Suchergebnisse

As with other communist successor parties, Germany's Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) enjoyed a political comeback in the mid-1990s. The PDS's success can be explained by many eastern German voters' disenchantment with the social, cultural, and economic effects of reunification as well as by the distinctive regional and fragmented character of the German Political Party System that allows the PDS, as the self-proclaimed defender of "eastern interests," disproportionate political influence. The PDS is faced with a dilemma, however. In the long-term it will have to become a true all-German party of the left if it wishes to survive electorally. Yet in becoming an all-German party the PDS risks losing the distinctive eastern identity that has been so essential to its success hitherto. ; As with other communist successor parties, Germany's Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) enjoyed a political comeback in the mid-1990s. The PDS's success can be explained by many eastern German voters' disenchantment with the social, cultural, and economic effects of reunification as well as by the distinctive regional and fragmented character of the German Political Party System that allows the PDS, as the self-proclaimed defender of "eastern interests," disproportionate political influence. The PDS is faced with a dilemma, however. In the long-term it will have to become a true all-German party of the left if it wishes to survive electorally. Yet in becoming an all-German party the PDS risks losing the distinctive eastern identity that has been so essential to its success hitherto.

Socialism was born out of the belief in the bright future of mankind. Thus, the utopian vision of classless society occupied the minds of the early communist avant-garde. Yet, such hopes did not survive the initial revolutionary enthusiasm. As the social organization of the 'real socialism' turned out to be a rigid bureaucratic system, the visions of the 'bright future' were replaced by the 'picture of the golden age', namely the image of the revolution itself. Accordingly, rituals commemorating the 'founding fathers of socialism' substituted the ritualized commitments to building the 'ideal society of equals'. The ideological content of socialism vanished. Past memories occupied the present. With the breakdown of communism the present could for a moment release itself from the iron grip of the past. The "envelope of the unhistorical" seemed to be open for the deeds of new reformers. Yet, the present could not escape too far. It was almost immediately caught again either by the past or by the future. In the first case, post-communist nationalisms (Brubaker 1996) monopolized the political field; in the second case, the "scientists of the not yet" (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 1-11) disseminated their neoliberal visions of free-market economy. As a result, the present was defined either in terms of national myths going far back to history or by visions to be realized by imitation of the Western model of capitalism. The focus of this paper is the different paths taken by different countries in the region after the collapse of socialism. The paper distinguishes between the 'nationalizing alternative' as one basic direction, and the 'catching up option' as another one. The paper further argues that this dichotomy itself forms around two clusters of several potential stances which could have been taken in the process of transformations. The goal of the paper is to propose a general framework, with the help of which the interactions 'behind' the political decisions taken by political elites in the post-socialist countries ...

One of few can enjoy the pleasures of living in a time of transition to democracy and have the opportunity to comment on the development and raise critical questions about the future of the Central and Eastern Europe. Editors Kaldor and Vejvoda pose several such questions right at the beginning of their book: Do political systems within CEEC represent a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of the world? Is it possible to talk about a post-communist model sui generis that is influenced by the legacy of communism and at the same time by both the weaknesses and strengths of western democracy? Can we talk about an emergent concept of European Democratic Space [term introduced by editors] as a way of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries and of reinvigorating democracy in Western Europe? ; One of few can enjoy the pleasures of living in a time of transition to democracy and have the opportunity to comment on the development and raise critical questions about the future of the Central and Eastern Europe. Editors Kaldor and Vejvoda pose several such questions right at the beginning of their book: Do political systems within CEEC represent a particular variant of democracy that is specific to this part of the world? Is it possible to talk about a post-communist model sui generis that is influenced by the legacy of communism and at the same time by both the weaknesses and strengths of western democracy? Can we talk about an emergent concept of European Democratic Space [term introduced by editors] as a way of consolidating democracy in Central and Eastern European Countries and of reinvigorating democracy in Western Europe?

The article explores the connections between the performance of the Czech regional governments, the economic development of the regions, & the level of social capital in the regions. Analyses suggest that there is no relationship between regional government performance & the economic performance of the regions, & no relationship between regional government performance & the level of social capital in the regions. Government performance does not appear to be dependent on either of these two factors. Some positive statistical relationships do exist between the level of social capital & the economic performance of the regions. This relationship is stronger when the dynamics of the changes are evaluated -- economic growth in the period between 1995 & 2004 was significantly higher in regions with a higher level of social capital. Analyses also revealed the strong effect of another factor -- the level of human capital as measured by the education of the population -- on all the other observed parameters of the regions. The regions with more educated inhabitants recorded more rapid economic growth, a higher level of social capital, & better performing governments.

European kinship is usually conceptualised as one of the elements that forms the boundary between nature and culture. However, this implicitly assumed biogenetic basis of membership in a particular descent group is not evident in the case of kinship among inhabitants of a Roma settlement. The nature of their kinship can be described as the incorporative process of women and pristašis into descent groups. The fundamental criterion for an expectant partner in marriage is to be 'lačhe' (good, proper, appropriate). The division of people in a Roma settlement into two basic groups (lačhe versus degešis) does not mean that these people form endogamous groups defi ned by procreation. It is rather a matter of moral ideas about what makes people good or bad. Two complementary principles play an important role in these ideas. The first principle relates to the natural base, the second to the process of socialisation. In this respect, fajta does not just refer to a cognatic descent group, but also has another dimension, which cannot simply be defined in terms of procreation and which indicates a shift towards a common basis. This can be demonstrated in the example of pristašis, which is a long-term process of incorporation in which fajta, as the domain of nature, shifts to the frame of culture. Despite of the difficulty of determining whether people were born or socialised into a particular fajta, kinship in a Roma settlement should be studied within the wider organisational complex that on the one hand makes some people related and homogenous and on the other hand excludes other people from this relatedness.

The Middle East has been caught in a cycle of Israeli-Palestinian violence for the last two years. Last year brought some changes that have the potential to bring about a shift in this violent situation. First, within a very short time period two figureheads of the Islamic militant group Hamas were killed by Israelis: the spiritual leader Sheikh Ahamad Yassin & the leader of Hamas, Abdal Aziz Al Rantissi. Second, an important development in the past year was the change in the policy of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. He came up with the so-called "Disengagement Plan," which envisioned the retreat of Israeli settlers from the Gaza Strip. Such a plan was not expected from a settlement-pioneer like Sharon. Third, an event of great importance for the Middle East was the re-election of American President George W. Bush. US diplomacy plays a crucial role in the Middle East. Fourth, probably the most important event in the region was the death of long-time Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. His death will have a strong influence on the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations. The four developments are in the center of this article's analysis. References. Adapted from the source document.

Zsfassung in dt. Sprache u.d.T.: Die Solidarität über die Grenzen hinaus: die Opposition in der ČSSR und in der DDR seit 1968. - Literaturverz. S. 366 - 375