Suchergebnisse

U radu se razmatraju osnovni aspekti Lutherova i Calvinova shvaćanja morala, posebno u povezanosti s pojmom (moralne) individualizacije kao ključnog etičkog određenja. Također, razmatra se i pitanje uloge reformacijskog učenja u razgradnji srednjovjekovne »moralne slike svijeta«, kao i posljedice koje je ono izazvalo u političkom i ekonomskom smislu. ; This paper deals with the fundamental aspects of Luther's and Calvin's understanding of morality, particularly regarding the notion of moral individualisation as a key ethical definition. Additionally, the question of the role of Reformation teachings in the degeneration of the medieval "moral picture of the world" is also being considered, as well as the consequences it caused in the political and economic sense.

Članak nastoji rasvijetliti tendencije suvremene etizacije u različitim područjima života, od gospodarstva i tehnike do znanosti i politike, s posebnim naglaskom na pravnu domenu. Ključno je pitanje: kako se danas masovno nabujala etizacija svijeta života odnosi prema načelu odvajanja prava i morala te prema vladavini prava kao minimuma morala u društvu? Teoretsko je polazište za ovo razmatranje Thomasiusova podjela naravnoga prava na honestum, decorum i iustum te Kantova dihotomija metafizičkih temelja nauka o pravu i kreposti u Metafizici ćudoređa. Taj je okvir upravo vrhunac prosvjetiteljskih nastojanja za strogim odvajanjem sfere zakonitosti i moralnosti. Postavlja se u tom sklopu pitanje, potkopavaju li suvremene etičke tendencije prosvjetiteljsko naslijeđe zaštite ljudskih prava. Na temelju takva dihotomna modela dalje se raščlanjuje utjecaj nedavne ekspanzije profesionalnih, medicinskih, znanstvenih, poslovnih i drugih oblika etike, masovno uspostavljanje etičkih povjerenstava, politička korektnost i djelovanje javnoga mnijenja na okvir ljudskih temeljnih sloboda. Za ilustraciju prikazana su dva ogledna primjera iz Hrvatske – normativni nedostaci etičkoga kodeksa i zloporaba etičkoga tijela u političke svrhe. U zaključku se obrazlaže kako suvremena etizacija može donijeti dobre plodove promicanjem ćudorednih pitanja i pravne zaštite. Međutim, ona ne smije prekoračivati granice i potkopavati vladavinu prava. Razdvajanje morala i prava znatna je baština demokratske ustavne države. Neobuzdana i preobilna etizacija raznih sfera, međutim, može biti pogubna za dobro uređenje i blagostanje u suvremenom, sve više pluralističkom i multikulturnom društvu. Primjerenije je stoga da o pravu sude nepristrani sudci i neovisni sudovi, držeći se u pravorijeku stoljećima izborenih i utvrđenih mjerila pravednosti; oni to zacijelo čine znatno pravednije nego što bi to činili provizorni etički odbori i ad hoc imenovani povjerenici. Etika se može baviti unutarnjom stranom djelovanja i moralnim maksimama. No, etičke maksime nisu uvijek vezane uz izvanjsku pravnu prisilu. O toj bitnoj razlici, koju bi svako društvo trebalo pažljivo razgraničiti i propisati, ovisi u bitnome ostvarenje ljudske slobode u njezinoj punini. ; This paper seeks to shed light on the trends of contemporary ethicisation in various areas of life, from business and technology to science and politics, with special emphasis on the legal domain. The key question is: how does nowadays immensely enlarged ethicisation of the lifeworld relate to the principle of separating legality from morality and the rule of law as the minimum of moral in the society? Theoretical framework for this analysis is Thomasius' division of natural law into honestum, decorum and iustum, as well as Kant's dichotomy of the metaphysical foundations of the doctrine of law and virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals. This framework represents the pinnacle of the demand of the Enlightenment era for a separation of the spheres of legality and morality. The question is raised as to whether contemporary ethical tendencies undermine the legacy of the Enlightenment regarding the protection of the human rights. Based on this dichotomous model, the impact of the recent expansion of professional, medical, scientific, business and other forms of ethics, the massive establishment of ethics committees, political correctness, and the mediation of public opinion on the framework of human fundamental freedoms is further elaborated. By way of illustration, two exemplary case studies from Croatia are presented—the normative flaws of a code of ethics and the misuse of an ethical body for political purposes. The conclusion elaborates how contemporary ethicisation can produce good results by promoting legal issues and legal protection. However, it should not exceed the limits and undermine the rule of law. The separation of morality and law is an important legacy of the democratic constitutional state. The unbridled and extensive ethicisation of various spheres, though, can be devastating to good order and well-being in the contemporary increasingly pluralistic and multicultural society. Therefore, the impartial tribunals should judge by the centuries-old and established standards of justice; they do it more equitably than the provisional ethical committees and the ad hoc appointed commissioners would. Ethics may continue to deal with the inner side of action and maxims. Nevertheless, the ethical maxims are not always bound to external compulsion. The full realisation of human freedom depends on this essential distinction, which every society should carefully determine and regulate. ; Cet article vise à faire la lumière sur les tendances de l'éthisation contemporaine dans divers domaines de la vie : des affaires et technologie à la science et politique, en mettant un accent particulier sur le domaine juridique. La question clé est la suivante : quel est le rapport entre l'éthisation contemporaine du monde de la vie, massivement accrue, avec le principe de la séparation entre le droit et la morale et la primauté du droit en tant que minimum de morale ? La présupposition de départ pour cette réflexion est la division par Thomasius de la loi naturelle en honestum, decorum et iustum, ainsi que la dichotomie par Kant des fondements métaphysiques de la doctrine du droit et de la vertu dans la Métaphysique des Mœurs, ledit cadre représentant le comble de l'exigence des Lumières pour une séparation stricte entre les sphères de la légalité et de la moralité. La question se pose de savoir si les tendances éthiques contemporaines nuisent l'héritage des Lumières de la protection des droits de l'homme. Sur la base de ce modèle dichotomique, une analyse plus profonde est fournie ayant pour but de démontrer l'impact de l'expansion récente des formes de l'éthique professionnelle, médicale, scientifique, des affaires et autres, de la mise en place massive des comités d'éthique, de la rectitude politique et de la médiation de l'opinion publique. A titre d'illustration, deux études sur des cas exemplaires en Croatie sont ici traitées: les faiblesses normatives d'un code d'éthique et l'abus d'un organe éthique à des fins politiques. En conclusion, il est montré que l'éthisation contemporaine peut porter ses fruits en promouvant les questions morales et la protection juridique. Cependant, elle ne doit pas dépasser les limites de le régime du droit et le nuire. La séparation entre la morale et le droit est un héritage important de l'Etat constitutionnel démocratique. L'éthisation effrénée et étendue à divers domaines peut néanmoins être dévastatrice pour le bon ordre et le bien-être dans la société contemporaine de plus en plus pluraliste et multiculturelle. Par conséquent, les juges impartiaux et les tribunaux indépendants devraient juger selon les normes de la justice séculaires et bien établies ; ils le font de manière plus équitable que le feraient le comité d'éthique provisoire ou les commissaires nommés ad hoc. L'éthique peut continuer à traiter du côté intérieur des actions et des maximes. Néanmoins, les maximes éthiques ne sont pas toujours liées à la contrainte juridique extérieure. De cette distinction essentielle, que chaque société devrait déterminer et réglementer avec soin, dépend avant tout la réalisation de la liberté humaine dans sa plénitude. ; Dieser Aufsatz versucht, die Tendenzen der zeitgenössischen Ethisierung in verschiedenen Bereichen des Lebens, von der Wirtschaft und Technik bis hin zur Wissenschaft und Politik, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rechtsdomäne, zu beleuchten. Die Schlüsselfrage lautet: Wie verhält sich die heutige massiv angewachsene Ethisierung der Lebenswelt zum Grundsatz der Trennung von Legalität und Moralität sowie zum rechtsstaatlichen Postulat des Rechts als des Minimums der Moral in der Gesellschaft? Als Rahmen für die Untersuchung dient die Aufteilung des Naturrechts in honestum, decorum und iustum bei Thomasius, ferner Kants Dichotomie der metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechts- und Tugendlehre in der Metaphysik der Sitten, wo als Höhepunkt die aufklärerische Forderung nach einer strengen Scheidung der Sphäre der Legalität von der Moralität untermauert wurde. Es wird die Frage erörtert, ob zeitgenössische Ethisierungstendenzen das aufklärerische Erbe der Verteidigung der Menschenrechte untergraben. Ausgehend von diesem dichotomischen Modell wird erörtert, welche Auswirkungen die jüngere Ausweitung der Ethik im Berufsleben, in Medizin, Wissenschaft, Geschäftsbeziehungen sowie sonstige Formen der Ethik, ferner die massiven Gründungen von Ethikkommissionen, die politische Korrektheit und die öffentliche Meinungsbildung auf den Rahmen der menschlichen Grundfreiheiten haben. Zur Veranschaulichung werden zwei Fallbeispiele aus Kroatien angeführt: die normativen Mängel eines Ethikkodexes und der Missbrauch eines ethischen Gremiums zu politischen Zwecken. Abschließend wird festgestellt, dass die zeitgenössische Ethisierung gute Früchte tragen kann, sofern sie die Rechtsfragen und den Rechtsschutz fördert. Aber sie darf dabei nicht die Grenzen überschreiten und den Rechtsstaat untergraben. Die Trennung von Moral und Recht ist ein wichtiges Erbe des demokratischen Rechtsstaates. Die ungezügelte und extensive Ethisierung verschiedener Sphären kann indessen für die gute Ordnung und das Wohlleben in der heutzutage immer ausgeprägteren pluralistischen und multikulturellen Gesellschaft verheerend sein. Daher mögen lieber unparteiische Richter und unabhängige Gerichtshöfe nach den in vielen Jahrhunderten errungenen und bewährten Maßstäben der Gerechtigkeit urteilen; sie tun dies gerechter, als es provisorische Ethikkomitees und ad hoc ernannte Beauftrage je tun würden. Die Ethik mag sich weiter mit dem inneren Bereich des Handelns und den Maximen befassen. Die ethischen Maximen sind aber dem äußeren Zwang nicht immer verpflichtet. Von dieser wesentlichen Unterscheidung, die jede Gesellschaft sorgfältig bestimmen und reglementieren sollte, hängt die Verwirklichung der Menschenfreiheit in ihrer Fülle ab.

This paper examines some of the main assumptions on which the IR theory of political realism is based. According to the theory of political realism, national interest and not morality is the main criterion by which the state acts in its foreign affairs. In its first part this article examines three arguments in support of realists' skepticism towards morality in international relations. In the second part the concept of national interest and the possibility of its application as the main criterion in choosing the state action in international relations are examined. The author argues that the only plausible version of morality is universal morality based on respect for fundamental human rights. Realists' view of morality at the international level cannot be defended in a convincing manner. Still, the theory of political realism provides valuable insights about the nature of international morality and the limits of its application. Adapted from the source document.

Nenad Miscevic's Nationalism and Beyond: Introducing Moral Debate about Values (New York: CEU Press, 2001) is reviewed. Of the book's three parts, part 1 describes nationalism as a political program; part 2 discusses the relationship between culture, identity, & tradition; & part 3 proposes cosmopolitanism as an alternative to nationalism. The review focuses on Miscevic's debunking of the intellectual, political, cultural, & moral arguments advanced by proponents in favor of nationalism; the various arguments are presented & Miscevic's criticism is supported. It is concluded that the author's ethical-political argumentation against nationalism is very convincing, but his treatment of the relationship between the individual & society seems to be too general & perfunctory. 2 References. Z. Dubiel

The great story of don Quijote is the first novel in the literary West which attempts to restore the lost gestures (of mercy, chivalry, generosity, morality, & politicality as common interest), or rather bring them within the range of remembrance of the new epoch. Or, in the words of G. Agamben, "it tries for the last time to evoke that which threatens to elude it forever." The insanity of the epoch is manifest primarily through the insanity related to "loss of control over the gestures"; thus a demented gesticulation with absolute gestures of power becomes a universal symptom. It is precisely to this insanity of his time that the insane don Quijote responds with imagined or imaginary pure gestures of pure chivalry. This is the code of don Quijote's insanity: everyone claims that he alone is insane, but no one is aware that they themselves have fallen into the trap of insanity. The historical events testify to this fall into insanity, to the forgetting of every genuine chivalrous gesture, first & foremost towards adversaries, women, children, the elderly & the politically deprived. The end of religious tolerance is connected with the collapse of chivalrous idealism. The unhappy or lost mankind has lost its gestures of chivalry, morality & politicality, & this is the hour of the cruel world of outright political violence. The center of this world of dismay is the court as "the court of death," as the image of "evil giants" & "colossuses" which it sends forth from its deadly womb as the sole life-forces. Presently the court spreads the seed of wizardry as the seed of death to all corners of the world, as well as all arbitrary powers, from wizarding to nuclear, both in the present & in the future. Adapted from the source document.

In the wake of the 'Kant revival,' which has spawned a plethora of works on his philosophy by its contemporary interpreters & advocates such as Herbert Schnadelbach, Hans Lenk, Konrad Cramer, Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, Volker Gerhardt, Karl-Otto Apel, Otfried Hoffe & others (whose studies were published this year under the title of Kant in der Diskussion der Moderne), the author tries to prove, by means of an analysis of Kant's treatise Uber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fur die Praxis, that not only did Kant in his later works draft & expound the program of a practical philosophy of morality & right, politics, & history, but also that in the last three chapters of this work, this philosophy evolves into a modern liberal theory of morality, state law, & international or "international civil" law built around the central principle of Kant's practical philosophy: "Was aus Vernunftgrunden fur die Theorie gilt, das gilt auch fur die Praxis.". Adapted from the source document.

Kant's philosophy in its entirety outgrew its Humeist heritage of rational empiricism, ie, relativism. This relativism is particularly unwelcome in the realm of morality -- hence his philosophy of a priori concepts. Since law, as the minimum of morality, would be invalidated by the political (value) relativism, Kant has no politics apart from law -- specifically civil, Roman law -- which he declares natural (& absolutely rational). Roman private legal principles are the axiomatic foundations on which a structure of deductional theorems of political reasoning is erected. Ubi ius ibi remedium is the central principle, which serves to deny & circumvent rights -- including the right to revolt -- that would make up a set of political supra "rights." In the age of enlightened absolutism -- a schematic derivative of the philosophy of rationalism -- government ceased to be diffuse. Its bearers became too unequivocal, & the whole system turned into a highly visible & assailable target. For Kant (as well as for Hobbes), anarchy is the worst form of tyranny. While Montesquieu & Rousseau sought refuge from tyranny in the diffusion of power, & Raynal & Mably claimed that the right to resist oppression is not only the ultimate remedium but a civil duty, Kant (long before the French revolution & Burke) considers as nonpermissible not only the right to resist oppression but also that against revolutions instigated by legitimate sovereigns. Adapted from the source document.

The debate on this topic began in the 1950s in the texts by Patrick Devlin. Devlin argued that for the sake of its stability the community has the right to impose moral standards by means of law in relation to those actions that breed intolerance, anger & disgust. Devlin's arguments are challenged on several grounds. First, Hart's argument is accepted, that there is no direct connection between such moral attitudes & the stability of a community. Second, Devlin's foundations of morality are rejected. & finally, an alternative model of the stability of community is taken over from Rawls' social contract theory. References. Adapted from the source document.

The author analyzes the reinterpretation of the 17th-century English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) offered by contemporary American philosopher Gregory S. Kavka. The state of nature, the social contract (pact), the forming of the very first state, & the problem of compliance to its newly formed government are discussed. The question arises of how it is possible to make a social contract because it is still a "state of nature contract," & in these conditions, contracts do not oblige adherence while there is yet no one to punish rebellion or disobedience. (Rather, the state should be a result of that contract.) Another question concerns the possibility of establishing morality in the state of nature, because no authority is formed there, & therefore a moral code & positive law system are nonexistent. The author claims (together with Kavka) that, in spite of the fact that there exists no entire moral code, the possibility of elemental traces of morality exists, because morality & nature (from humanistic outlook) are timeless, as is the state of nature as well. 4 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author describes the spiritual climate at the time of the publication of Rawis' A Theory of Justice (1971) & describes its huge impact on the political philosophy of the 20th century. Then he analyses Rawls' acknowledgement of Kant. First he depicts Rawls' formulation of his original position along the lines of Kant's idea of the autonomy of the individual & the categorical imperative. There might be some problems with the possible convergence of Rawls' economism & Kant's moral position. According to Rawis, the original position parties may express their nature, but at the same time they belong to the intelligible world. Raws has tried to overcome this divergence from Kant's concept in his paper Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory by means of distinguishing between the rational & the full autonomy, from which the author concludes that Rawis was inclined to adopt a certain version of utilitarianism. According to the author, Rawis' attempt to bridge Kant's rigorous distinction between the law & the morality by means of his sense of justice is entirely alien to Kant. Hence there is an unbridgable chasm between Kant & Rawis, which does not mean that Rawis' attempt at using Kant's categories in the design of democratic societies is insufficiently legitimate. 71 References. Adapted from the source document.

The author looks into the meaning of law in Kant's practical philosophy for the constitution of a political community. First, he defines the specific character of modern knowledge by referring to Heidegger & Fink & how this knowledge is reflected in Kant's philosophy of morality & law. Then he goes on to define the external legislation & list its applications. After the author has defined Kant's concept of law, he shows how freedom & its security -- not happiness, well-being, or interest -- are central to Kant's political philosophy. Freedom becomes the foundation of all activities & laws, & freedom can only be based on law & not morality. Thus, individual freedom is possible solely within a law-abiding community. Adapted from the source document.

The author outlines the chief features of the constructivist moral conception in its Kantian variant & argues that such a moral conception had been unjustifiably looked over in relation to the traditional moral conceptions such as utilitariarism, intuitionism & perfectionism. The central idea of Kantian constructivism is linking certain notions of the person & principles of justice that should regulate basic social institutions by means of the constructivist procedure. The author's starting point is the conception of moral persons as free & equal. He claims that an appropriate connection among thus perceived persons & the first principles of justice is established in such a way that the first principles are chosen under reasonable conditions in which individuals possess solely such qualities. The reasonable conditions consist of the symmetrical situatedness of the "choosers," the veil of ignorance (which obscures the morally irrelevant features of persons' attributes) & the publicity condition. The author's goal is to reach a proper viewpoint on the basis of which citizens are to judge their fundamental social institutions & in that way achieve consensus on the need for & the direction of their reform. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines some of the main assumptions on which the IR theory of political realism is based. According to the theory of political realism, national interest and not morality is the main criterion by which the state acts in its foreign affairs. In its first part this article examines three arguments in support of realists' skepticism towards morality in international relations. In the second part the concept of national interest and the possibility of its application as the main criterion in choosing the state action in international relations are examined. The author argues that the only plausible version of morality is universal morality based on respect for fundamental human rights. Realists' view of morality at the international level cannot be defended in a convincing manner. Still, the theory of political realism provides valuable insights about the nature of international morality and the limits of its application. Adapted from the source document.