Suchergebnisse

Artykuł prezentuje polityczny i medialny proces formowania niemieckiej opinii publicznej na temat Federacji Rosyjskiej, który przybrał na sile po przyjęciu przez RFN nowej polityki wschodniej. Wraz z początkiem konfliktu ukraińsko-rosyjskiego i wprowadzeniem przez UE sankcji maszyna propagandowa Moskwy dotknęła wszystkie poziomy aktywności rosyjskiej w Niemczech. Ich analiza umożliwiła identyfikację tzw. Russlandversteher oraz instytucjo­nalnych form wzajemnych kontaktów, które mogły mieć wpływ na procesy decyzyjne rządu niemieckiego. Wymieniono również głównych aktorów lobbingu rosyjskiego, których popular­ność może modyfikować percepcję polityki rosyjskiej względem Ukrainy i UE. ; The article presents the political and media process of the formation of the public opinion between Germany and the Russian Federation on the background of increasing the East-West crisis, especially taking into consideration the Neue Ostpolitik that Germany is following. With the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and after the western sanctions were imposed on Moscow, the Russia propaganda machine started to work on every political, economic and media level. The paper analyses its system and mechanism in the context of the dynamically changing international order. The author identifies the German Russlandversteher, defines the most active institutional forms of the German-Russia cooperation and economic contacts under the patronage of both governments that can have influence on decision process of the German government. To the most important actors in the Russian lobbying belong German political par­ties, representatives of the German world of culture, art, media, whose popularity can modify the perception of the Russian politics against the Ukraine and the European Union. ; The article presents the political and media process of the formation of the public opinion between Germany and the Russian Federation on the background of increasing the East-West crisis, especially taking into consideration the Neue Ostpolitik that Germany is following. With the beginning of the Ukraine-Russia conflict and after the western sanctions were imposed on Moscow, the Russia propaganda machine started to work on every political, economic and media level. The paper analyses its system and mechanism in the context of the dynamically changing international order. The author identifies the German Russlandversteher, defines the most active institutional forms of the German-Russia cooperation and economic contacts under the patronage of both governments that can have influence on decision process of the German government. To the most important actors in the Russian lobbying belong German political par­ties, representatives of the German world of culture, art, media, whose popularity can modify the perception of the Russian politics against the Ukraine and the European Union.

"This paper empirically investigates market behavior and firms' lobbying in a unified structural setup. In a sequential game, where firms lobby for regulation before they compete in the product market, we derive a testable measure of lobbying coordination. Applying the setting to the early U.S. cellular services industry, we find that lobbying expenditures, as measured by campaign contributions, and market conduct were consistent with a one-shot Nash equilibrium and that price caps were binding on average. Furthermore, campaign contributions from cellular firms effectively lowered the burden of the price caps and reduced production costs." (author's abstract)

Lobbying dominates corporate political spending, but comprehensive studies of the benefits accrued are scarce. Using a dataset of all U.S. firms with publicly available financial statements, we delve into the tax benefits obtained from lobbying. Firms that spend more on lobbying in a given year pay lower effective tax rates in the next year. Increasing registered lobbying expenditures by 1% appears to lower effective tax rates by somewhere in the range of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points for the average firm that lobbies. While individual firms amass considerable benefits, the costs of lobbying‐induced tax breaks appear modest for the government.

On May 30, 2019, an unlikely agreement between Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Ted Cruz appeared to take place on Twitter. Ocasio-Cortez tweeted that members of Congress should be banned from becoming corporate lobbyists or should at least be subjected to a waiting period following their congressional service. Ocasio-Cortez cited a statistic from Public Citizen, in which the advocacy group reported that among former Congress members who move to jobs outside of politics, nearly 60% start lobbying or otherwise influencing federal policy. After Cruz weighed in expressing his agreement with Ocasio-Cortez's proposal, Ocasio-Cortez proposed a deal to co-lead a bill with Cruz. Cruz's response? "You're on."

This study explains the observed repeated personal interactions between lobbyists and policymakers. The analysis uses a dynamic model of commercial lobbying in which citizens may hire lobbyists to present policy proposals on their behalf to policymakers. It is shown that repeated interactions with lobbyists simplify a policymaker's information problem in the presence of unverifiable information provision and allow a solution to their contracting problem. The welfare implications of these interactions depend on whether the policymakers' information or contracting problem predominates. Further, the policymaker's information problem and financial contributions may actually improve social welfare in comparison to the full information outcome.

AbstractHow do interest groups decide which member of Congress to target when decisions are made collectively? Do lobbying strategies change as legislation advances? Answering these questions is challenging due to a lack of systematic observations of lobbying contacts. I answer these questions using a novel data set constructed from reports submitted by lobbyists on behalf of South Korea regarding its free trade agreement with the United States for 10 years. I show that a diverse set of politicians are contacted but the timing, intensity, and strategy of lobbying contacts vary by politicians' institutional positions as well as their predisposed preferences for free trade.