Suchergebnisse

La definición del concepto del lobbying está desarrollándose en paralelo a la exigencia ciudadana de un aumento de la participación y de la transparencia en la toma de decisiones públicas. En esta voz se realiza un acercamiento a la actividad del lobbying considerando la acepción utilizada principalmente por la Unión Europea y en las escasas legislaciones de los últimos años. A pesar de la falta de regulación específica, el lobbying cuenta con una cobertura legal en las democracias representativas como una forma de participación y de defensa de los intereses de los grupos sociales. Sin embargo, este servicio conlleva también riesgos que pueden evitarse incrementado de forma notable la transparencia. El lobbying es influir desde una simetría en el acceso y desde la transparencia, basado en la capacidad para trasladar los mensajes correctos y convencer. Al contar con la opinión de las partes implicadas, las decisiones públicas mejoran así su calidad, pero también su legitimidad. En España está extendiéndose la elaboración de regulaciones sobre lobbying y es previsible que en esta nueva legislatura, con nuevos partidos y con necesidad de negociación y acuerdos, se cree definitivamente un marco normativo para este cauce de participación. Palabras clave Lobbying, influencia, transparencia, participación, políticas públicas, democracia. Abstract The definition of lobbying is being developed in parallel with the public demand for increased participation and transparency in public decision-making. In this definition it is made an approach to lobbying activity considering the meaning mainly used by the European Union and the few laws adopted in recent years. Despite the lack of specific regulation, lobbying has a legal cover in representative democracies as a form of participation and defense of social groups interests. However, lobbying also carries risks that can be avoided significantly increasing transparency. Lobbying is to influence from a symmetry in access to and from the transparency, based on the ability to convey the right messages and convince. Having the opinion of stakeholders involved, quality of public decisions improve, but also its legitimacy. In Spain the development of regulations on lobbying is spreading and it is expected that during this new legislature, with new political parties in need of negotiation and agreements, a regulatory framework for this mean of participation will be definitely created. Keywords Lobbying, influence, transparency, participation, public policies, democracy.

AbstractThis paper suggests that the nature of activism is changing to take account of the shifts in political and economic conditions. It further goes on to consider that as a result of these emerging trends we have witnessed a generational shift in how governments, businesses, interest groups and citizens will interact. It is possible to place the issues and questions that this new environment raises under a number of broad headings—Democracy and Dissent, Government and Parliament, Media, and Lobbying –each of which the paper deals with in turn. Copyright © 2003 Henry Stewart Publications.

At the end students will be able to:• Compare the differences between influence and lobbying in a democratic and digi-tal context,• Reveal the psychological dimensions of influence and its expansion to digital tools,• Identify the protagonists and their activities,• Elaborate strong arguments relying on data and expert opinions,• Describe the process for elaborating norms and laws,• Discover the public action process, in a parliament as well as in civil society,• Ask ethical and critical questions about lobbying regulations.Course requirements: basic notions on the most important theories of information and communication, and competences in sociology. A good knowledge of actuality is necessary. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Do interest groups strategically select lobbying tactics in response to the legislative context of policies they wish to influence? As rational actors, interest groups should be keen to spend their resources wisely by responding strategically to legislative contexts. This research suggests a theoretical and empirical framework and attempts to explain variations in interest group behavior at the policy level. The empirical design associates direct and indirect interest group lobbying activities with specific policies and tests the hypothesis that interest groups use legislative context as a part of their decision calculus when considering how to lobby Congress. I find that measures of legislative context are important components of models of direct and indirect lobbying. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2007.]

In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An extremist candidate is elected and implements a centrist policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous.

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two industry lobbies can seek a laxer policy that would apply to both industries & loophole lobbying that provides benefits specific to one industry. We determine the properties of the lobbying equilibrium, including the resulting emissions level. In many cases, higher effectiveness of loophole lobbying is detrimental for industries & beneficial for environmental quality, as it exacerbates the free-rider problem in the provision of general lobbying by inducing industries to turn towards loophole lobbying. Figures, References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]

We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. We show that a single decision maker and a decentralized majoritarian legis- lature provide widely di .erent incentives for interest groups to acquire and transmit policy relevant information. The paper also shows a di .erence in the opportunity to a .ect policy through lobbying between a parliamentary legislature and a legislature with low voting cohesion,such as the U.S.Congress.We show that the incentives to lobby a parliamentary legislature are much lower than to lobby Congress.The results provide a rationale for why lobby groups are more active n the U.S.Congress. The key institutional feature to explain the di .erent behavior of lobby groups is the vote of con .dence procedure,which creates voting cohesion in a parlia- mentary system across policy issues.We show that the .exibility of creating majorities in the Congress creates an incentive for interest groups to play an active role in the design of policy in the congressional system,while the voting cohesion in the parliamentary system dissuades interest group 's incentive to engage in information provision.

In an age of corruption, sleaze and scandal associated with financial crisis and economic downturn across the globe, citizens want more transparency and accountability in politics. This book examines a principal means by which this can be achieved: the regulation of lobbyists. It provides innovative insights into lobbying regulations across four continents? North America, Europe, Asia and Australia. What are these regulations about? What are the differences across the continents? How effective are the rules? How have they changed the lobbying profession? Using qualitative and quantitative ana.

"We study the effects of unequal representation in the interest-group system on the degree of information transmission between a lobbyist and a policymaker. Employing a dynamic cheap-talk model in which the lobbyist cares instrumentally about his reputation for truthtelling, we show that the larger is the inequality, the less information can credibly be transmitted to the policymaker. We also investigate the effects of inequality on welfare and discuss the welfare effects of institutions that increase transparency but which as well, as an unintended side-effect, lower the lobbyist's incentives for truthtelling." (author's abstract)

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.