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We thank the four anonymous referees whose comments substantially helped to improve this paper. We thank Anna Attlee and Althea Davies who helped to facilitate the research workshops; Anna Attlee also for helping to analyse the qualitative data. We thank all the participants of our study for their effort, and the Marine Conservation Society, the British Sub-Aqua Club and the Angling Trust for assisting with participant recruitment. This work was funded through the UK National Ecosystem Assessment Follow-On (Work Package 6: Shared, Plural and Cultural Values), funded by the UK Department of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Welsh Government, the UK Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), and Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC); additional funding was received from the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation through the Marine Conservation Society. J.O. Kenter was also supported by the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agreement no 315925 and K.N. Irvine by the Scottish Government Rural and Economic Sciences and Analytical Service (RESAS) Division. ; Peer reviewed ; Publisher PDF

International audience ; Prostitution regimes in the EU-28 include prohibition, regulation and abolition; economics literature tackles this typology from the perspective of both free sex work and forced labour trafficking. We review the data sources on the demand-side and the supply-side in order to gauge how large is the sex market and informal employment for sex workers. We calculate Estimates 1A and 1B from miscellaneous sources, whereas HIV prevalence among sex workers from World Health Organisation provides Estimates 2A and 2B. We calculate Estimate 3 from victims of sexual exploitation trafficking according to data collected by the UNODC and Eurostat. We design an OLS model to test the five Estimates of prostitution in EU-28 according to GDP per capita, legislation, supply-side and demand-side variables. Last, we assess which might be the most likely Estimates as regards GDP enhancement in 2010, with respect to National Accounts adjustment for illegal production and consumption expenditure. Hence, we come up with a lower bound Estimate that may be used as a benchmark for macroeconomic policy.

International audience ; Prostitution regimes in the EU-28 include prohibition, regulation and abolition; economics literature tackles this typology from the perspective of both free sex work and forced labour trafficking. We review the data sources on the demand-side and the supply-side in order to gauge how large is the sex market and informal employment for sex workers. We calculate Estimates 1A and 1B from miscellaneous sources, whereas HIV prevalence among sex workers from World Health Organisation provides Estimates 2A and 2B. We calculate Estimate 3 from victims of sexual exploitation trafficking according to data collected by the UNODC and Eurostat. We design an OLS model to test the five Estimates of prostitution in EU-28 according to GDP per capita, legislation, supply-side and demand-side variables. Last, we assess which might be the most likely Estimates as regards GDP enhancement in 2010, with respect to National Accounts adjustment for illegal production and consumption expenditure. Hence, we come up with a lower bound Estimate that may be used as a benchmark for macroeconomic policy.

The euro is a new currency, and the ECB as a new institution still has to establish its reputation. The best way to do this is for the ECB to deliver a stable money. The two-pillar strategy pursued by the ECB seems to confuse the markets because market participants are unclear about which of the two pillars is the dominating one. The ECB will have to rethink its strategy and move more in the direction of the monetary targeting approach. A central bank cannot have two nominal anchors for its currency, both the internal price level and the external value of a currency. Admittedly, a low external value may translate into inflationary expectations or expectations on further depreciations. These effects cannot be neglected by the ECB. Therefore, it has to factor in the impact of depreciation on the future price level. Member countries of the common currency area may free ride on the common currency. Although a Minhas Gerais problem in the European Monetary Union is unlikely, countries with high indebtedness may put pressure on the ECB to follow a rather lax monetary policy characterized by low interest rates and a (slightly) higher inflation rate than the one anticipated by financial markets. The stability pact has to shield the ECB against such pressures. National economic policies in the three major continental countries, Germany, France, and Italy, have severe difficulties in establishing the necessary institutional conditions in the national labor markets for a smooth functioning of the common currency. Interest groups in the member countries will defend their political position and will resist necessary institutional changes. Wage policy should be decentralized and not europeanized. Employment policy should not be europeanized either. In attracting new members, care must be taken not to increase the heterogeneity of the monetary union. This relates to the candidates for new EU membership; they will need the exchange rate for quite some time. For the UK, only a short time window in which the business cycle in the UK and that in EMU are in a similar phase will allow entry. Two types of conflict have to be distinguished: "Type-1 conflict" is a conflict between the monetary authority and politics on the weight that should be assigned to a stable money or to other targets. "Type-2 conflict" is a conflict between national political decision-making and the europeanized monetary policy in the case of a major national economic crisis. The worst case that can be envisioned for the new monetary arrangement is a fundamentally divergent economic situation in a major country while at the same time the other economies in the rest of euroland are doing fine. An ingredient of such a scenario would be a major national crisis, for instance a homemade crisis due to severe policy failure. Such a major crisis will be the real test for the euro. Politics has to accept the depolitization and the denationalization of the common monetary policy. Relying on goodwill may not be sufficient to solve potential conflicts. Mechanisms have to be developed that make sure that goodwill is not the only basis for withstanding a major crisis. One way is to change the democratic set-up of political decision-making by giving more weight to European aspects. This raises severe questions which relate to the political concept for Europe and its federal structure, to the issue of a European constitution, and to the very basic question whether a European sovereign — a European people — is beginning to exist. Another approach is to create a European audience for the ECB's policy as well as for economic policy issues in general. Establishing a European Council of Economic Advisers is a step in this direction.

In light of the failed negotiations with Greece, Jan Krahnen argues that an effective reform agenda for Greece can only be designed by the elected government. Fundamental reforms will take time to take full effect and euro area member states will, in the meantime, have to offer Greece a basic level of economic security. Krahnen demands that policy makers and the professional public involved view the Greek crisis as an opportunity to take the next necessary steps to formulate a reform agenda for the European Monetary Union. A community of supranational and non-party researchers and intellectuals could take the initiative and in a structured process develop a trustworthy and realistic concept that drafts the next big step towards a political union of Europe, including elements of a fiscal union. ; Mit Blick auf die gescheiterten Verhandlungen mit Griechenland, argumentiert Jan Krahnen im vorliegenden Policy Beitrag, dass eine zielführende Reformagenda nur von der gewählten Regierung Griechenlands formuliert werden kann. Die Euro-Staaten müssten Griechenland für die Zeitdauer einer Restrukturierungszeit eine Grundsicherung zusagen. Die EU-Staaten fordert Krahnen dazu auf, aus der Griechenlandkrise die notwendigen Konsequenzen zu ziehen. Auch die Eurozone brauche eine effektive Reformagenda. Die Verschuldungsdynamik innerhalb der Währungsunion, deren Auswüchse am Beispiel Griechenlands besonders deutlich werden, könne bei fehlendem guten Willen nur durch eine politische Union und eine in sie eingebettete Fiskalunion aufgelöst werden. Krahnen argumentiert, dass ein Weiterverhandeln über Restrukturierungsauflagen aus der derzeitigen verfahrenen Situation nicht herausführen wird. Entscheidend sei, ein mehr oder weniger umfassendes Paket zu schnüren, das Elemente eines teilweisen internationalen Haftungsverbunds mit Elementen eines partiellen nationalen Souveränitätsverzichts verbindet.

This paper investigates the issue of real and nominal economic convergence of transition economies in two distinct ways: i) within their own groups as in Koèenda (2001) and ii) to the European Union (EU). We extend Koèenda's study not only by using a more stable period (post-93) but also by employing a more recent panel estimation approach developed by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) (1997), which offers less restrictive assumptions about convergence by allowing heterogeneity in the convergence rates than previous panel unit root techniques. Relaxing the assumption of homogeneity in convergence rates yields less convergence in price level and money supply variables than reported by Koèenda. Again using the IPS method, we extend the investigation to examine the convergence of the first and second round candidate economies to EU standards. We find that the first-round candidates have made significant progress in monetary policy convergence with respect to EU and there is significant real convergence between the first round candidate economies and EU, but not for the second round candidate countries. The results have important implications for full EU membership preparations by these countries, including the choice of an optimal interim exchange rate policy.

In March 2018, representatives of member countries of the African Union signed the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. This agreement provides a framework for trade liberalization in goods and services and is expected to eventually cover all African countries. Using a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium model based on Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014), we estimate the welfare effects of the AfCFTA for 45 countries in Africa. Three different model specifications-comprising both perfect competition and monopolistic competition-are used. Simulations include full elimination of import tariffs and partial but substantial reduction in non-tariff barriers (NTBs). Results reveal significant potential welfare gains from trade liberalization in Africa. As intra-regional import tariffs in the continent are already low, the bulk of these gains come from lowering NTBs. Overall gains for the continent are broadly similar under the three model specifications used, with considerable variation of potential welfare gains across countries in all model structures

"With the international monetary system dominated by the USA, by the European Monetary Union and Japan, all important decisions on monetary policy will continue to be taken within the G 7 framework. For the foreseeable future the IMF will have to content itself with a role that is essentially geared to ensuring the monetary stabilization of the developing and newly industrializing countries, and especially of the emerging economies. The emphasis here is on four
areas of responsibility: Monetary forum: Regardless of the special role played by the G 7, the IMF should be developed into the world's main monetary forum. Only if the newly industrializing and developing countries are appropriately involved in the reform of the international financial architecture can the IMF live up to its claim to universality. In these circumstances, the establishment in the autumn of 1999 of the G 20, in which the leading industrialized and newly
industrializing countries are represented, counteracts the planned upgrading of the IMF's International Monetary and Financial Committee. Economic and monetary advice for its members countries will continue to be one of the IMF's principal tasks in the future. It is the most important contribution the IMF makes to crisis prevention. The IMF should be given the
mandate of an 'enlarged information policy', enabling it in specific cases to inform the public about critical developments in a country or even to issue a warning if it becomes clear that the government concerned is unwilling to take action against serious undesirable developments in its own country. Greater discipline over a country's economic policy might then be maintained through the markets. The financing facilities are the IMF's most important instrument in the management of financial and monetary crises. However, they form an extremely complex, bureaucratic system of arrangements, which has also lost its inner logic with the passage of time. Apart from the existing credit facilities and a new crisis facility that covers all kinds of crisis, all the facilities should be completely abandoned. The same applies to the Poverty Reduction and Growth
Facility. The scope of the credit facilities should be increased accordingly, and terms of maturity should be determined flexibly to suit the nature and magnitude of the balance-of-payments problems. The IMF should expand its service functions, some of which it is already performing. They include the preparation of statistics, analyses and assessments, technical cooperation with developing countries and countries in transition and mediation, as in relations between creditors and debtor countries at the time of debt crises." (excerpt)

This paper investigates the appropriate exchange rate regimes, both prior to and following European Union accession, for those former centrally planned Central and Eastern European countries that are currently candidates for full membership in the European Union (1). The exchange rate regime is a key determinant of a country's macroeconomic stability, which is in turn a key determinant of the investment climate. The choice of exchange rate regime is therefore of great relevance to all who are interested in the transition process. It now seems likely that as many as eight out of the ten candidate countries from the EBRD's region of operations will become EU members by early 2004, in time to participate in the EU Parliamentary elections of June 2004. Further delays beyond 2004 are, however, certainly possible, as enlargement has effectively become contingent on the success of internal reforms in the EU. Inadequate reforms of European institutions may also pose obstacles to successful EU candidates that wish to join European Monetary Union (EMU) at an early date. The body making monetary policy in the European Central Bank (ECB) is the Governing Council. It currently has 18 members - six Executive Board members and 12 national central bank governors, one for each of the 12 EMU member countries. Formally, all 18 members have equal weight in the decision making process. Eighteen members are already too many from the point of view of effective discussion, deliberation and collective decision-making. Enlarging an unreformed European Central Bank (ECB) to include ten new members would turn the current 18 member ECB Governing Council into an unwieldy, indeed unmanageable group (2).

First made available online in 2018 ; First made available online in 2018 ; History is unpredictable. 1992 was to crown eight years of hard labour of the Community institutions, with the completion of the internal market and the launching of the European Union. Instead, the Community has been caught in one of the most severe crises it has ever had to face. The rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish people and the narrow victory of the "yes" vote in the French referendum have shown that European integration was meeting with stronger resistence than expected at national level, while the monetary crisis of mid-September has cast a shadow on the prospects for monetary union. In this difficult situation, the subsidiarity concept appears as a cure for all the problems now faced by the Community. Today's political discourse is replete with references to the spirit an letter of subsidiarity. Encouraged by its recognition in the Maastricht Treaty, the Community institutions have engaged into a discussion on how such a principle could be given effect. The expectation seems to be that this will help the Community to steer a new course in the years to come. Yet there is still no clear understanding of the actual scope of the subsidiarity principle, nor of the ways in which it could be used by the Community institutions. The aim of this article is to contribute to the debate on these two issues. Before examining the merits of the discussion, it is however useful to analyse the reasons that have led to the insertion of subsidiarity in the Treaty on European Union.

In this work, Richard E. Mshomba offers an in-depth analysis of economic integration in Africa with a focus on the East African Community (EAC), arguably the most ambitious of all the regional economic blocs currently in existence in Africa. Economic Integration in Africa provides more than just an overview of regional economic blocs in Africa; it also offers a rich historical discussion on the birth and death of the first EAC starting with the onset of colonialism in the 1890s, and a systematic analysis of the birth, growth, and aspirations of the current EAC. Those objectives include forming a monetary union and eventually an East African political federation. This book also examines the African Union's aspirations for continent-wide integration as envisioned by the Abuja Treaty. Mshomba carefully argues that maturity of democracy and good governance in each country are prerequisites for the formation of a viable and sustainable East African federation and genuine continent-wide integration

Introduction 1. Birth Of A Nation The Road To Independence-- Nationhood, Its Costs And Consequences-- A Unified Country Breaks Down, 1963-64-- 2. Forever Divided? The Turkish Invasion And Its Aftermath-- A Final Hope? The Annan Plan, 2002-2004 3. The Financial Crisis Spreads To Cyprus The Single Currency And International Finance-- Akel: An Easy Target For Blame? Greece, The Psi, And Sacrifice Of Cyprus-- Greek Fallout In Cyprus-- Casino Economics And Political Games-- From Bailouts To Bail-In 4. Bailouts And Bail-Ins The Cyprus Experiment-- International Reactions To The Bail-In-- The Piraeus Asset Transfer-- Austerity, Banking And Housing Bubble Parallels-- Cyprus And The Politicised 'Russian' Connection 5. The Cypriot Recovery And Strategic Challenges Banking Confidence And The Eurozone-- The Rapid Recovery Of Cyprus-- Natural Gas And The Strategic Conflict With Turkey 6. Bail-In And The Future Of The Eurozone A Dream Undone? Monetary Union: Stability Or Systemic Weakness? Conclusion Bibliography

Luigi Einaudi (1874-1961) was a leading liberal Italian economist, economic historian and political figure: Governor of the Bank of Italy, Minister for the Budget and President of the Italian Republic. He was a prolific writer in all fields and his writings testify to his outstanding contribution to economics during his long career. He is best know for his work on public finance and the study of the principles of taxation, although he also focused on money and banking. Throughout his career Einaudi argued the economic and political case for European unity, anticipating the need for a common market and monetary union. His writings on political and economic liberalism are enlivened by a down-to-earth conception of the market and grounded in extensive historical and institutional knowledge. This is the second book in a three volume collection of Einaudi's works, which have been made available in English for the first time.