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The paper explores the paradoxes of the political philosophy of liberalism. Liberal conception of justice is incapable of providing grounds for an identity of liberalism. Liberals do not have a moral conception of their own. This is a source of a paradox. Political identity points to morality and moral identity points to politics. The aim of this paper is to clarify this paradox. Political liberalism is based on certain assumptions of a philosophy of culture. Liberals defend a conception of culture which justifies their inconsistencies. They lack any coherent conception of morality and politics. The article is an attempt to prove this by using the "final position" – an alternative to the Rawlsian "original position".

The paper explores the paradoxes of the political philosophy of liberalism. Liberal conception of justice is incapable of providing grounds for an identity of liberalism. Liberals do not have a moral conception of their own. This is a source of a paradox. Political identity points to morality and moral identity points to politics. The aim of this paper is to clarify this paradox. Political liberalism is based on certain assumptions of a philosophy of culture. Liberals defend a conception of culture which justifies their inconsistencies. They lack any coherent conception of morality and politics. The article is an attempt to prove this by using the "final position" – an alternative to the Rawlsian "original position".

The article develops normative assumptions about what the political ideologies, democracy and political parties ought to be and advocates a reconsidered version of liberalism, which is perceived as an alternative to the prevailing modern political ideologies. Assumptions of reconsidered liberalism about the role of ideologies in democracy are generalized in the concept of ideological pluralism. The article also presents a concept of comprehensive democracy as an alternative to representative, direct, deliberative, civic and other modern conceptions of democracies. In this perspective democracy is perceived as a mode of collective decision-making process. Normative criteria for the basic elements of a collective decision making process, i.e.: participants of decision-making processes, decisionmaking procedures, content of decisions and implementation of decisions, are formulated. Assumptions about the alternative role of political parties in democracy are derived from the conception of the comprehensive democracy. It is proposed to assign to political parties functions such as civic education, organizing and moderating public deliberations, monitoring policy implementation.

The article develops normative assumptions about what the political ideologies, democracy and political parties ought to be and advocates a reconsidered version of liberalism, which is perceived as an alternative to the prevailing modern political ideologies. Assumptions of reconsidered liberalism about the role of ideologies in democracy are generalized in the concept of ideological pluralism. The article also presents a concept of comprehensive democracy as an alternative to representative, direct, deliberative, civic and other modern conceptions of democracies. In this perspective democracy is perceived as a mode of collective decision-making process. Normative criteria for the basic elements of a collective decision making process, i.e.: participants of decision-making processes, decisionmaking procedures, content of decisions and implementation of decisions, are formulated. Assumptions about the alternative role of political parties in democracy are derived from the conception of the comprehensive democracy. It is proposed to assign to political parties functions such as civic education, organizing and moderating public deliberations, monitoring policy implementation.

The agonistic model of democracy says that the dimension of antagonism is inherent in human relations. The ineradicability of antagonism, it is argued, is constitutive of the political. The main task of this model is to establish us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. On the one hand, agonistic democracy criticizes neutral and procedural aspects of liberal democracy, on the other hand, both agonistic and liberal models accepts the priority of pluralism and individual rights. In summary, the processes of liberalization and democratization are conceptually contradictory. The ethos of liberalism, especially the ideal of negative liberty, reduces the substantial concept of equality to indifferent equal liberty. The principle of moral equality is gradually transformed to the principle of moral individualism. The deontological liberalism ignores the main democratic question – how to establish the democratic community with both the autonomy of persons and the shared understanding of the good? In this way political liberalism negates the ideal of democracy – the identity between governing and governed.

The agonistic model of democracy says that the dimension of antagonism is inherent in human relations. The ineradicability of antagonism, it is argued, is constitutive of the political. The main task of this model is to establish us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. On the one hand, agonistic democracy criticizes neutral and procedural aspects of liberal democracy, on the other hand, both agonistic and liberal models accepts the priority of pluralism and individual rights. In summary, the processes of liberalization and democratization are conceptually contradictory. The ethos of liberalism, especially the ideal of negative liberty, reduces the substantial concept of equality to indifferent equal liberty. The principle of moral equality is gradually transformed to the principle of moral individualism. The deontological liberalism ignores the main democratic question – how to establish the democratic community with both the autonomy of persons and the shared understanding of the good? In this way political liberalism negates the ideal of democracy – the identity between governing and governed.

The agonistic model of democracy says that the dimension of antagonism is inherent in human relations. The ineradicability of antagonism, it is argued, is constitutive of the political. The main task of this model is to establish us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. On the one hand, agonistic democracy criticizes neutral and procedural aspects of liberal democracy, on the other hand, both agonistic and liberal models accepts the priority of pluralism and individual rights. In summary, the processes of liberalization and democratization are conceptually contradictory. The ethos of liberalism, especially the ideal of negative liberty, reduces the substantial concept of equality to indifferent equal liberty. The principle of moral equality is gradually transformed to the principle of moral individualism. The deontological liberalism ignores the main democratic question – how to establish the democratic community with both the autonomy of persons and the shared understanding of the good? In this way political liberalism negates the ideal of democracy – the identity between governing and governed.

The agonistic model of democracy says that the dimension of antagonism is inherent in human relations. The ineradicability of antagonism, it is argued, is constitutive of the political. The main task of this model is to establish us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. On the one hand, agonistic democracy criticizes neutral and procedural aspects of liberal democracy, on the other hand, both agonistic and liberal models accepts the priority of pluralism and individual rights. In summary, the processes of liberalization and democratization are conceptually contradictory. The ethos of liberalism, especially the ideal of negative liberty, reduces the substantial concept of equality to indifferent equal liberty. The principle of moral equality is gradually transformed to the principle of moral individualism. The deontological liberalism ignores the main democratic question – how to establish the democratic community with both the autonomy of persons and the shared understanding of the good? In this way political liberalism negates the ideal of democracy – the identity between governing and governed.

The phenomenon of German neo-liberalism as a peculiar political–economic doctrine which became popular after World War II is analysed in the context of the ideology of neo-liberalism. Attempts have been made to show historical and cultural conditions which favoured the implementation of the ideas developed by W. Eucken, theoretician of the German neo-liberalism, and the representatives of the Freiburg school. The aim of the paper is to identify the peculiarities that make this economic thought different from classical neo-liberalism and have stimulated the development of the economy in post-war West Germany.

The phenomenon of German neo-liberalism as a peculiar political–economic doctrine which became popular after World War II is analysed in the context of the ideology of neo-liberalism. Attempts have been made to show historical and cultural conditions which favoured the implementation of the ideas developed by W. Eucken, theoretician of the German neo-liberalism, and the representatives of the Freiburg school. The aim of the paper is to identify the peculiarities that make this economic thought different from classical neo-liberalism and have stimulated the development of the economy in post-war West Germany.

The phenomenon of German neo-liberalism as a peculiar political–economic doctrine which became popular after World War II is analysed in the context of the ideology of neo-liberalism. Attempts have been made to show historical and cultural conditions which favoured the implementation of the ideas developed by W. Eucken, theoretician of the German neo-liberalism, and the representatives of the Freiburg school. The aim of the paper is to identify the peculiarities that make this economic thought different from classical neo-liberalism and have stimulated the development of the economy in post-war West Germany.

The phenomenon of German neo-liberalism as a peculiar political–economic doctrine which became popular after World War II is analysed in the context of the ideology of neo-liberalism. Attempts have been made to show historical and cultural conditions which favoured the implementation of the ideas developed by W. Eucken, theoretician of the German neo-liberalism, and the representatives of the Freiburg school. The aim of the paper is to identify the peculiarities that make this economic thought different from classical neo-liberalism and have stimulated the development of the economy in post-war West Germany.

The phenomenon of German neo-liberalism as a peculiar political–economic doctrine which became popular after World War II is analysed in the context of the ideology of neo-liberalism. Attempts have been made to show historical and cultural conditions which favoured the implementation of the ideas developed by W. Eucken, theoretician of the German neo-liberalism, and the representatives of the Freiburg school. The aim of the paper is to identify the peculiarities that make this economic thought different from classical neo-liberalism and have stimulated the development of the economy in post-war West Germany.

The main strategy of this article is to consider liberalism in contrast with democracy. The article argues that there is a tension between the principles of democratic homogeneity and liberal heterogeneity. Deontological liberalism accents formal and procedural aspects of liberal democracy. In this way the democratic substantial concept of equality is reduced to the indifferent concept of equal individual liberty. Thus the model of liberal democracy gives priority to liberalism, but not democracy. The article also argues that it is possible to draw the conceptual distinction between liberalism and democracy only if the question is considered as a critical framework of different philosophical discourses. Adapted from the source document.

The article is based on an idea that there are four different modes of understanding reality -- practice, science, art and mysticism. Political liberalism demands separation of public and private beliefs. However, mystical understanding of reality is not a system of propositions and beliefs. This is why one can speak of a conflict between liberalism and mystical understanding of reality. Political liberalism imposes a certain understanding of reality on believers. Liberals propose to remove religious convictions from public life and not to treat them as a basis of politics. They forget that mystics have the biggest trouble namely with convictions. To turn the reality of God into words for them is always the hardest task. Mystics find God before words, concepts and discourses. Liberals reduce religion to convictions and demand from mystics to comprehend that, which in their opinion is not comprehensible. There is a tension between liberalism and people who have mystical experiences. Liberals narrow down religious experience to convictions. However, mystical experience is a much broader subject. Behind it stands an understanding of world that has its own standards of reality. Adapted from the source document.