This book explains the political background and describes the decision-making leading to European Monetary Union, as seen by a former central banker who participated in the process during more than two decades. Political rather than economic considerations were decisive in establishing EMU. French-German relations in particular form a thread that runs through the book, notably French efforts to replace German monetary domination by a form of decision-making France can influence. Thus, the issues involved are issues of power, though often presented in technical terms of economics.
Establishing a single currency will launch the EU on a journey into the unknown. Thus while it is widely accepted that the fall-out from this decision will be far-reaching, little consensus exists on the impact on particular policy arenas. This article explores some of the main implications of monetary union for Social Europe-national systems of welfare pro vision and employment regulation. It is argued that efforts by virtually all the member states to meet the Maastricht criteria for joining the single currency club are impacting negatively on Social Europe. Moreover, with the member states signing a deflation-oriented Stability Pact, this cold climate threatens to spill over into the actual operation of the new Euro- zone. Thus the road to monetary union paved by Europe's political elite spells bad news for already beleaguered welfare and employment systems. At the same time, the article argues that a different form of monetary union is necessary to create more robust macroeco nomic foundations to Social Europe. At present, it is suggested that a big coordination deficit has emerged inside the European economy, causing an inhospitable environ ment for the social dimension in the absence of a single currency. Thus retreating to national mechanisms for economic management is rejected as an alternative project to the Maastricht plan for monetary union. Finally, the article investigates the viability of various reform paths to make the new Euro-zone more socially friendly.
No doubt the monetary measures taken by the Government of the Federal Republic on May 10 have caused quite a stir. The question is: Can the European economic and monetary union still be achieved, in spite of the German measures?
This book studies the coexistence of inflation and unemployment in a monetary union. The focus is on how to reduce the associated loss. The primary target of the European central bank is low inflation in Europe. The primary target of the German government is low unemployment in Germany. And the primary target of the French government is low unemployment in France. The European central bank has a quadratic loss function. The same applies to the German government and the French government. The key questions are: To what extent can the sequential process of monetary and fiscal decisions reduce the loss caused by inflation and unemployment? Is monetary and fiscal cooperation superior to the sequential process of monetary and fiscal decisions?
A comprehensive study of the international coordination of economic policy in a monetary union. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on competition between the union central bank, the German government, and the French government. Similarly, as to policy cooperation, the focus is on cooperation between the union central bank, the German government, and the French government. The key questions are: Does the process of policy competition lead to full employment and price stability? Can these targets be achieved through policy cooperation? And is policy cooperation superior to policy competition? Another important issue is monetary competition / monetary cooperation between Europe and America
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, sovereign default risk and the zero lower bound have limited the ability of policy-makers in the European monetary union to achieve their stabilization objective. This paper investigates the interaction between sovereign default risk and the conduct of monetary policy, when borrowers can act strategically and they share with their lenders a single currency in a monetary union. We address this question in an endogenous sovereign default model of heterogeneous countries in a monetary union, where the monetary authority may be constrained by the zero lower bound. We uncover three main results. First, in normal times, debtors have a stronger incentive to default to induce more expansionary monetary policy. Second, the zero lower bound, or constraints on monetary policy may act as a disciplining device to enforce repayment of sovereign debt. Third, sovereign default risk induces countries with a preference for tight monetary policy to accept a laxer policy stance. These results help to shed light on the recent European experience of high default risk, expansionary monetary policy and low nominal interest rates. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
At present the biggest threat to the monetary union is posed by the anti-European political parties. These parties call for their countries to leave the union. They are thriving especially in countries with slower economic growth and high unemployment rates. The best remedy against them is to increase economic growth and thus reduce the unemployment rate in their home countries. The measures taken to achieve this need to be systematic, rather than merely temporary patches. In peripheral and semi-peripheral economies, undercapitalised banks and the lower competitiveness of domestic producers are slowing down growth. The correct measures to address these problems include banning dividend payouts by undercapitalised banks and creating minimum standards for competitiveness.
This book explores the new economics of monetary union. It carefully discusses the effects of shocks and policies on output and prices. Shocks and policies are country-specific or common. They occur on the demand or supply side. Countries can differ in behavioural functions. Wages can be fixed, flexible, or slow. In addition, fixed wages and flexible wages can coexist. Take for instance fixed wages in Germany and flexible wages in France. Or take fixed wages in Europe and flexible wages in America. A special feature of this book is the numerical estimation of shock and policy multipliers. Further topics are inflation and disinflation. Take for instance inflation in Germany and price stability in France. Then what policy is needed for disinflation in the union? And what will be the dynamic effects on Germany and France?
All pillars of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) have unleashed an array of measures to transform the economy towards climate neutrality. With the Green Deal, the strategy review of the European Central Bank (ECB), and the growing body of sustainable finance legislation, climate considerations have entered the traditional mandates governing the conduct of financial, fiscal, and monetary policy. The cross-sectional nature of climate issues reinforces the interdependence and coordination of EMU policies. This article explores changes to EMU architecture and discusses the institutional and legal implications of the novel role of climate in the coordination of EMU policies. It addresses the relationship between Treaty mandate and policy leeway, specifically the way in which the ECB extends its focus on price stability to account for climate considerations and the fiscal legal framework relies on flexibility to incentivize climate investment. It also tracks the emergence of climate stability as an EMU concept, adding to existing concepts of price, fiscal and financial stability. EMU, ECB, monetary policy, financial policy, fiscal policy, climate change, sustainable finance, greenflation, policy coordination
Supranationalist and liberal‐intergovernmentalist theoretical accounts of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) largely ignore geopolitical factors. This article argues that geopolitical factors are of vital importance for explaining and understanding EMU. It does this by examining the role of such factors at five crucial moments of the EMU process: (1) the launching of EMU in 1988–89; (2) the uncertain year following the opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989; (3) the final decisions on EMU taken at the December 1991 Maastricht summit; (4) the ratification and currency crises of 1992–93; and (5) the efforts to implement EMU after the treaty's final ratification in October 1993. A focus on geopolitics, it is argued, fits within a historical‐institutionalist account of European integration.
If the plans concerning EMU will be realised, by 2002 national currencies will be replaced by the Euro and national central banks will be partially replaced by the European Central Bank. The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union starts with the argument that EMU is more a political than an economic project. It develops this theme by addressing five different questions. First, precisely what is the general role of EMU in the globalising political economy? Second, how EMU will change the power relations and the relationship between `political' and `economic'? Third, what effects will EMU have on generally accepted values - including for example efficiency, self-determination, and democracy? Fourth, how does the EMU-related politics of symbols - including money - take part in constructing political identities? And last, but certainly not least, what effects EMU will have on the social and political dimension of the Union and thus also on its legitimacy? The politics of EMU includes many dimensions. The book tries to explain the hegemony of the neoliberal and German vision of Europe in the context of recent development in the global political economy. It assesses the consequences of this hegemony and the possibility for alternatives from a variety of perspectives. In many chapters, it is also argued that the legitimation problems of the Union may turn into an acute crisis also because of EMU. We should expect an actualised crisis to lead to a transformation of the Union