Suchergebnisse

This book provocatively inquires into whether some aspects of law should be regarded as beyond the purview of democratic procedures. On Melissa Schwartzberg's account, "entrenchment,"—her term for those aspects of law thought not to be susceptible to revision by democratic majorities or to constitutional amendment by supramajoritarian procedures—damages democracy, despite its prevalence in modern history. She argues that entrenchment risks sedimenting law and deadening active democratic participation because it places crucial issues beyond debate. In resisting entrenchment, she aligns herself with Jürgen Habermas's project of invigorating democratic constitutionalism as a "living project."

The ancient Athenians regarded their ability to modify their laws as a fundamentally democratic trait; indeed, the faculty of "pragmatic innovation" was well known throughout the Greek world and was widely viewed as a key advantage that Athens had over its rival, Sparta. The Athenian commitment to legal change endured despite disastrous consequences at the end of the fifth century, a comprehensive revision of the laws, and the complication of legal procedure in the fourth century. In an apparent paradox, however, the Athenians also used "entrenchment clauses" to make certain laws immutable. Through analysis of entrenched laws and decrees, it is shown that the innovativeness that made Athens enviable also made it a difficult ally; entrenchment enabled the Athenians to make its commitments more credible. Although today entrenchment is typically used to protect crucial constitutional provisions, such as rights, in the ancient world it served a strategic purpose.

Law is the vehicle through which society defines not only its regulations, but also its actual values and behavioral patterns, as well as what is considered to be natural or unnatural. As such, the laws described in this article become symbols of what Lebanese society considers natural or not and hence assume far more implications than their strictly legal context would admit. Consequently, the law, as the symbol of authority, exercises its power through its simultaneous claim to pragmatic common sense. This is attested to by the difficulties encountered by Lebanese women and human rights organizations in their endeavors to repeal or amend discriminatory laws, or to introduce new laws that would guarantee the welfare of women and protect their rights. Due to the efforts of these women and human rights organizations, several Lebanese discriminatory laws were repealed or amended, from 1953 to the present. Yet, a summary study of the personal status codes (family law) and the civil and secular laws (everything else) clearly demonstrates that the position of a married woman in Lebanon is still that of a femme couverte , since upon marriage, she loses most of her civil rights, becomes the ward of her husband, and assumes a subordinate legal position, one that is incorporated into that of the husband.

A response to Linda S. Bishai's "Intervention in Law and Politics" & Jan Klabbers's "Separating Law and Politics: A Comment" (2001). Contrary to Bishai's interpretation of the Danish Instit of International Affairs' (DUPI) (1999) examination of humanitarian intervention as an attempt to preserve international law from politics, it is contended that the DUPI's document was designed to think about the legal & political practices connected to humanitarian intervention efforts. An overview of the DUPI's argument concerning the role & legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in third-party states is subsequently provided, emphasizing the agency's identification of four legal-political strategies for justifying intervening efforts. Bishai's & Klabbers' respective assertions that adopting a unified perspective toward humanitarian intervention is impossible within the context of international law are addressed. A three-part explanation for the DUPI's theoretical decision to differentiate legal & political arguments for humanitarian intervention is then provided. Bishai's & Klabbers' respective suggestions that separating legal & political perspectives constitutes a nonpolitical move is ultimately rejected. 8 References. J. W. Parker