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Aristotle's discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law are required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. The analysis involves a re-examination of 1268b 25ss in book II of Aristotle's Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle's Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato's Politicus and Laws.

Aristotle's discussion of legal change in Politics II.8 is the subject of this article. The aim is to show that Aristotle viewed legal change positively, when changes to the law were required, and that his discussion was mainly concerned with the two rather distinct roles of the demos and of the legislator. This essay deals with a re-examination of 1268b 25ff. in book II of Aristotle's Politics and its connection with book III. The analysis is also extended to Aristotle's Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics, and to Plato's Politicus and Laws. ; La discusión de Aristóteles sobre el cambio legal en Política II.8 es el tema de este artículo. El objetivo es mostrar que Aristóteles vio el cambio legal positivamente, cuando se requieren cambios a la ley, y que su discusión se refería principalmente a los dos roles bastante distintos del demos y del legislador. El análisis implica un nuevo examen de 1268b 25ss en el libro II de la Política de Aristóteles y su conexión con el libro III. El análisis también se extiende a la Retórica de Aristóteles y la Ética a Nicómaco, y al Político y las Leyes de Platón.

This book provocatively inquires into whether some aspects of law should be regarded as beyond the purview of democratic procedures. On Melissa Schwartzberg's account, "entrenchment,"—her term for those aspects of law thought not to be susceptible to revision by democratic majorities or to constitutional amendment by supramajoritarian procedures—damages democracy, despite its prevalence in modern history. She argues that entrenchment risks sedimenting law and deadening active democratic participation because it places crucial issues beyond debate. In resisting entrenchment, she aligns herself with Jürgen Habermas's project of invigorating democratic constitutionalism as a "living project."

Since ancient Athens, democrats have taken pride in their power and inclination to change their laws, yet they have also sought to counter this capacity by creating immutable laws. In Democracy and Legal Change, Melissa Schwartzberg argues that modifying law is a fundamental and attractive democratic activity. Against those who would defend the use of 'entrenchment clauses' to protect key constitutional provisions from revision, Schwartzberg seeks to demonstrate historically the strategic and even unjust purposes unamendable laws have typically served, and to highlight the regrettable consequences that entrenchment may have for democracies today. Drawing on historical evidence, classical political theory, and contemporary constitutional and democratic theory, Democracy and Legal Change reexamines the relationship between democracy and the rule of law from a new, and often surprising, set of vantage points

Transitions: Legal Change, Legal Meanings illustrates the various intersections, crises, and shifts that continually occur within the law, and how these moments of change interact with and comment on contemporary society. Together the essays in this volume investigate the transformation of US law during moments of political change and explore what we can learn about law by examining its role and its use in times of transition. Whether by an abrupt shift in regime or an orderly progression from one government to the next, political change often calls into question the stability and versatili

Institutions matter both for long-term economic evolution as well as for more short-termed economic performance. The law is particularly important in shaping the institutional framework for economic activities. This paper gives an overview of typical evolutionary explanations of legal change, i.e. the generation and dissemination of legal innovations over time. The main actors, the key determinants, and the central mechanisms are identified. In addition to approaches which deal primarily with statutory respectively judge-made legal change, the concept of legal paradigms and path dependence, the co-evolution of law and technology and the impact of institutional competition on legal change are discussed.

The ancient Athenians regarded their ability to modify their laws as a fundamentally democratic trait; indeed, the faculty of "pragmatic innovation" was well known throughout the Greek world and was widely viewed as a key advantage that Athens had over its rival, Sparta. The Athenian commitment to legal change endured despite disastrous consequences at the end of the fifth century, a comprehensive revision of the laws, and the complication of legal procedure in the fourth century. In an apparent paradox, however, the Athenians also used "entrenchment clauses" to make certain laws immutable. Through analysis of entrenched laws and decrees, it is shown that the innovativeness that made Athens enviable also made it a difficult ally; entrenchment enabled the Athenians to make its commitments more credible. Although today entrenchment is typically used to protect crucial constitutional provisions, such as rights, in the ancient world it served a strategic purpose.

Law is the vehicle through which society defines not only its regulations, but also its actual values and behavioral patterns, as well as what is considered to be natural or unnatural. As such, the laws described in this article become symbols of what Lebanese society considers natural or not and hence assume far more implications than their strictly legal context would admit. Consequently, the law, as the symbol of authority, exercises its power through its simultaneous claim to pragmatic common sense. This is attested to by the difficulties encountered by Lebanese women and human rights organizations in their endeavors to repeal or amend discriminatory laws, or to introduce new laws that would guarantee the welfare of women and protect their rights. Due to the efforts of these women and human rights organizations, several Lebanese discriminatory laws were repealed or amended, from 1953 to the present. Yet, a summary study of the personal status codes (family law) and the civil and secular laws (everything else) clearly demonstrates that the position of a married woman in Lebanon is still that of a femme couverte , since upon marriage, she loses most of her civil rights, becomes the ward of her husband, and assumes a subordinate legal position, one that is incorporated into that of the husband.

1. Seeking Constitutional Settlement in Myanmar -- Janelle Saffin -- 2. Rule of Law Concepts in Burma's Constitutions and Actual Practice: No Ground for Optimism -- Myint Zan -- 3. A Second Panglong Agreement: Burmese Federalism for the Twenty-first Century -- David C Williams -- 4. Irresistible Forces and Immovable Objects: Constitutional Change in Myanmar -- Andrew Harding -- 5. The 2008 Constitution: The Evolution of Leadership -- Priscilla Clapp -- 6. Contesting the Rules: Myanmar's 2015 Election and Electoral Integrity -- Bridget Welsh -- 7. Achieving 'Genuine Federalism'? Myanmar's Inexorable Path Towards Constitutional Devolution and -- Decentralised Governance -- Marcus Brand -- 8. The Everyday Emergency: Between the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure in Myanmar -- Melissa Crouch -- 9. How the Constitutional Tribunal's Jurisprudence Sparked a Crisis -- Dominic Jerry Nardi, Jr -- 10. Judicial Power and the Constitutional Tribunal: Some Suggestions for Better Legislation Relating to -- the Tribunal and its Role -- Khin Khin Oo -- 11. Human Rights under the New Regime -- Catherine Renshaw -- 12. The Legal Profession and the Substantive Rule of Law in Myanmar -- Janelle Saffin and Nathan Willis

A response to Linda S. Bishai's "Intervention in Law and Politics" & Jan Klabbers's "Separating Law and Politics: A Comment" (2001). Contrary to Bishai's interpretation of the Danish Instit of International Affairs' (DUPI) (1999) examination of humanitarian intervention as an attempt to preserve international law from politics, it is contended that the DUPI's document was designed to think about the legal & political practices connected to humanitarian intervention efforts. An overview of the DUPI's argument concerning the role & legitimacy of humanitarian intervention in third-party states is subsequently provided, emphasizing the agency's identification of four legal-political strategies for justifying intervening efforts. Bishai's & Klabbers' respective assertions that adopting a unified perspective toward humanitarian intervention is impossible within the context of international law are addressed. A three-part explanation for the DUPI's theoretical decision to differentiate legal & political arguments for humanitarian intervention is then provided. Bishai's & Klabbers' respective suggestions that separating legal & political perspectives constitutes a nonpolitical move is ultimately rejected. 8 References. J. W. Parker