Suchergebnisse

A brief review of some recent European Union (EU) monetary & trade history (from the 1970 Treaty of Luxembourg to the recent Greek declarations), in which problems & successes of various kinds (eg, accession of new member states, the juste retour of the UK) have been matched by new methods of raising revenue. As tariffs & trade barriers disappeared throughout the EU, other revenues (external trade tariffs, VAT, etc) have increased in importance. Three milestones in recent EU economic history are former British Prime Minister Thatcher's disputes with the EU over trade & currency issues in the early 1980s, Maastricht, & the 1999 Council of Europe, in which current financing standards were agreed upon. 4 Tables. A. Siegel

Ten years ago, now, the Eurozone began to shake on its foundations. This article traces the genesis of the crisis and the present state of affairs. As to the causes of the global financial crisis in 2008, I argue that contrary to common understanding, the financial crisis had its deeper causes in a decades old tendency towards crisis in the real economy, produced by the continuous overaccumulation of capital which can only return profits by undertaking speculative short-term investments (a phenomenon known as 'financialisation'). I then trace how the global financial crisis morphed into a crisis of public deficits and debt in 2010-2011, particularly in the Eurozone. Three factors are shown to be responsible: financialization, design faults in the European monetary union, and the neo-mercantilist strategy of especially Germany and the Netherlands. The paper next looks at the five main traits of the policy responses in the Eurozone: bailing out governments and banks through creating emergency funds; imposition of austerity and budget discipline for member state governments; attempting to create and complete a Eurozone banking union; subsequently the European Central Bank engaged on an unprecedented scale in 'quantitative easing'; and finally, institutional reform in an attempt to repair the most pressing design faults of the EMU. The paper concludes that the underlying structural factors leading up to the crisis have only been addressed incompletely: the overaccumulation of capital continues, the completion of the banking union is in an impasse, quantitative easing has mostly just intensified financialization by pushing up asset prizes, and institutional reform has taken the form of a fundamentally undemocratic attempt at monetary and political union by stealth. The broader legitimacy of the European project has been substantially undermined, and Europe is not in a better position than eight years ago in case of a new global crisis.