International audience ; The international news during the summer of 2004 was full of ethnic fighting and a 'war on terrorism' that reached around the world. These events raise again the topic of nationalism. Using examples of rhetorical nationalism from two cases, Finland and the United States, this article examines these two distinct expressions of nationalism, how they are based on differing systems of valuation and on whether the message is directed to internal or external relations. Internally-directed nationalism may result in ethnic fighting but it is usually territorial, while externally-directed nationalism has global repercussions.
The resurgence of nationalism in the shape of neo-nationalism and right-wing political parties in Europe and the United States at the end of the twentieth century, followed by similar tendencies in other parts of the world, raises the question of why nationalism is regaining favor again. According to classical nationalism viewpoint, the nationalism term is used to conceptualize the nation-state as the modern state formation that emerged since the 18th century. Though it retains the same ambiguity as classical nationalism, the rise of neo-nationalism in contemporary politics is intriguing and increases interest in studying nationalism, which fails to distinguish between state-nationalism (statist nationalism) and cultural-nationalism (cultural nationalism), each with its own vision and ideals It is also necessary to define the differences between the two types of nationalism, including the debates over Geerzt and Sidel about the future of nationalism in post-colonial countries.KEYWORDS: Nationalism, nation-state, contemporary culture, Indonesia
International audience ; Le nationalisme méthodologique est la tendance à prendre l'Etat-nation pour l'unité naturelle de l'analyse des phénomènes sociaux. Mais comment ce biais affecte-t-il les théories de la justice distributive? Pour répondre, on distingue d'abord trois versions de nationalisme méthodologique, pour montrer ensuite que la théorie de Rawls endosse les trois versions. Les arguments fondés sur la justice en pâtissent.
International audience ; Le nationalisme méthodologique est la tendance à prendre l'Etat-nation pour l'unité naturelle de l'analyse des phénomènes sociaux. Mais comment ce biais affecte-t-il les théories de la justice distributive? Pour répondre, on distingue d'abord trois versions de nationalisme méthodologique, pour montrer ensuite que la théorie de Rawls endosse les trois versions. Les arguments fondés sur la justice en pâtissent.
International audience ; Le nationalisme méthodologique est la tendance à prendre l'Etat-nation pour l'unité naturelle de l'analyse des phénomènes sociaux. Mais comment ce biais affecte-t-il les théories de la justice distributive? Pour répondre, on distingue d'abord trois versions de nationalisme méthodologique, pour montrer ensuite que la théorie de Rawls endosse les trois versions. Les arguments fondés sur la justice en pâtissent.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Saenz v. Roe struck down a California welfare law that imposed residency requirements on recent arrivals to the state. In vindicating the mobility rights of migrants, the Court breathed new life into the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. This Article suggests that, however misconceived the decision might appear from the perspective of welfare law, it usefully serves to promote a common American identity on which nationalist sentiments crucially depend. The core nationalist symbol for Americans is the idea of constitutionally-protected liberties that I call liberal nationalism A liberal nationalist understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has four implications for constitutional interpretation. First, it suggests that the mobility rights the Saenz court upheld deserve the high degree of protection they received in that case. Second, the argument from nationalism offers an explanation for cases where the Supreme Court has been faulted for failing to protect national symbols such as the flag. More than the flag, constitutional liberties are a national symbol for Americans, and in upholding the right to deface the flag on free speech grounds, the Court has merely preferred one patriotic symbol to another. Third, a nationalist perspective suggests that basic liberties should enjoy constitutional protection at the national level and should not be entirely returned to the states. But for the argument from nationalism, a strong case could be made for a very thin set of national constitutional liberties, or even for state opt-out rights. Finally, nationalist concerns suggest a need for caution before removing contentious issues from political deliberation by turning them into constitutional rights. In politics, there are only winners and losers, and there is no great shame in being a loser; but in American constitutional law the losers can be faulted for a want of loyalty to core American values, and this must weaken American nationalism.
International audience ; In recent years, it has been a common complaint among scholars to acknowledge the lack of research on Spanish nationalism. This article addresses the gap by giving an historical overview of 'ethnic' and 'civic' Spanish nationalist discourses during the last two centuries. It is argued here that Spanish nationalism is not a unified ideology but it has, at least, two varieties. During the 19th-century, both a 'liberal' and a 'conservative-traditionalist' nationalist discourse were formulated and these competed against each other for hegemony within the Spanish market of ideas. In the 20th-century, these two discourses continued to be present and became backbones of different political regimes. However, after the emergence of the Basque and Catalan nationalist movements, Spanish nationalists unified as a counter-force to these regional sources of identity. In fact, one can see 20th-century Spanish nationalism as a dialectical struggle between the centre and the periphery.
What is often described today as neo-nationalism or nationalist-populism today arguably looks like the old nationalism. What is emerging as genuinely new are the identity-based nationalisms of the centre-left, sometimes called 'liberal nationalism' or 'progressive patriotism'. I offer my own contribution to the latter, which may be called 'multicultural nationalism'. I argue that multiculturalism is a mode of integration that does not just emphasise the centrality of minority group identities but argues that integration is incomplete without re-making national identity so that all can have a sense of belonging to it. In this respect, multiculturalist approaches to national belonging have some relation to liberal nationalism and a majoritarian interculturalism. It makes not just individual rights but minority accommodation a feature of acceptable nationalism. Importantly, however, unlike cosmopolitanism it is national-focused and is not against immigration controls (subject to certain conditions). For these reasons multicultural nationalism unites the concerns of some of those currently sympathetic to majoritarian nationalism and those who are pro-diversity and minority accommodationist in the way that liberal nationalism (with its emphasis on individualism and majoritarianism) or cosmopolitanism (with its disavowal of national belonging and championing of open borders) does not. It therefore represents the political idea and tendency most likely to offer a feasible alternative rallying point to monocultural nationalism.
International audience ; Both nation and religion tend to resist attempts at a universal and unequivocal definition. It has even been even suggested that the definitions of religion resemble a Tower of Babel. One might rightfully use a similar image to speak of the nation. The founding fathers of social science admitted that they were perplexed when faced with this notion. As Durkheim put it, the concept of the nation is beyond doubt a mystical, an obscure idea. As in the case of religion, attempts to define the nation have gravitated towards two poles. On one end of the spectrum, primordial definitions of the nation border on essentialism. On the other end, scholars opt for various shades of functionalism. The nation does not easily lend itself to unified definitions. Since it was originally coined, the notion has evolved at the intersection between complex, and at times contradictory logics. The nation imposed itself in the 19th century as a new framework of collective identification and a source of political legitimacy more in tune with modernity. Its promotion went alongside the destruction of previous constituent markers of traditional identities and the erosion of imperial logics. Thereby, the nation became a privileged site for those who wished to explore and articulate new symbols of identity and politics. Nationalism, meanwhile, appeared on European soil as a kind of "in-between." It embodied the gap that existed between the initial ambitions of "national movements" and the concrete realities produced by the instrumentalization of the mobilizing powers of the national idea in the service of the State. This led to a situation where the nation, previously a central reference in the European Movement (those who everywhere were fighting against the established Order), was used by political actors as a device to promote and sanction specific kinds of political order.
When East Pakistan1 broke away from Pakistan to become the independent and sovereign nation of Bangladesh in 1971after nine month long war of independent against west Pakistan, many observers believed that South Asia was irrevocably on its route to a secular nationalism beyond religious 'tribalism'2 and 'two nation theory'3 (G.Allana (ed),1967, Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents,p-77 ) which purported the 1947 partition of British India and establishment of Pakistan on the basis of religious separate identity. As later events proved, they were sadly mistaken. The primacy of Islamic traditions and sentiments cast aside by the Bengalis in East Pakistan in 1971 to fight the Pakistani crackdown and later deliberately excised by the new Bangladesh government, subsequently returned as a resilient and widespread political phenomenon. This was loosely characterized as Muslim identity, different from the Bang alee nationalism which was focused on secularism, language and literature.4 The international community was familiar with 'militant' Islam but Muslim consciousness in Bangladesh was not identical to the global Islamic fundamentalism. The growing Muslim consciousness in Bangladesh was still evolving its goals, strategies and tactics. In its broadest connotation, Muslim nationalism in Bangladesh was the sentiment and spirit of 'Muslim heritage and rule in Bengal. It was also the passion of belonging which girded, the Muslims through a common monotheistic faith and a nexus of culture, values, customs, experiences, traditions, personal laws, ways of life and rituals. These were perceived as their distinctive heritage which might, in fact, be the product of coevolving forces over a history. Its basic appeal was the sense of pride, recognition, a yearning for harmony and a mystique which made them 'feel good' and secure against internal constraints and external threats. However, the real arena of dispute between Islamic identity and Bang alee nationalism was its domestic politics. After the breakup of Pakistan, it was an uphill slog for the Islamists to regroup and reassert themselves as a viable political force. The primary objective of this paper is to examine the cultural and political dynamics of Islam and Muslim consciousness in Bangladesh and their confrontation with the secularists and the Bang alee nationalists and try to give an analysis on the nationalism trends of Bangladesh. DOI:10.5901/ajis.2014.v3n1p439
The first globalisation coincided with the establishment of the nation as a legitimate basis for political sovereignty. Globalisation and the expansion of the nation state are the result of the same ideological, technological and economic developments. The nation is a new universalism, resulting in the formation of distinct but relatively equivalent political and cultural units. The formation of nation states takes place within a strictly transnational framework and quickly opens up the issue of international affairs. The term refers not only to the organisation of relations between nation states but also to the union of social groups across national borders. Nineteenth century Europe reinforces its hegemonic position in the first globalisation by establishing itself as the central place of modern universalism, as the place where its political and cultural norms are established, and as the home for their challenge. ; International audience The first globalisation coincided with the consecration of the nation as the legitimate foundation for political sovereignty. Globalisation and the expansion of the Nation-State in fact emerge out of the same ideological, technological and economic developments. The nation is a new form of universalism, which translates into the formation of distinct but relatively similar cultural and political units. The formation of Nation-States took place against a transnational background, but rapidly raised the issue of its international dimension. This involves the organisation of relations between Nation-States, but also the unity of social categories beyond national frontiers. 19th century Europe comforted its hegemonic position in the first globalisation by instituting itself as the major pole of modern universalism, as the locus for the institutionalisation of its political and cultural norms, and as the heart of any contestation against them. ; The first globalisation coincided with the establishment of the nation as a legitimate basis for political sovereignty. Globalisation and ...
Gezi protests which began as a reaction against the AKP's authoritarian intervention into urban space in May 2013, in a short time, turned into a country-wide social movement that brought the various components of the society that have different political/ ideological tendencies together around a demand for democratic and pluralistic governance. In this social picture, Turkish nationalist discourse with its hybrid and complex content, and its eclectic, flexible and nonhomogeneous structure inevitably attained its own place. Unlike the primordialist approaches to nationalism which considers nations as preexisting structures, modernist theoreticians embrace it as an invented and imagined product of social engineering. This understanding which focuses on political institutions and actors overlooks the role of everyday life and individuals, as the real carriers of nationalism and national identity, in the story of nationalism. However, everyday nationalism conception on which this study will be based focuses on how nationalist discourses and symbols are internalized and reproduced by ordinary people in everyday life experiences with a micro sociological perspective. Hence, this study, benefiting from the concepts of "everyday nationalism", aims to investigate how people who participated in the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013 subjectively construct or reconstruct their nationhood in their own discourses and narratives about their Gezi experiences. Is the perception of nationalism of these Gezi supporters compatible with the official nationalist rhetoric? The study will be based on qualitative data obtained from deep interviews with approximately 10 respondents who participated in the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013. The research findings will be analyzed by using discourse and narrative analysis. Participants' perception of nationalism and their discursive construction of national identity in their everyday life will be traced through their experiences of Gezi protests.
This is a chapter from The Wiley Blackwell Companion to Political Geography [http://eu.wiley.com/] ; Nation and nationalism are two referents which continue to play a major role in how politics and social life are organized. The present article discusses their relevance from two distinct perspectives. Traditional accounts of nation and nationalism have largely focused on the questions of 'when' and 'what' is a nation, i.e. on the historical origins and substance of the nation, including its civic/ethnic character. Starting from the early 1990s, new approaches have instead privileged the 'how' and 'where' of a nation, i.e. the ways and the sites in which the nation is reproduced and becomes a relevant resource in people's lives. The article then focuses on one of the most pressing challenges the nation is facing today, namely the increasing ethno-cultural diversity of its population. Final remarks point to the directions where further research is needed and where political geography can offer an important contribution.
The chief purpose of this paper is to understand and compare the political ideologies of two key thinkers and leaders of twentieth century Muslim India on the question of nationalism. These thinkers are Dr Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938) and Maulana Hussain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957). Firstly, concept of nationalism has been explored in the political writings and statements of these thinkers. Secondly, debate between Muhammad Iqbal and Maulana Madani over their conceptions of "nation" has been discussed. Thirdly these theories of nationalism have been compared in the historical context as well as in the overall conceptual framework of these thinkers. Finally, the study has been concluded by discussing what the contemporary Muslim world can learn from the intellectual heritage of Iqbal and Maulana Madani.
Economic outcomes before and after the break-up of Yugoslavia What are the costs of nationalistic policies? The expectations may be more optimistic than is warranted as the example of the breakup of Yugoslavia suggests. Assuming that nationalists expected that economic results would be better than in federal Yugoslavia, it makes sense to get some idea of what an alternative to a nationalistic strategy would have achieved in the last 20 years. The alternatives are nationalism vs. integration, not necessarily independence vs. federal Yugoslav state. That allows Slovenian development to be the basis for counterfactual simulations of where would have other Yugoslav states been had they followed its strategy of transition. This because (i) Slovenia opted for gradual transformation of the inherited Yugoslav institutions to those characteristic of the European Union (this is sometimes seen as a type of economic nationalism though in view of the next characteristic it is more of a gradualist strategy of transition) and that allows for an indirect evaluation of the Yugoslav institutions; (ii) chose to integrate with the EU and indeed the EMU, both as soon as possible, rather than pursue a protectionist, nationalistic strategy, which enables the comparison of these two strategies; and (iii) fared well, though not miraculously well, so its performance can be used as unbiased basis for comparative assessment of the price of nationalism.
