Suchergebnisse

L'arrêt du 21 juin 2016 du Tribunal constitutionnel fédéral allemand constitue le dernier épisode d'une longue saga, au cours de laquelle cette juridiction et la CJUE se sont opposées sur la question de la conformité au droit de l'Union de l'action de la BCE lors de la crise des dettes souveraines et, par voie de conséquence, sur celle d'une mutation constitutionnelle tacite du mandat de cette dernière. Dans son arrêt, le Tribunal constitutionnel fédéral confirme la conformité du programme monétaire Outright Monetary Transactions de la BCE au droit de l'Union et à la Loi Fondamentale allemande mais n'en maintient pas moins de « sérieuses objections » à l'encontre de son homologue européenne, entretenant ainsi la possibilité, perceptible également dans d'autres États membres de l'Union (France et Belgique notamment), d'une confrontation ouverte entre juridictions constitutionnelles nationales et CJUE ; The German Federal Constitutional Court judgment of June 21th 2016 is the last episode of a long saga in which the FCC and the CJEU have been opposed each other regarding the compliance with European Union Law of the European Central Bank (ECB)'s action during the sovereign debt crisis and, consequently, concerning the existence of a tacit constitutional mutation of the ECB's mandate. In its decision, the Federal Constitutional Court confirms the conformity of the ECB's monetary program (Outright Monetary Transactions) with EU law and German constitutional law, but maintains nevertheless some "serious objections" against the CJEU's position, thus nourishing the possibility – also perceptible in other EU Member States (France and Belgium in particular) – of an open confrontation between national constitutional courts and the CJEU. ; Peer reviewed

Monetary search theory implies that the real effects of inflation via its impact on price dispersion depend on the level of search costs and, thus, on the level of market integration. For less integrated markets, the inflation-price dispersion nexus is predicted to be asymmetrically V-shaped which results in an optimal inflation rate above zero. For highly integrated markets with low search costs, however, the impact of inflation on price dispersion should only be small. Using price data of the European Union member states, this paper is the first that tests and confirms these predictions of monetary search theory.

International audience ; Background In order to support the case for intersectoral policies to tackle health inequalities, we have explored the economic costs of socioeconomic inequalities in health in the European Union, Methods Using recent data on inequalities in self-assessed health and mortality covering most of the European Union, we calculated the health losses due to socioeconomic inequalities in health by applying a counterfactual scenario in which the health of those with lower secondary education or lower (roughly 50% of the population) would be improved to the average level of health of those with at least higher secondary education. We then calculated various economic effects of those health losses: health care costs, costs of social security schemes, losses to Gross Domestic Product through reduced labour productivity, and the monetary value of total losses in welfare. Results Inequalities-related losses to health amount to more than 700,000 deaths per year, and 33 million prevalent cases of ill-health, in the European Union as a whole. These losses account for 20% of the total costs of health care, and 15% of the total costs of social security benefits. Inequalities-related losses to health reduce labour productivity and take 1.4% off GDP each year. The monetary value of health inequalities-related welfare losses is estimated to be €980 billion per year, or 9.4% of GDP. Conclusion Our results suggest that the economic costs of socioeconomic inequalities in health in Europe are substantial. As this is a first attempt at quantifying the economic implications of health inequalities, the estimates are surrounded by considerable uncertainty, and further research is needed to reduce this uncertainty. If our results are confirmed in further studies, the economic implications of health inequalities warrant significant investments in policies and interventions to reduce them.

This paper argues that Capital Markets Union - the EU's attempt to establish a more marketbased financial system - is a result less of financial policymaking than of macroeconomic governance in a politically fractured polity. The current governance structure of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) severely limits the capacity of both national and supranational actors to provide a core public good, macroeconomic stabilization. While member states have institutionalized fiscal austerity and abandoned other macroeconomic levers, the European polity lacks the fiscal resources necessary to achieve stable macroeconomic conditions: smoothing the business cycle, ensuring growth and job creation, and mitigating the impact of asymmetric output shocks on consumption. Capital Markets Union, we argue, is an attempt by European policymakers to devise a financial fix for this structural capacity gap. Using its regulatory powers, the European Commission, supported by the European Central Bank (ECB), seeks to harness private financial markets and instruments to provide the public policy good of macroeconomic stabilization. We trace how technocrats, think tanks, and financial-sector lobbyists, through the strategic use of knowledge and expertise, established securitization and market-based finance as solutions to EMU's governance problems. ; Woher rührt das politische Streben in Brüssel nach einer Kapitalmarktunion und damit nach einem stärker marktbasierten europäischen Finanzsystem? Dieser Aufsatz legt dar, dass es sich nicht in erster Linie um ein finanzmarktpolitisches Projekt handelt, sondern um ein Projekt makroökonomischer Steuerungspolitik innerhalb eines fragmentierten Mehrebenensystems. Die Struktur der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (EWU) beschneidet Steuerungskapazitäten auf der nationalen Ebene, ohne sie auf der supranationalen Ebene zu stärken. National verordnete fiskalische Austerität in Kombination mit dem Verlust anderer Steuerungshebel haben in der Eurozone ein institutionelles Umfeld geschaffen, in dem die notwendigen fiskalischen Ressourcen zur Gewährleistung stabiler makroökonomischer Bedingungen fehlen - allen voran Konjunkturglättung und Wachstumsförderung. Das Projekt Kapitalmarktunion, so unser zentrales Argument, ist der Versuch europäischer Entscheidungsträger, diese strukturelle Kapazitätslücke mit den zur Verfügung stehenden regulativen Mitteln zu füllen. Konkret versucht die Europäische Kommission, unterstützt durch die Europäische Zentralbank, das öffentliche Gut makroökonomischer Stabilität über den Umweg privater Finanzmärkte und Finanzinstrumente zu erreichen. Im Rahmen einer detaillierten Prozessanalyse zeichnen wir nach, wie Technokraten, Think Tanks und Finanzlobbyisten Wissen und Expertise mobilisierten, um Kreditverbriefung und marktbasierte Finanzierung als Lösungen für die Steuerungsdefizite der EWU zu etablieren.

Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA). Examines causes and consequences of the Jan. 1994 CFA Franc parity change; cooperation with European Union countries, origins of the bank crisis, Mali's financial sector, and impact on the Cameroonian economy; 5 articles. Text in German and English; summaries in English and French.

AbstractIn the context of the Eurozone crisis this paper re‐examines the Hard ECU using the concepts of the macroeconomic trilemma and the political trilemma. We find that the Hard ECU would have been less economically and politically damaging than the euro. We conclude that it was a superior approach to monetary union.

This paper aims to discuss the proposal for monetary union in Mercosur in the light of the theory of Optimal Currency Area (OCA). It shows that there is no evidence that macroeconomic convergence can be reached in Mercosur, since the area only minimally achieved some basic criteria defined by the OCA literature. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

The Delors Committee's three stage plan for attaining European Economic and Monetary Union has met with heavy criticism and has given rise to various counter-proposals. The following article examines the relative merits and shortcomings of the Delors Plan and the alternative concepts presented by the Deutsche Bundesbank and the British Government.

This study is structured around the observation of a gap between the pursuit of apolitical project of a federal nature, the single currency, and implementation tools based onbelonging to a centralized state, the ante budgetary control. This situation results first of lackof trust between them, but the use of tools unsuitable for purpose generates numerousmalfunctions and feeling, for lack of a sufficiently strong association of national parliaments ofa "power of Brussels" seeking to assert itself against the will of the states and their peoples.three texts were introduced [the "six pack", the "Two pack" and the Treaty on Stability,Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG)] in EuropeanUnion economic coordination that are no longer only indicative and the possibility for the EUto indicate to the structural reforms that these countries must undertake in areas that do notbelong to the field of competence of the European Union raised for the jurist many questionson both the doctrinal foundations of the European Union and on the institutional mechanismsimplemented. ; Cette étude est structurée autour du constat d'un hiatus entre la poursuite d'unprojet politique de nature fédérale, la monnaie unique, et une mise en oeuvre reposant surdes outils appartenant à un état centralisé, le contrôle budgétaire à priori. Cette situation,résulte d'abord du manque de confiance entre les Etats mais l'utilisation d'outils inadaptés aubut poursuivi génère de nombreux dysfonctionnements. Le fait de confier par trois ensemblede textes [le « six pack », le « Two pack » et le Traité sur la stabilité, la coordination et lagouvernance au sein de l'Union économique et monétaire (TSCG)] à l'union européenne unecoordination économique qui ne soit plus uniquement indicative et la possibilité, donnée àcette dernière, d'indiquer aux Etats les réformes structurelles que ces derniers doivententreprendre, dans des domaines qui n'appartiennent pas au champ de compétences del'Union européenne, soulève pour le juriste de ...

n this paper, I analyze the pros and cons of implementing structural reforms of the labor market in booms vs. recessions, in light of considerations of social efficiency, political viability, and macroeconomic fine tuning. While the optimal timing of a reform depends on the relative importance of several conflicting effects, it seems clear that a reform should be accompanied by an expansionary macroeconomic policy. This makes structural reform more problematic in the context of the European Monetary Union.

The mechanism of euro functioning is analyzed in the article from the standpoint of limiting the autonomy of monetary authorities of the European monetary union members, which precludes them from manipulating national currency for the short sighted political interests and postponing painful structural reforms under crises aimed at liberalizing the economy. In some aspects euro excels the classical gold standard, which fell under monetary nationalism attack in the 1930s. Motives and arguments of critics and adversaries are analyzed and the reasons for euro defense are exposed. Real economic and social problems of Europe and ECB errors are described.

The strong state and the free economy: German ordoliberalism, political theology and European democracy -- Free economy as political practice -- Democracy and freedom: on authoritarian liberalism -- Economic constitution and social order: on the freedom of complete competition -- Social policy: from the class society to the enterprise society -- European and the idea of subsidiarity: on the elements of ordoliberalism -- European monetary union: economic constitution and ordnungspolitik -- Authoritarian liberalism and the euro: on the political theology of the executive state