private banking system. Since then, the region has entered a new phase of abundance of capital inflows, bearing some resemblance to the preceding episode of the 70s.In this paper a review is made of the origins of indebtedness, of the emergence of the crisis in the early 80s, and of the management by creditors and debtors during that decade. Some lessons are derived about the working of international financial markets and policy implications. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

A integração comercial e financeira global fortaleceu a classe capitalista em relação ao proletariado em cada país ao permitir às transnacionais deslocar suas empresas para países em que o custo da mão de obra é menor. A crise colheu a América Latina pela fuga das divisas fortes, extinção do crédito externo e queda das exportações, das inversões estrangeiras e das remessas dos emigrados. A crise se generaliza com as demissões em massa, a difusão do pânico que faz o crédito encolher, derrubando as vendas de bens de maior valor e os investimentos. Os governos do Primeiro Mundo trataram de resgatar os seus bancos falidos, comprando parte do seu capital ou sua totalidade com recursos do Tesouro. No Brasil, o governo faz que os bancos públicos estendam o crédito aos setores abandonados pelos bancos privados e baixem os juros que cobram. Os governos latino-americanos estimulam o mercado interno a absorver a produção que não enontra mais compradores no exterior mediante redistribuição da renda e aumento do investimento público. Nos últimos seis anos, os emergentes cresceram 50%, enquanto os industrializados cresceram apenas 10%, o que ampliou o número de nações cuja coordenação é indispensável para que a crise mundial possa ser domada do G-7 para o G-20. Uma das lições da crise é que, em lugar da globalização financeira, o povo de cada país deve ter o direito de decidir como seu excedente social deve ser administrado. A guarda do dinheiro do público e o seu empréstimo a investidores e consumidores devem ser reservados ao poder público e a entidades associativas sem fins de lucro. ; Global commercial and financial integration has strengthened the capitalist class in comparison with the proletariat around the globe as it permitted multinationals to relocate their companies to countries in which the cost of the labor force was lower. The crisis reached Latin America through the flight of capital, disappearance of external credit and a drop in exports, foreign investment and emigrant remittances. The crisis spread due to mass job redundancies, diffusion of panic which negatively affected credit availability and decreased sales of higher added value goods and investments. Developed-countries governments rescued their bankrupt banks acquiring part of their capital or even the entire institution with Treasury resources. In Brazil, the government forced public banks to extend credit to the sectors that had been abandoned by the private market and to decrease their interest rates. Latin-American governments stimulated the domestic market to absorb the production that could no longer find buyers abroad in return for redistribution of income and increase of public investment. In the last six years, emerging economies have grown 50% while industrialized countries have grown only 10%. Such fact has enlarged the number of nations that must be coordinated to tackle the global crisis from seven (G7) to twenty (G20). One of the lessons to be learned from the crisis is that instead of financial globalization, the people of each country must have the right to decide how their social surplus must be managed. Monitoring the use of public money as well as public loans to investors and consumers must be the role of the public authorities and not-for-profit organizations only.