Suchergebnisse

According to the Theory of Economic Regulation, corporate lobbying is a productive investment for firms looking to influence legislation and public policy. Corporate political activity can generate benefits for the organization; however, in the presence of agency conflicts the advantage is often offset by agency costs borne by the shareholders. Sometimes excess remuneration is offered by the principal in exchange for the agent's commitment to shareholder wealth creation. In this study we evaluated the association between corporate lobbying, chief executive officer remuneration and corporate performance in238 firms traded on the New York Stock Exchange, covering the period 2014-2017. Our regression analyses reveal that corporate lobbying is positively associated with chief executive officer remuneration and negatively associated with corporate performance, suggesting the existence of agency costs resulting from corporate lobbying. In such scenarios, based on our sample, corporate lobbying does not improve performance or generate benefits for shareholders, but serves as a personal and political tool for executive self-promotion. ; Consoante preconiza a Teoria da Regulação Econômica, o lobbying corporativo é considerado um investimento produtivo para as empresas que procuram influenciar a legislação e as políticas públicas. A atividade política corporativa pode gerar benefícios para a organização, porém, na presença de conflitos de agência, essa vantagem é muitas vezes neutralizada pelos custos de agência suportados pelos acionistas. Por vezes, a remuneração excessiva é oferecida pelo principal em troca do compromisso do agente para com a criação de riqueza dos acionistas. Neste estudo, avalia-se a associação entre o lobbying corporativo, a remuneração do Chief Executive Officer e o desempenho empresarial, em 238 empresas com ações negociadas na New York Stock Exchange, abrangendo o quadriênio 2014-2017. As análises de regressão revelam que o lobbying corporativo está positivamente associado à remuneração do Chief ...

This paper aims to empirically verify to what extent the controversies on lobbying regulation are manifested by the opinions of political actors directly involved in the activities of the National Congress, which are interest groups' representatives and legislative advisors of governmental agencies. To this end, we present results of original survey and in-depth interviews. The results point to convergence on the need to regulate lobbying activity and about the positive effects expected to come with regulation. We also find convergence with most regulatory initiatives presented in the Congress. However, differences appear when the most controversial themes are addressed, especially those on accountability and declaration of interest on the part of pressure groups. It thus concludes that the political opinion amongst actors engaged in the representation of interests within the Congress is supportive of the regulations, but some points should be taken to further debate. It is recommended that this debate must not ignore that lobbying is an important mechanism of political participation and that it depends, largely, on the access of different social groups to the constituted power and its representatives.

O artigo analisa interações entre membros do empresariado e o governo brasi­leiro durante o governo Lula, de 2003 a 2010, no âmbito das políticas públicas domésticas e ex­terna nacionais que teriam fomentado as rela­ções com países africanos com vistas a ganhos instrumentais. Defende-se que tanto atores pri­vados quanto estatais, por convergências e/ou associações de interesses, teriam obtido vanta­gens ao trabalhar sincronicamente. Enquanto o setor privado lograria diminuir seus custos políticos e financeiros com investimentos no exterior, o governo brasileiro, paralelamente, poderia utilizar-se desses investimentos priva­dos como meio de expandir sua influência in­ternacional e lograr seus objetivos. Nesse con­texto, foram analisados três casos de empresas brasileiras que realizaram investimentos na África no período indicado. ; The ar­ticle analyses interactions between members of the Brazilian private sector and the Brazi­lian state apparatus during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's two terms as president, from 2003 to 2010, within the domestic and foreign public policies' framework, which would have fomen­ted relations with African countries pursuing instrumental gains. The article supports the thesis that actors from both private and gover­nmental sectors achieves advantages as they emprehend synchronic actions. While the pri­vate sector succeeds in minimizing its opera­tional and political costs in its external invest­ments, the Brazilian government, in parallel, uses such private investments as a means of ex­panding its international influence and achie­ve its objectives. In light of this, three cases of Brazilian companies that invested in Africa during the investigated period, are analyzed. ; The ar­ticle analyses interactions between members of the Brazilian private sector and the Brazi­lian state apparatus during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's two terms as president, from 2003 to 2010, within the domestic and foreign public policies' framework, which would have fomen­ted relations with African countries pursuing instrumental gains. The article supports the thesis that actors from both private and gover­nmental sectors achieves advantages as they emprehend synchronic actions. While the pri­vate sector succeeds in minimizing its opera­tional and political costs in its external invest­ments, the Brazilian government, in parallel, uses such private investments as a means of ex­panding its international influence and achie­ve its objectives. In light of this, three cases of Brazilian companies that invested in Africa during the investigated period, are analyzed.

O presente artigo parte da hipótese de que os retrocessos políticos vividos no Brasil desde o golpe parlamentar de 2016 mostram a tendência ao aumento de poder dos agentes hegemônicos do agronegócio atuantes no país e, consequentemente, a propensão ao agravamento das desigualdades socioespaciais, dos conflitos e da violência no campo e nas cidades. O principal objetivo é discutir o que consideramos alguns dos principais mitos e nós nos quais se escora o agronegócio, uma vez que julgamos que devem ser desfeitos para que possamos trilhar os caminhos para uma sociedade mais justa, igualitária e democrática. A metodologia estruturou-se nos fundamentos da pesquisa qualitativa. Concluímos que as formas-conteúdo do agronegócio são contestáveis e devem ser rejeitadas e substituídas por outras. ; La rédaction du présent article trouve son origine dans l'hypothèse voulant que les régressions politiques vécues au Brésil depuis le coup parlementaire de 2016 montrent la tendance de l'augmentation des pouvoirs des agents hégémoniques de l'agrobusiness en activité dans le pays et, par conséquent, la propension à l'explosion des inégalités sociales et territoriales, des conflits et de la violence à la campagne et dans les villes. L'objectif principal est d'aborder ce que nous comprenons comme étant certains des principaux mythes et nœuds s'appuyant sur l'agrobusiness, étant entendu que nous jugeons qu'ils demandent à être déconstruits afin que nous puissions tracer le chemin d'une société plus juste, égalitaire et démocratique. La méthodologie s'est structurée autour des fondements de la recherche qualitative. Nous concluons que les formes-contenu de l'agrobusiness sont contestables et doivent être refusées et remplacées par d'autres. ; The concept of this article starts from the hypothesis that since 2016's coup d'etat in Brazil political setbacks tend to increase the power of agribusiness hegemonic agents in the country. As a result, urban and rural social-spatial inequalities, conflicts and violence tend to worsen. The main objective is to discuss what is regarded as most supportive myths and nodes of agribusiness. That way, we assume such nodes and myths should be untied and undone, allowing us to tread the path to a fairer, more democratic and egalitarian society. The methodology is based upon qualitative research. As a conclusion, agribusiness "content-shapes" are dubious and should be refused, in order to be replaced by other ones.

Os lobistas são agentes políticos de grande importância, já que operam com o objetivo de influenciar a tomada de decisão de diferentes instituições. Visando melhorar o conhecimento sobre estes grupos de pressão, a presente investigação analisa a composição e o funcionamento dos 745 lóbis espanhóis que se encontram, até à data do estudo, inscritos no Registo de Transparência da União Europeia. Através de uma análise de conteúdo, procurou-se mostrar a relevância e a influência que estes grupos detêm sobre os decisores políticos do Parlamento Europeu. Os resultados mostraram que a categoria formada pelos grupos de pressão das empresas das associações comerciais, empresariais ou profissionais é a mais numerosa, assumindo 50,6% da amostra estudada. Em relação aos indivíduos que dirigem estes grupos, notou-se que são maioritariamente homens, numa proporção que corresponde ao dobro do número de mulheres que desempenham esta função. Por outro lado, observa-se que apenas 8,18% dos lóbis espanhóis dispõem de sede na Bélgica, em comparação com 91,81% que não estão domiciliados no lugar onde se encontra a principal sede administrativa da União Europeia. Tal indica que a atividade de lobbying dos grupos espanhóis ainda é reduzida. ; Lobbyists are political agents of great importance, since they operate with the objective of influencing the decision making of different institutions. In order to improve knowledge about these pressure groups, the present research analyses the composition and functioning of the 745 Spanish lobbies that are, until the date of the study, registered in the Transparency Register of the European Union. Through a content analysis, we tried to show the relevance and influence that these groups have on the European Parliament's political decision-makers. The results showed that the category formed by the pressure groups of the companies of the commercial, business or professional associations is the most numerous, assuming 50,6% of the studied sample. Regarding the individuals who run these groups, it was noted that they are mostly men, in a proportion that corresponds to twice the number of women who perform this function. On the other hand, it is observed that only 8,18% of Spanish lobbies have their headquarters in Belgium, compared to 91,81% who are not domiciled in the place where the main administrative headquarters of the European Union is located. This indicates that the lobbying activity of Spanish groups is still low.