Suchergebnisse

Examines the 1992-1996 siege of Sarajevo to explore how experiences of war influence perceptions about war. A model of "civilian," "soldier," & "deserter" modes of perceiving war is introduced as the basis for social interaction. Each mode is discussed in relation to four domains of social life considered important in war: the character of time; perceptions of social order; legitimation of choices; & group identities. Data were drawn from 1 year of fieldwork during the war, as well as from books & documents written by Sarajevans, foreign diplomats, & journalists. The material is presented in the form of a key narrator who exemplifies how the three modes of perception merge to deal with war experiences. It is noted that the civilian mode of thinking characterizes war as the opposite of peace & the normal way of life, while the soldier mode sees war as an acceptable phenomenon controlled by people, & the deserter mode views violence as part of a life in which lines between war & peace are blurred. Ways in which the modes affect social actions are discussed. 41 References. J. Lindroth

Examines the 1992-1996 siege of Sarajevo to explore how experiences of war influence perceptions about war. A model of "civilian," "soldier," & "deserter" modes of perceiving war is introduced as the basis for social interaction. Each mode is discussed in relation to four domains of social life considered important in war: the character of time; perceptions of social order; legitimation of choices; & group identities. Data were drawn from 1 year of fieldwork during the war, as well as from books & documents written by Sarajevans, foreign diplomats, & journalists. The material is presented in the form of a key narrator who exemplifies how the three modes of perception merge to deal with war experiences. It is noted that the civilian mode of thinking characterizes war as the opposite of peace & the normal way of life, while the soldier mode sees war as an acceptable phenomenon controlled by people, & the deserter mode views violence as part of a life in which lines between war & peace are blurred. Ways in which the modes affect social actions are discussed. 41 References. J. Lindroth

Germany's future contribution to European and allied security depends on the Bundeswehr's ability to harness emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) such as artificial intelligence, 5G/6G cellular network technology, Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite connectivity, and quantum communications and computation. Even amidst Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, Germany continues to be mired in siloed conceptual, institutional, and ethical thinking that results in disconnections between the military and the technology sector, and even between ­Germany and its allies. The Zeitenwende should catalyze not only a defense budgetary increase but a reconciliation between ethics and military requirements regarding EDTs if Germany is to look beyond immediate needs and ensure the Bundeswehr's future ­operational readiness.

The issue of whether war crimes should be considered as a moral, legal, or political category is addressed. It is initially contended that only "crimes against peace" should be considered war crimes since other traditional categories of war crimes (eg, violations of human rights) remain criminal in nature outside the context of war. Moreover, it is claimed that crimes against peace possess specific moral & legal difficulties since defeated parties are generally labeled war criminals. The tendency to equate military success in war with absolution from blame is subsequently questioned on moral & legal grounds; specifically, it is argued that prosecuting those who achieve military victory may infringe on a state's universal right to self-defense. Moreover, the capacity to bring charges of war crimes against parties regardless of the outcome of war is deemed problematic since such reasoning suggests that certain entities have a right to victory during war. Consequently, it is maintained that only aggressor states that are defeated during war can legitimately be prosecuted. It is concluded that prosecutions of parties accused of committing war crimes ultimately constitutes a political act. J. W. Parker

Examines the argument that major interstate war is in decline as a policy option & interrogates the notion of a post-World War II "discontinuity." Kant's purported pacifism & cosmopolitanism are problematized, as is modern political & military scholarship contending that major-power war is becoming obsolescent. The technological deterrent is also examined, as are the rise of the international system, global economic & political development, & multilateral norms, laws, & ethics. The decline of major war depends on some basic social & global transformations; this thesis therefore contradicts the notion that major-power war can vanish in the absence of significant alterations in root human & social conditions. K. Coddon

The issue of whether morally unjustifiable means (ie, war crimes) can be used by state military forces to accomplish morally justifiable ends in times of war is contemplated. It is contended that human rights impose certain constraints on the means & ends of wartime behavior. Consequently, crimes that violate human rights committed against aggressor forces are deemed morally permissible since the perpetrators were attempting to violate the human rights of the defenders. However, two categories of war crimes that essentially violate human rights are identified: actions in which (1) aggressor states attempt to dominate other groups for purposes of self-aggrandizement regardless of such groups' human rights & (2) military forces inflict unnecessary injury (eg, rape & torture) on subjugated groups. It is claimed that justifiable ends realized through the use of unjustifiable means cannot be morally legitimized. It is concluded that international law has a moral responsibility to establish guidelines for preventing & punishing violations of human rights during times of war. J. W. Parker

An exploration of state violence in Brazil draws on interviews conducted in 1993 with 14 police officers who had engaged in torture &/or murder during Brazil's military period, including Sergio, a Sao Paulo official whose four decades of police service covered years in intelligence. The various branches of Brazil's civil & military police forces are described. Sergio's emphatic denial of personally carrying out torture & his contention that the bad behavior of police officers can be controlled by rational officials illustrates the complex moral assumptions involved. He justified torture carried out under his command by suggesting that it was acceptable if it was controlled by a competent police official &/or performed for a "just cause," such as saving a child's life. Four key explanations came out in interviewee accounts of torture in which they participated: diffusing responsibility to other official bodies; blaming victims or perpetrators; citing just causes for the actions; & citing professional imperatives. The relationship of discursive content to societal conditions is discussed. Excerpts from the interviews are included. 1 Table. J. Lindroth