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This article reviews and compares Canadian and Russian approaches to Arctic fisheries management through a three-part format. First, the complex array of laws and policies applicable to Arctic fisheries is described for each country. How Canada and Russia have addressed international fishery issues is also highlighted, including their participation in the 2018 Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement. Second, commonalities in fisheries governance approaches are summarized, including national commitments to implement precautionary and ecosystem approaches. Finally, contrasts in Arctic fisheries management are discussed. Major differences include the greater devolution of management responsibilities by Canada to Indigenous communities through land-claim agreements and co-management arrangements and Russia's greater success in formalizing bilateral fisheries management arrangements with its neighbours.

Since Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Northern Europe has increasingly aligned its national defence arrangements with the United States and NATO. This contrasts with the Cold War period, when Sweden and Finland were neutral, and Norway and Denmark put self-imposed restraints on their NATO memberships. Providing Northern Europe with a stable "buffer" between East and West, this so-called Nordic balance kept the United States and Soviet Union at an arm's length. Since 2014 however, Northern Europe has de facto slid from "buffer" to "springboard" for US forces. This slide may counter Russian assertiveness, but there is also reason to argue that it may increase regional tension and unpredictability. If so, this may leave the entire region with less rather than more security. Using the case of Norway, it is argued that too close an alignment with NATO may have accelerated Norway's role as a "springboard" for US forces. This is because cost-intensive reforms needed to accommodate US expectations abroad have also exacerbated critical vulnerabilities at home. Increased dependency on US forces thereby makes difficult the balance between deterrence and restraint vis-à-vis Russia.

The global human influence on the climate is growing at an alarming pace. This trend appears doomed to continue. Polar regions are feeling the effects first. This means that if the impacts of climate change serve to motivate effective policies, polar regions could be a good place to look for climate policy innovation. It is within this context that this article considers Arctic climate policy in Russia and Canada. The basic question posed is whether the unique and immediate threat climate change presents in the Arctic is reflected in progressive laws and policies with respect to four key areas: mitigation, adaptation, impacts and vulnerability, and development.

Over the last decade, Russia has considerably ramped up its military presence in the Arctic. This is something that attracted much attention from Western countries, especially against the backdrop of deteriorated relations and general mistrust following the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Current developments are to some extent familiar, as they echo the militarisation of the Arctic during the Cold War and the attendant US-Soviet tensions. Although comparisons with the Soviet Union's Arctic military posture lie close at hand, we need to analyse Russia's current military build-up in the Arctic with fresh eyes. Two of the most indicative developments were studied. Firstly, the formation of a single Arctic military command, with its implications for a reassessment of the Arctic strategic direction; secondly, the physical expansion of its Arctic military footprint, which includes both the construction of modern facilities and the increased activity of its armed forces there. In both these developments, the Northern Fleet is taking on a leading role, but the overall military posture relies on other military and civilian actors as well, and is closely related to security concerns of the developing latitudinal axis of the Northern Sea Route, rather than the Cold War longitudinal axis of a massive nuclear weapons exchange.

The Arctic region has been the focus of considerable attention in recent years, often concerned with maritime claims and an alleged race for the region's resources. Against this narrative, the article focuses on the practices of Canada and the Russian Federation with respect to their maritime jurisdictional claims and the delimitation of maritime boundaries with their Arctic neighbours. The article provides an overview of the Arctic region and the international law of the sea with an emphasis on the baselines and maritime claims of the Arctic coastal states. Discussion then turns to the maritime boundary agreements that have been concluded in the Arctic region before overlapping claims to areas of continental shelf underlying the central part of the Arctic Ocean are appraised. The article concludes that Canada and the Russian Federation have enjoyed considerable success in resolving overlapping maritime claims and their pragmatic and innovative approaches coupled with existing regional cooperation bode well for finding peaceful solutions to Arctic Ocean governance challenges in the future.

This article is the guest editors' introduction to the special series entitled Responding to a Changing Arctic Ocean: Canadian and Russian Experiences and Challenges.