Suchergebnisse

Este artículo desarrolla la hipótesis de que una de las dos corporaciones de los sectores dominantes más relevantes de la historia y la economía argentinas, la Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA), y la Acción Coordinadora de Instituciones Empresarias Libres (ACIEL) contribuyeron a crear un clima destituyente a partir de sus críticas y presiones constantes. La vinculación de sus propuestas y de las políticas efectivamente aplicadas a partir de la dictadura militar de Juan Carlos Onganía da cuenta de lo que constituye un entramado de complicidad cívico-militar que posibilitó y facilitó el derrocamiento del presidente. ; This article develops the hypothesis that, the Unión Industrial Argentina (UIA)-one of the most notable cor- porations in the argentinian economic history-, and the Acción Coordinadora de Instituciones Empresarias Libres (ACIEL) helped to create a climate of dismissal. The linking of their proposals and policies effectively applied from the military dictatorship Juan Carlos Onganía is a proof of the existence of a relationship be- tween economic power and military that made possible the overthrow of the president. ; Fil: Miguez, Maria Cecilia. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Unidades En Red - Conicet. Instituto de Estudios Históricos, Económicos, Sociales e Internacionales; Argentina

Las dictaduras militares de Chile (1973-1990) y Argentina (1976-1983) fueron productoras de exilios políticos masivos. Los retornos de estos exiliados fueron, también, objeto de atención diferente para cada dictadura. El presente artículo analiza en clave comparada cuáles fueron las respuestas o medidas que tomaron los regímenes autoritarios ante la posibilidad de que regresaran sus exiliados. A partir de la comparación, el artículo plantea que los retornos del exilio fueron recursos estatales y estrategias políticas para canalizar conflictos internos y externos que fueron transitando los regímenes autoritarios de la región ; The military dictatorships of Chile (1973-1990) and Argentina (1976-1983) resulted in a large number of exiles. Likewise, the return of these exiles caught the attention of each dictatorship differently. By a comparative approach, the present article analyzes the military dictatorships' answers to the exiles' homecoming. Departing from the comparison, this article posits that exiles' returns were state resources and political strategies to channel internal and external conflicts that were circulating the authoritarian regimes in the region. ; Fil: Lastra, María Soledad. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales; Argentina

Oral history property of University of Utah, J. Willard Marriott Library, Special Collections Department .Photocopy of a typescript transcipt of an oral history with Philip Johnston, conducted on Novemmber 7, 1970. The table of contents indicates that the following topics are addressed: Johnston's background, gospel union, land, trading posts, economics, language, NDAA court case, education, military service, employment, code [Navajo], and military service. Of particular interest is the portion of the transcript that describes Johnston's conception of and involvment with the Navajo Code Talker program. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE: The Navajo Code Talkers Collection (1919-1976, with bulk dates of 1942-1945) documents the development and implementation of the highly successful Navajo Code Talkers program used in the Pacific Theater during World War II. The collection also records Philip Johnston involvement in the development and implementation of this crucial program. Philip Johnston is credited with having conceived the idea of using Native Americans speaking their native language as the foundation for a cryptographic code that could be used to quickly and confidently transmit confidential and sensitive information. The code was never broken by the Japanese and has been attributed with being an integral part of the Allies success in the South Pacific.

Over the past 42 years clay smoking pipes have been excavated from two U.S. army posts, Fort Hoskins (35BE15) and Fort Yamhill (35PO75) and curated at Oregon State University. These two forts were established in Western Oregon in 1856 and by 1866 both had been decommissioned. Numerous theses have focused on the lives of the men assigned to the forts, but none have focused on the clay pipe, a ubiquitous find at many historic sites. This simple object can often communicate information about human social, economic and status cultures. The military forts were restricted environments in which daily activities were restrained. One means in which someone could express their individuality was with a pipe. This thesis examines clay pipes and combines extensive archival research, journals of soldiers stationed at each fort, with comparison data of previous clay pipe research and consultation with experts in the field to help in their identification. The impact of smoking upon the health and psyche of the men within the military milieu of the forts is examined, as is consumer choice, availability of clay pipes and expressions of status. This thesis presents evidence to support definitive and tentative conclusions for the identification of clay pipe manufacturers and conjecture on consumer choice.

South America is a region which is free from nuclear weapons. However, this was not an inevitable development from the relationships among its countries. Indeed, regional rivalries between Brazil and Argentina, with military implications for both countries, lasted a long time. After wwii these countries took part in the race to obtain nuclear technologies and nuclear ambitions were part of the game. In the mid 1980s, the end of military dictatorships and the successful establishing of democratic institutions put an end to the race. Thus regional and national interests in addition to the establishment of democracies in Latin America have been responsible for the building of trust between the two countries. Meaningful international initiatives are once again needed in the framework of worldwide cooperation. This cooperation is better developed when democratic regimes are in place. ; Fil: Freire Jr., Olival. Universidade Federal da Bahia; Brasil ; Fil: Hurtado de Mendoza, Diego Fabian. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad Nacional de San Martín. Escuela de Humanidades. Centro de Estudios de Historia de la Ciencia y de la Técnica "José Babini"; Argentina ; Fil: de Castro Moreira, Ildeu. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro; Brasil ; Fil: de Souza Barros, Fernando. Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro; Brasil

UNTIL recently most of the books by disarmers said little about the dirty business of nuclear strategy and most strategists made only occasional references to the Utopia of disarmament. And so it also was with the actual policies—military vs. disarmament—of the nuclear nations. So long as this split persisted there was little chance of disarmament being seriously considered, and so long as the best military analysts considered nuclear weapons useful and even vital to Western defense—as a great many of them did—there was little hope for nuclear disarmament. But in the last few years this split between armers and disarmers has begun to be bridged by an increasing number of men who analyze from both perspectives at once, and by a shift in the consensus on the specific question of the usefulness of nuclear weapons— a shift largely reflecting the steady increase in Soviet nuclear power. These trends were given a considerable assist from these two excellent works by eminent Englishmen, both of whom assume that nuclear parity (and therefore, they believe, nuclear uselessness) is upon us, and both of whom are concerned with deterrence and disarmament, and how to get from one to the other.

Geopolitical considerations necessitate alliances with Pakistan. Pakistan borders on Russia and China, lies astride the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, and constitutes a bridge, geographically and otherwise, between the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The alliances rest on a firm foundation of common objectives and values that are shared by Pakistan and the United States. The charge that alliances and grant of military aid have generated tension in the areas concerned lacks foundation. To wit, tension in the Middle East has not subsided despite Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact; relations between India and Pakistan have lately improved vastly despite continuance of alliances and military aid. The basic cause of Indo-Pakistan tension is the continuance of the Kashmir dispute. Recent developments on India's northern borders underline the urgency of Indo-Pakistan co-operation to meet a common danger. Pakistan has offered to join with India in defense of the subcontinent. This can be possible only if the Kashmir dispute is settled. Economic progress of new Asian countries is not possible without the assurance of continued security. And alliances provide this assurance. They constitute a shield behind which the standard of living of the peoples of Asian allies can be raised.

The Council of the Baghdad Pact, meeting on the ministerial level, convened in London on July 28, 1958. It was reported that during its two-day meeting, Secretary of State Dulles committed the United States to partnership in the pact with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. The United States' acceptance of obligations expressed in Article 1 of the pact was accompanied by an oral promise to increase military assistance to the three Asian members. According to the press, these two steps were considered "just as good" as signing a treaty. There were two considerations, according to one source, in the procedure adopted by the United States of agreeing to obligations to members of the pact instead of becoming a full member: 1) special military and economic agreements to be made could be made immediately under the joint resolution on the Middle East passed by both Houses of Congress in March 1957; if the United States had joined the pact as a full member, a new treaty would have been involved requiring the Senate's ratification; 2) the United States was not committed to make such special agreements with Iraq, since the latter did not sign the declaration issued by the Council following its meetings on July 28.

Military strategy is of all the human sciences at once the most ancient and the least developed. It could hardly be otherwise. Its votaries must be men of decision and action rather than of theory. Victory is the payoff, and is regarded as the most telling confirmation of correct judgment. There is no other science where judgments are tested in blood and answered in the servitude of the defeated, where the supreme authority is the leader who has won or can instill confidence that he will win.Some modicum of theory there always had to be. But like much other military equipment, it had to be light in weight and easily packaged to be carried into the field. Thus, the strategic ideas which have from time to time evolved have no sooner gained acceptance than they have been stripped to their barest essentials and converted into maxims. Because the baggage that was stripped normally contained the justifications, the qualifications, and the instances of historical application or misapplication, the surviving maxim had to be accorded a substitute dignity and authority by treating it as an axiom, or, in latter-day parlance, a "principle."

In a speech made in Boston, Massachusetts, in 1949, Sir Winston Churchill said, "For good or ill, air mastery today is the supreme expression of military power, and fleets and armies, however necessary, must accept a subordinate rank." This statement comes from a figure of world repute whose strategic instincts are steeped in naval tradition. It has been echoed by President Eisenhower in recent speeches and Eisenhower is a General of the Army. We can therefore take it that modern air weapons are supremely important for all major aspects of contemporary strategy and politics. The big questions are these: In an age when atomic and hydrogen bombs have demonstrated that they can devastate cities and military and naval targets in a way never before experienced, would the heavy bomber and long-range rocket inevitably get through and shatter air defense? Or could prohibitive losses be inflicted again and again on the raiders so that the scale of attack dwindled? And, furthermore, could the United States or the USSR, militarily or economically, sustain a long-range atomic or hydrogen bomb and rocket air offensive? These are indeed $64 questions which are likely to be unanswerable for several years to come.

THE Communist conquest of mainland China may be legitimately viewed as the culmination of a century-long interregnum during which the traditional equilibrium of Chinese society was profoundly disturbed by the Western impact, at a time of dynastic decline. The initial impact of the West was in the nature of a shock treatment administered by the Opium War, the subsequent military defeats, the unequal treaties, and the rise of the whole Treaty Ports system. Thus China's first massive contact with the West was associated with humiliation, bewilderment, frustration, and a sense of inequality. In these terms, then, a constant and continuing struggle for equality has been a hallmark of China's development since 1840.The military and diplomatic defeats suffered by the Chinese made them conscious of the West's technological and industrial superiority. In fact, one of the essential ingredients in China's striving toward equality was economic—expressedin a deep-seated aspiration to catch up, to narrow the gap, and to industrialize. In other words, the Western impact generated "tension between the actual state of economic activities in the country and the existing obstacles to industrial development, on the one hand, and the great promise inherent in such a development, on the other."

Annual Report: The fifth annual report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was released in January 1954, stressed three developments:) the elimination of inflationary trends of recent years;) the improvement of west Europe's balance of payments, both over-all and with the dollar area; and) the continued failure of western European production to expand at a satisfactory rate. After a brief look at the causes and consequences of the first two of these developments, the report turned its attention to the third and concluded that, unless specific proposals were implemented and if world conditions remained generally the same, European production as a whole would increase only slightly, and Europe's exchange reserves were likely to increase. Several factors which led to these conclusions were:) internal demand was not likely to expand without more expansionary policies by governments;) since export earnings of primary producers were not likely to increase, external demand for European production was similarly not likely to increase; and) United States over-all current surplus, exclusive of all military transactions, would be offset by a new military expenditure abroad of $2.5 billion in 1953 and $2.1 billion in the first half of 1954.

Statement of Problem As citizens living under a democratic form of government, we are proud of our system of public education. Indeed we boast of our educational progress from 1864 up to the present. But when we consider the figures on illiteracy among the soldiers during the World War on 1918-1919, our pride falls. On the basis of figures 700,00 draftees of the 24,234,021 draftees called up for military services, were found to be illiterate. Likewise, during 1941, the president of The United States, Franklin D. Roosevelt, instituted a special educational program for the reduction of illiteracy among selective service registrants rejected for military service, because of inability to pass a fourth-grade examination. 1 In 1930, the last year for which comprehensive figures were available, the United States had 4,283,753 illiterates over ten years of age, or 4,3% of that population age. These illiterates came from all parts of the county and from all classes and groups. World War I and World War II helped us to realize some of the defects of our education and the need for greater effort, especially a need for a wider extension of educational opportunity to all.

Even before most of the world was embroiled, the war of 1914 was a world war. Those countries which attempted at the outset to remain aloof from the conflict soon found that, while they might avoid military hostilities, they became parties, whether willing or not, to an economic war, a struggle scarcely less destructive than that which raged on the battlefield. National leaders might will the division of Europe into separate political or military units, but to break the economic ties which linked the warring countries to each other was an infinitely harder task. The truism that the world is economically interdependent, so blandly reiterated today, became grimly apparent in 1914. The demands of war could not be met without the continued exchange of commodities; no country was capable, by itself, of feeding and clothing its population and of supplying its fighting forces with arms and munitions. With the markets of Europe barricaded by belligerent lines, thus cutting off from both sides normal sources of large supplies, the neutral states became factors of immense importance. The war could not go on without the neutral merchant; each belligerent needed him, and a major objective of offense was to prevent the enemy from satisfying that need.

"More arrangements for the Union in Congress." EXCELSIOR. Mexico, D.F. July 8, 1927. Representatives and Senators agree to present a unified front in favor of Obregón. "Another reminder to the Military Chiefs." EXCELSIOR. Mexico, D.F. July 8, 1927. Prohibition of the military from participating in politics if they are in service. GUISA Y AZEVEDO, Jesús. "The Enigma of the Revolution." EXCELSIOR. Mexico, D.f. July 8, 1927. "Example of Revolutionism." EXCELSIOR. Mexico, D.F. July 8, 1927. "Gen. Obregón's candidacy will be favorable to Mexico." EXCELSIOR. Mexico, D.F. July 8, 1927. It will serve to strengthen relations between Mexico and the United States. / "Más Gestiones para la Unión en la Cámara". EXCELSIOR. México, D.F. Julio 8, 1927. Diputados y Senadores se han puesto de acuerdo para presentar un frente único en pro de Obregón. "Otro Recordatorio a los Jefes Militares". EXCELSIOR. México, D.F. Julio 8, 1927. Prohibición a los militares de mezclarse en política si están en servicio. GUISA Y AZEVEDO, Jesús. "El Enigma de la Revolución". EXCELSIOR. México, D.F. Julio 8, 1927. "Ejemplo de Revolucionarismo". EXCELSIOR. México, D.F. Julio 8, 1927. "La Candidatura del Gral. Obregón será favorable a México". EXCELSIOR. México, D.F. Julio 8, 1927. Servirá para estrechar las relaciones entre México y Estados Unidos.