Good afternoon. To begin, I’d like to thank Ed Wallis and the Richmond Journal of Law & Tech- nology for inviting me to speak on such a distinguished panel. And I’d like to tell you one thing about myself that is not in my fancy lawyer biography. I grew up on a small family farm down in North Caro- lina, so I learned from an early age about the different types of genetic manipulations that go on a farm, from breeding cattle to grafting apple trees, which if you’re fourteen years old, consists of spending your entire Spring Break taking one kind of apple tree with sturdy rootstock, and a branch from another kind of tree that makes tasty apples, smushing them together, wrapping the result in freezer tape, and planting it. It’s not Johnny Appleseed, but it works.
THIS PAPER ADDRESSES THE ISSUES OF WHETHER HAVING CAUSED HARM SHOULD BE A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR LIABILITY FOR THAT HARM, AND IF SO, WHY. THE AUTHOR EXAMINES JUDITH THOMSON'S ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF AN UN-KANTIAN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION, AND POINTS TO WHAT THE AUTHOR BELIEVES ARE THE INADEQUACIES OF THIS ARGUMENT AGAINST KANTIANISM.