Suchergebnisse

This paper argues that steps towards a Political Union dictated by major ambitions in terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy continue to be, for various reasons, a mirage. and as Germany, at the pre-Lisbon Treaty discussions, as never shown willingness to change the balances from Maastricht regarding the economic and Monetary Union, it was also not in that area that one would be expecting significant institutional progress. However, suddenly, coming from nowhere, the so-called sovereign debt crisis, in this last domain, will determine an inevitable revision of the European treaties. Adapted from the source document.

The euro has been tested by the emergency of the economic & financial crisis that begun in 2007. The impact on the single currency was so strong that is common to doubt its endurance as the currency of the European economies. With the increasing of the current crisis & the differences within the eurozone two questions emerge: if the single currency is a reasonable project & if is a stable & durable project. Adapted from the source document.

Examines the principal macroeconomic challenges for the country as a member of the European Union, focusing on anti-inflationary credibility, fiscal discipline, economic stabilization, structural reforms, and unemployment; Portugal.

This article is about the Euro crisis. It intends to present a small contribution concerning the political interests that guided member states on the issue of monetary cooperation, since the so-called "Snake" to the European monetary system, and later on the creation of the Monetary Union. Then it concentrates on the Euro crisis, trying to identify the interests that prevailed on what was done by the area countries to overcome the current crisis, and also on what remains to be done. It ends up with a brief reflection on the political effects of the crisis on the EU balance of power. Adapted from the source document.

This paper aims to discuss the proposal for monetary union in Mercosur in the light of the theory of Optimal Currency Area (OCA). It shows that there is no evidence that macroeconomic convergence can be reached in Mercosur, since the area only minimally achieved some basic criteria defined by the OCA literature. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

The assumptions and lessons from the main theories of European integration (neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism) are depicted in order to understand their explanatory potential for the creation and evolution of Economic and Monetary Union. Since both theories come from international relations theories, their restrictions on the context of European integration are obvious. Notwithstanding both theories explain different moments of European monetary integration, they need to be supplemented by other theoretical approaches that capture the particularisms of European integration. Thus, the role of ideas, the awareness of the Europeanisation of politics, and the influence of powerful epistemic communities come to the surface. Adapted from the source document.

In Portugal, as in most other European Union (EU) countries, the challenge of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has worked as a mechanism for economic stabilisation. However, the political consensus on the participation in EMU did not develop with respect to the need for implementing structural reforms and abolishing many of the policy distortions affecting the economy and to other goals of European integration, such as environmental quality, consumer protection or internal social cohesion, all of them pre-conditions for long-term development. Moreover, the objectives of EMU price stability and sound public finances were also not internalised in that consensus, although they were behind some crucial policy decisions, such as to join the EMS in 1992. During the entire macroeconomic convergence phase European monetary reform was regarded as an unavoidable external constraint that went together with an exogenous political objective. It was only due to the political consensus on not being left out of the EU core that the necessary consensus could be maintained to pursue a policy compatible with the objective of EMU participation throughout the heights of the European recession in Portugal (1993/94), the electoral year of 1995 and the two first years of a new legislature (1996/97) with a minority Government of a different political colour. This lack of internal objectives and economic and political strategy of integration surfaced and the political and social consensus broke once Portugal had joined EMU upon its inception. ; This paper is part of an FCT research project on Economic Growth, Convergence and Institutions (research grant POCI/EGE/55423/2004, partially funded by ...