Suchergebnisse

La definición del concepto del lobbying está desarrollándose en paralelo a la exigencia ciudadana de un aumento de la participación y de la transparencia en la toma de decisiones públicas. En esta voz se realiza un acercamiento a la actividad del lobbying considerando la acepción utilizada principalmente por la Unión Europea y en las escasas legislaciones de los últimos años. A pesar de la falta de regulación específica, el lobbying cuenta con una cobertura legal en las democracias representativas como una forma de participación y de defensa de los intereses de los grupos sociales. Sin embargo, este servicio conlleva también riesgos que pueden evitarse incrementado de forma notable la transparencia. El lobbying es influir desde una simetría en el acceso y desde la transparencia, basado en la capacidad para trasladar los mensajes correctos y convencer. Al contar con la opinión de las partes implicadas, las decisiones públicas mejoran así su calidad, pero también su legitimidad. En España está extendiéndose la elaboración de regulaciones sobre lobbying y es previsible que en esta nueva legislatura, con nuevos partidos y con necesidad de negociación y acuerdos, se cree definitivamente un marco normativo para este cauce de participación. Palabras clave Lobbying, influencia, transparencia, participación, políticas públicas, democracia. Abstract The definition of lobbying is being developed in parallel with the public demand for increased participation and transparency in public decision-making. In this definition it is made an approach to lobbying activity considering the meaning mainly used by the European Union and the few laws adopted in recent years. Despite the lack of specific regulation, lobbying has a legal cover in representative democracies as a form of participation and defense of social groups interests. However, lobbying also carries risks that can be avoided significantly increasing transparency. Lobbying is to influence from a symmetry in access to and from the transparency, based on the ability to convey the right messages and convince. Having the opinion of stakeholders involved, quality of public decisions improve, but also its legitimacy. In Spain the development of regulations on lobbying is spreading and it is expected that during this new legislature, with new political parties in need of negotiation and agreements, a regulatory framework for this mean of participation will be definitely created. Keywords Lobbying, influence, transparency, participation, public policies, democracy.

At the end students will be able to:• Compare the differences between influence and lobbying in a democratic and digi-tal context,• Reveal the psychological dimensions of influence and its expansion to digital tools,• Identify the protagonists and their activities,• Elaborate strong arguments relying on data and expert opinions,• Describe the process for elaborating norms and laws,• Discover the public action process, in a parliament as well as in civil society,• Ask ethical and critical questions about lobbying regulations.Course requirements: basic notions on the most important theories of information and communication, and competences in sociology. A good knowledge of actuality is necessary. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Lobbying regulation is a public policy approach capable of enriching participatory democracy while decreasing the dangers of corruption sometimes associated with lobbying. Here we present some insights into the state of lobbying regulations around the world today for scholars, practitioners and for society at large. We discuss the challenges in terms of defining lobbying and its regulation both academically and legislatively. We explore the broad context of lobbying regulation and the range of lobbying registers that have emerged over the years. The motivations for the introduction of lobbying regulations are also considered. The chapter finishes by comparing and classifying the robustness – the level of transparency and accountability – of contemporary lobbying regulations found in various jurisdictions. We will see from this chapter that lobbying regulations constitute part of the broader category of transparency regulations that aim to strengthen confidence in public institutions and enhance democratic accountability.

In this paper we endogenize the number and characteristics of lobbies in a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy where citizens can lobby an elected policy-maker. We find that lobbying always matters. That is, lobbying always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. Moreover, only one policy outcome emerges in equilibrium. An extremist candidate is elected and implements a centrist policy that differs from the one most preferred by the median voter. These results are in contrast with the ones obtained in the context of a citizen-candidate model where lobbies are exogenous.

We analyze informational lobbying in the context of multi-member legislatures. We show that a single decision maker and a decentralized majoritarian legis- lature provide widely di .erent incentives for interest groups to acquire and transmit policy relevant information. The paper also shows a di .erence in the opportunity to a .ect policy through lobbying between a parliamentary legislature and a legislature with low voting cohesion,such as the U.S.Congress.We show that the incentives to lobby a parliamentary legislature are much lower than to lobby Congress.The results provide a rationale for why lobby groups are more active n the U.S.Congress. The key institutional feature to explain the di .erent behavior of lobby groups is the vote of con .dence procedure,which creates voting cohesion in a parlia- mentary system across policy issues.We show that the .exibility of creating majorities in the Congress creates an incentive for interest groups to play an active role in the design of policy in the congressional system,while the voting cohesion in the parliamentary system dissuades interest group 's incentive to engage in information provision.

We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the competitor. We determine the lobbying equilibrium and discuss the resulting emission level. In many cases, a higher effectiveness of private lobbying is detrimental for firms and beneficial for environmental quality, as it induces firms to turn towards excessive amounts of relatively unproductive private lobbying.

A letter report issued by the General Accounting Office with an abstract that begins "Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the reporting of lobbying activities by organizations that have employees who lobby on the organizations' behalf and have the option to report their lobbying expenses under the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 or applicable Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provisions that they use for tax purposes, focusing on: (1) the differences between the LDA and IRC section 4911 and 162(e) definitions of lobbying; (2) the impact that differences in the definitions may have on registration and reporting under LDA, including information on the number of organizations using each definition and the expenses they have reported; and (3) identifying and analyzing options, including harmonizing the three definitions, that may better ensure that the public disclosure purposes of LDA are realized."

Judges who lobby Congress for legal reform tread into an ethical gray area: lobbying is legally permissible, but generally frowned upon. Currently, there are no legal or ethical constraints on judges speaking publicly regarding proposed legislative changes, only an ill-defined norm against the practice. Scholars have largely dismissed judicial lobbying efforts as the result of haphazard, one-off events, driven by the unique interests, expertise, or ideology of the individual judge involved. According to scholars, there is nothing that should be done—not to mention little that could be done—to restrict judges from lobbying. Judicial lobbying occurs, in large part, when Congress proposes jurisdictional changes: judges lobby when the scope of their review may change. Yet, jurisdictional issues raise concerns about the judiciary's biases when it comes to lobbying. To further explore this point, this Article explores the case of specialized courts' involvement in legislative lobbying efforts. Specialized courts have more opportunities to lobby Congress on jurisdiction because any legislative change to the subject matter under the specialized court's purview is likely to alter the court's jurisdiction. This Article argues that in certain instances lobbying by specialized judges ought to be curtailed. Lobbying by specialized courts raises unique issues that may not be present when judges on generalized courts lobby. Namely, specialized court lobbying may sacrifice long-held judicial virtues, including due process and impartiality, virtues which are fundamental to the legitimacy of the judiciary. This Article examines potential solutions to check such lobbying, and offers a partial solution that leverages the wisdom of the judicial branch, as a whole, to minimize those concerns.

Judges who lobby Congress for legal reform tread into an ethical gray area: lobbying is legally permissible, but generally frowned upon. Currently, there are no legal or ethical constraints on judges speaking publicly regarding proposed legislative changes, only an ill-defined norm against the practice. Scholars have largely dismissed judicial lobbying efforts as the result of haphazard, one-off events, driven by the unique interests, expertise, or ideology of the individual judge involved. According to scholars, there is nothing that should be done—not to mention little that could be done—to restrict judges from lobbying. Judicial lobbying occurs, in large part, when Congress proposes jurisdictional changes: judges lobby when the scope of their review may change. Yet, jurisdictional issues raise concerns about the judiciary's biases when it comes to lobbying. To further explore this point, this Article explores the case of specialized courts' involvement in legislative lobbying efforts. Specialized courts have more opportunities to lobby Congress on jurisdiction because any legislative change to the subject matter under the specialized court's purview is likely to alter the court's jurisdiction. This Article argues that in certain instances lobbying by specialized judges ought to be curtailed. Lobbying by specialized courts raises unique issues that may not be present when judges on generalized courts lobby. Namely, specialized court lobbying may sacrifice long-held judicial virtues, including due process and impartiality, virtues which are fundamental to the legitimacy of the judiciary. This Article examines potential solutions to check such lobbying, and offers a partial solution that leverages the wisdom of the judicial branch, as a whole, to minimize those concerns.

with the syllabus, students will be able to:Compare the differences between influence and lobbying in a democratic and digital context,Reveal the psychological dimensions of influence and its expansion to digital tools,Identify the protagonists and their activities,• Elaborate strong arguments relying on data and expert opinions,Describe the process for elaborating norms and laws,Discover the public action process, in a parliament as well as in civil society,• Ask ethical and critical questions about lobbying regulations. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published ; 1

Artykuł prezentuje polityczny i medialny proces formowania niemieckiej opinii publicznej na temat Federacji Rosyjskiej, który przybrał na sile po przyjęciu przez RFN nowej polityki wschodniej. Wraz z początkiem konfliktu ukraińsko-rosyjskiego i wprowadzeniem przez UE sankcji maszyna propagandowa Moskwy dotknęła wszystkie poziomy aktywności rosyjskiej w Niemczech. Ich analiza umożliwiła identyfikację tzw. Russlandversteher oraz instytucjo­nalnych form wzajemnych kontaktów, które mogły mieć wpływ na procesy decyzyjne rządu niemieckiego. Wymieniono również głównych aktorów lobbingu rosyjskiego, których popular­ność może modyfikować percepcję polityki rosyjskiej względem Ukrainy i UE. ; The article presents the political and media process of the formation of the public opinion between Germany and the Russian Federation on the background of increasing the East-West crisis, especially taking into consideration the Neue Ostpolitik that Germany is following. With the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and after the western sanctions were imposed on Moscow, the Russia propaganda machine started to work on every political, economic and media level. The paper analyses its system and mechanism in the context of the dynamically changing international order. The author identifies the German Russlandversteher, defines the most active institutional forms of the German-Russia cooperation and economic contacts under the patronage of both governments that can have influence on decision process of the German government. To the most important actors in the Russian lobbying belong German political par­ties, representatives of the German world of culture, art, media, whose popularity can modify the perception of the Russian politics against the Ukraine and the European Union. ; The article presents the political and media process of the formation of the public opinion between Germany and the Russian Federation on the background of increasing the East-West crisis, especially taking into consideration the Neue Ostpolitik that Germany is following. With the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and after the western sanctions were imposed on Moscow, the Russia propaganda machine started to work on every political, economic and media level. The paper analyses its system and mechanism in the context of the dynamically changing international order. The author identifies the German Russlandversteher, defines the most active institutional forms of the German-Russia cooperation and economic contacts under the patronage of both governments that can have influence on decision process of the German government. To the most important actors in the Russian lobbying belong German political par­ties, representatives of the German world of culture, art, media, whose popularity can modify the perception of the Russian politics against the Ukraine and the European Union.

On May 30, 2019, an unlikely agreement between Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Ted Cruz appeared to take place on Twitter. Ocasio-Cortez tweeted that members of Congress should be banned from becoming corporate lobbyists or should at least be subjected to a waiting period following their congressional service. Ocasio-Cortez cited a statistic from Public Citizen, in which the advocacy group reported that among former Congress members who move to jobs outside of politics, nearly 60% start lobbying or otherwise influencing federal policy. After Cruz weighed in expressing his agreement with Ocasio-Cortez's proposal, Ocasio-Cortez proposed a deal to co-lead a bill with Cruz. Cruz's response? "You're on."

This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions with lobbyists simplify a policymaker's information problem in the presence of unverifiable information provision and allow a solution to their contracting problem. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers' information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker's information problem and financial contributions may actually improve social welfare in comparison to the full information outcome.

The focus of this paper is on individuals' decisions to seek access to influence a legislator's policy choice from a given binary agenda under uncertainty. In the model, influence is exclusively through the provision of information regarding the true state of the world, and money is used exclusively to seek access to the legislator to exert such influence. However, bias can occur through differences in individuals' willingness to contribute to seek access and through choice of argument at the lobbying stage, conditional on access being granted. Among the results are that the decision of moderates (i.e. those with state-dependent induced preferences over the agenda) to seek access is independent of others' decisions, but this is not true of extremists (those who unequivocally favour one or other of the two alternatives); that although the policy preferences of the legislator coincide with those of the moderates, the legislator often sets the required contribution from moderates higher than that from extremists and, moreover, this is so despite the fact that extremists seeking access offer an argument to the legislator which, although informative, gives negligible payoff gains to the legislator; and, finally, that (expected) "bias« in decision making typically exists and persists even when the size of extremist groups is negligible relative to that of the moderate group.

The compromise enhancing effect of lobbying on public policy has been established in two typical settings. In the first, lobbies are assumed to act as 'principals' and the setters of the policy (the candidates in a Downsian electoral competition or the elected policy maker in a citizen- candidate model of electoral competition) are conceived as 'agents'. In the second setting, the proposed policies are solely determined by the lobbies who are assumed to take the dual role of 'principals' in one stage of the public-policy game and 'agents' in its second stage. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that in the latter setting, the compromising effect of lobbying need not exist. Our reduced-form, two-stage public-policy contest, where two interest groups compete on the approval or rejection of the policy set by a politician, is sufficient to show that the proposed and possibly implemented policy can be more extreme and less efficient than the preferred policies of the interest groups. In such situations then more than the calf (interest groups) wish to suck the cow (politician) desires to suckle thereby threatening the public well being more than the lobbying interest groups. The main result specifies the conditions that give rise to such a situation under both the perfectly and imperfectly discriminating contests.