Hat der Multilateralismus noch eine Zukunft?
In: Berichte / Forschungsinstitut der Internationalen Wissenschaftlichen Vereinigung Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik (IWVWW) e.V, Band 11, Heft 111, S. 1-5
ISSN: 1022-3258
In: Berichte / Forschungsinstitut der Internationalen Wissenschaftlichen Vereinigung Weltwirtschaft und Weltpolitik (IWVWW) e.V, Band 11, Heft 111, S. 1-5
ISSN: 1022-3258
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In: Sirius: Zeitschrift für strategische Analysen, Band 4, Heft 3, S. 258-275
ISSN: 2510-2648
ZusammenfassungMultilateralismus charakterisiert die deutsche Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik seit ihren Anfängen in sehr spezifischer Weise. Der Beitrag erarbeitet anhand einer Begriffsklärung diese Besonderheiten und gibt einen Überblick über die Voraussetzungen, die historische Entwicklung, die spezifischen Ausprägungen und die Ergebnisse dieser Politik seit Gründung der Bundesrepublik. Der Beitrag kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Bundesrepublik Deutschland auch in Zukunft über keine Alternative zu einer multilateralistischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik verfügt, diese jedoch vor neuen und besonders schwierigen Herausforderungen steht, weil etliche der Rahmenbedingungen, die Deutschlands Außenpolitik in der Vergangenheit so erfolgreich agieren ließen, nicht mehr bestehen oder zumindest gefährdet erscheinen.
In: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft: IPG = International politics and society, Heft 4, S. 120-137
"Der Zusammenbruch der Doha-Welthandelsrunde stellt nicht nur die Institution WTO in Frage, sondern die Funktionsfähigkeit der multilateralen Ordnung, des Systems der 'Global Governance'. Er ist Symptom einer tiefen Krise der globalen (Wirtschafts-)Ordnung und auch der bilateralen und multilateralen Entwicklungspolitik, der es über Jahrzehnte nicht gelungen ist, arme Länder als lebensfähige Wirtschaften in den Weltmarkt zu integrieren." (Autorenreferat)
In: Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 69-92
ISSN: 2414-3197
In: Forschungsjournal Soziale Bewegungen: Analysen zu Demokratie und Zivilgesellschaft, Band 35, Heft 4, S. 653-664
ISSN: 2365-9890
Zusammenfassung
Die Welt steht vor einer unvorhergesehenen Krise mit dem Auftreten mehrerer regionaler Konflikte und dem Einmarsch Russlands in die Ukraine. Vor diesem Hintergrund erörtert dieser Artikel, wie Europas Sicherheit sich nach dieser Krise entfalten könnte. Er unterstreicht hierbei, dass die gegenwärtigen Herausforderungen für den europäischen Sicherheitsdialog die europäischen Staaten dazu auffordern, gemeinsam mit der OSZE die diplomatischen Beziehungen und die Zusammenarbeit zu stärken. Die Situation in Europa und dessen enge zwischenstaatliche Verflechtung betont zudem die Notwendigkeit und den Bedarf an Reformen, besonders im Sicherheitsbereich. Ferner ist es von entscheidender Bedeutung, sich in den Friedensbemühungen auf historische Entwicklungen zu stützen. In Anbetracht der aktuellen Situation werden die Lehren aus den Helsinki-Vereinbarungen und die Stärkung bestehender Rahmenwerke sich als entscheidend erweisen bei der Förderung von Frieden sowie von regionaler und internationaler Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit. Die Rolle der zivilgesellschaftlichen Organisationen ist hierbei von zentraler Bedeutung, da sie eine Fülle wertvoller Informationen und Forschungsanalysen bereitstellen, die einen entscheidenden Beitrag dazu leisten, Anliegen von Konflikten betroffener Regionen und der internationalen Gemeinschaft als Ganzes zu enthüllen und zu berücksichtigen.
In: IW-Analysen 11
With the inauguration of Joe Biden, the United States once again extends its hand to - relieved but wary - traditional partners and embraces the concept of strategic competition with Russia and China. The European Union sees more room for cooperation especially with China, which may, however, come with significant long-term costs. The hardening of fronts between democratic and authoritarian countries seems likely.
Even though the US wants to "earn back its position of trusted leadership," the EU and other partners have become wary of the North American country's reliability, as the political forces that brought Donald Trump to the presidency remain strong. Further, even though the US is pushing for a tougher stance against China, the EU is rather divided and has vested interests in continuing cooperation.
China and Russia have become increasingly aggressive, as the Crimea annexation, building of artificial islands with military bases in the South China Sea, and border clashes between Indian and Chinese military all showcase. China is increasingly weaponizing its economic power to exert influence on foreign countries such as Australia and continues to deny the existence of human rights abuses at home.
Selective decoupling by the US, and to some extent by the EU, has started. The latter for example recently established the European Raw Materials Alliance to become less dependent on imports.
The search for values-based alliances has begun as well. For instance, France and Germany initiated the Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019 to strengthen the rules-based international order. Partnerships with non-traditional allies from the Global South are crucial to help the multilateral liberal order survive, although it may lead to bloc-building between democratic and authoritarian regimes.
The rise of China will be the key determinant of international politics for decades to come. Continuing to cooperate with the country may come at great risk, as it helps an authoritarian regime to attain the status of global superpower - one that does not share democratic values and dismisses international law. The EU - but also other countries - will likely need to choose between emphasising a values-based or an all-inclusive multilateralism.
In view of the current challenges facing world politics and its specific structural conditions (national sovereignty, power diffusion), multilateralism appears to be an almost indispensable form of international diplomacy. Nevertheless, it seems controversial: multilateralism is currently under fire, particularly from the White House and the State Department, whilst both China's President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin pose as advocates and defenders of multilateralism. On closer inspection, however, the controversy is not about multilateralism as a diplomatic procedure, but essentially about the question of which principles, values and organizations should determine the international order and thus shape international politics. At the same time, the inherent difficulties and limitations of multilateralism are often underestimated, and its potential overestimated. In order to make multilateralism as effective as possible, a realistic assessment of its preconditions and a wise understanding of the peculiarities of multilateral politics are therefore essential. (author's abstract)
In September 2019 German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas will officially launch the Alliance for Multilateralism at the United Nations, which Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro regards as a "useless institution." Since the right-wing extremist took office in January 2019, Brazil and Germany have been positioned in opposing camps on climate change, migration, and human rights policies. Bolsonaro's rhetorical fanning of the flames in Amazonia is only the tip of the iceberg. Brazilian-German relations have not been more distant since the Brazilian military dictatorship.
Similar to President Donald Trump's populist modus operandi, Bolsonaro's foreign policy aims at pleasing his political base. Domestic interests are more important than global responsibilities such as the protection of the Amazon. Climate change has been called a "Marxist conspiracy" by Brazilian Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo.
Traditional principles of Brazilian diplomacy such as democratic multilateralism have taken a back seat. National development in technology, infrastructure, and trade is the priority goal. The highly competitive agribusiness is a key sector in this approach.
Bolsonaro's election promise to move the Brazilian embassy in Israel to Jerusalem was addressed to his powerful evangelical base. Cabinet members from the military warned that Brazil might become a target of Islamist terrorism, while the liberal agricultural lobby is afraid of losing its Middle Eastern markets.
Brazilian foreign policy will depend on the outcome of the struggle between economic liberals, religious ideologists, and the military. However, the Brazilian government has already transformed itself from an advocate for into a violator of indigenous, LGBT, and other minorities' rights.
Shared Brazilian-German goals are limited to the peaceful re-democratisation of Venezuela and soft balancing China's New Silk Road project. Brazil is on the edge of becoming an illiberal democracy. Germany and the European Union should start using their economic leverage to side with Brazilian minorities and human right defenders. With the recent signing of the EU–Mercosur trade agreement, Europeans should seek to enforce social and labour rights standards as well as binding and verifiable regulations on agricultural goods linked to deforestation and violations of indigenous rights.
Latin America and the Caribbean are considered natural allies for German foreign policy efforts to strengthen liberal multilateralism. However, an analysis of cooperation in the region presents an ambiguous picture. Particularly with respect to core elements in the liberal canon of values such as democracy and human rights, Latin American governments primarily pursue their own political interests.
The most successful element of Latin American multilateralism is the intergovernmental settlement of disputes, which has been institutionalised since 1948 in the Pact of Bogotá. In acute crises, however, ad hoc institutions take the place of established multilateral mechanisms. Ideological proximity is more important than values and norms.
The core elements of liberal multilateralism are democracy and human rights. The Latin American countries have not only signed the most international agreements on these values but have also anchored them in the inter-American system. In practice, however, implementation has proven to be difficult.
The crisis in Venezuela demonstrates the ambiguous nature of multilateral cooperation at the interface between regional stability and countries' own political interests. The Organization of American States (OAS) condemned the increasing authoritarianism early on, but has failed at implementing sanctions due to polarisation along ideological and party lines. The Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) disintegrated as a result of the crisis.
Reliable partnerships within the multilateral system, in Latin America and the Caribbean as well as elsewhere, are contingent on the protection and implementation of democracy and human rights in the partner countries themselves. Lip-service commitments are not enough. This should be at the forefront of German and European foreign policy. Only when the domestic and foreign policy standards are in harmony can stable partnerships emerge.
In: Policy paper / Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 16
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On 1 January 2019, Germany began its two-year term as a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). As the country has started the second year of its tenure, this GIGA Focus takes stock of Germany's achievements thus far. It points to the challenges, and then suggests strategies through which Germany could widen the reach and deepen the impact of its work. Germany deserves to be commended for its achievements in the UNSC at three levels. At a macro level, it has helped revive and enrich a global debate on multilateralism. At an operational level, it has initiated some valuable and detailed proposals for action. At a symbolic level, it has made some helpful moves. Despite these achievements, German diplomatic efforts to build support for multilateralism face several challenges. Within Germany, even though there seems to be support for international cooperation, there is ambiguity amongst the German electorate on what multilateralism actually means. Externally, although Germany has tried to build international support for multilateralism, including via its initiative "Alliance for Multilateralism," it is not clear what values underpin the concept nor whom Germany regards as its real allies. The challenges, in turn, derive from the fact that the German foreign policy establishment has paid insufficient attention to the values that should underpin multilateralism. It has also largely failed - thus far - to develop a convincing narrative for multilateralism. Plus it has ignored a fundamental risk to existing multilateral institutions that derives from "weaponised interdependence." Without attention to these three issues, it will be difficult for Germany to have a meaningful and constructive impact on the debate and practice of multilateralism. To get more bang for its buck, Germany needs to a) have a fundamental rethink on the values that underpin - or should underpin - its own foreign policy, and how these values connect with its quest to reform multilateralism b) develop a winning and sustainable narrative for multilateralism that appeals to multiple layers of society and c) explore ideas for a fundamental reform of multilateral organisations, taking into account geoeconomic considerations.
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