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THE AUTHOR PRESENTS TWO REASONS FOR ECONOMIC CONVERSION PLANNING: FIRST, TO FACILITATE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DAMAGE OWING TO A PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY; SECOND, TO RELIEVE DISARMAMENT REGUTIATORS OF THE FEAR THAT A REVERSAL OF THE ARMS RACE CARRIES UNACCEPTABLE ECONOMIC PENALTIES. TO THESE ENDS, ECONOMIC CONVERSION LAW IS REQUIRED BECAUSE MAJOR BARRIERS MUST BE OVERCOME TO SET IN MOTION THE NECESSARY PLANNING PROCESS FOR RELIABLE ECONOMIC PENALTIES. THE AUTHOR DESCRIBES TEN MAJOR COMPONENTS OF LAW FOR FACILITATING ECONOMIC CONVERSION PLANNING AND OPERATIONS.

Necessity and proportionality hold a firm place in the international law governing the use of force by states, as well as in the law of armed conflict. However, the precise contours of these two requirements are uncertain and controversial. The aim of Necessity and Proportionality in International Peace and Security Law is to explore how necessity and proportionality manifest themselves in the modern world under the law governing the use of force and the law of armed conflict, and how they relate to each other. The book explores the ways in which necessity and proportionality are applied in practice and addresses pressing legal issues in the law on the use of force, including the controversial "unwilling and unable" test for the use of force in self-defense, drones and targeted killing, the application of this legal regime during civil war, and the need for further transparency in states' justification for the use of force in self-defense. The analysis of the role of military necessity within the law of armed conflict on the modern battlefield focuses on the history and nature of the principle of military necessity, the proper application of the principle of proportionality, how commanders should account for mental harm in calculating proportionality, and the role artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems may play in proportionality analysis. The book concludes with a discussion of the potential role of proportionality in the law governing post-conflict contexts.

"This book asserts that, under international humanitarian law (IHL), military necessity neither obligates nor prohibits. Rather, it merely - and therefore indifferently - permits. This new theory challenges two influential views that currently exist on the subject. According to one, IHL bans unnecessary acts even if they do not violate any of its specific rules. Although IHL endeavours to accommodate war necessities, it does not make it its business to save incompetent belligerents from themselves. The other view holds that neither military necessity nor humanity justifies breaches of unqualified IHL rules. Military necessity clearly does not, but humanitarian imperatives may. Conversely, gross inhumanity may become unlawful even where no IHL rule specifically prohibits it"--

The idea of military necessity lies at the centre of the law of armed conflict and yet it is less than fully understood. This book analyses which legal limits govern the commander's assessment of military necessity, and argues that military necessity itself is not a limitation. Military necessity calls for a highly discretionary exercise: the assessment. Yet, there is little guidance as to how this discretionary process should be exercised, apart from the notions of 'a reasonable military commander'. A reasonable assessment of 'excessive' civilian losses are presumed to be almost intuitive. Objective standards for determining excessive civilian losses are difficult to identify, particularly when that 'excessiveness' will be understood in relative terms. The perpetual question arises: are civilian losses acceptable if the war can be won? The result is a heavy burden of assessment placed on the shoulders of the military commander.

The idea of military necessity lies at the centre of the law of armed conflict and yet it is less than fully understood. This book analyses which legal limits govern the commander's assessment of military necessity, and argues that military necessity itself is not a limitation. Military necessity calls for a highly discretionary exercise: the assessment. Yet, there is little guidance as to how this discretionary process should be exercised, apart from the notions of 'a reasonable military commander'. A reasonable assessment of 'excessive' civilian losses are presumed to be almost intuitive. Objective standards for determining excessive civilian losses are difficult to identify, particularly when that 'excessiveness' will be understood in relative terms. The perpetual question arises: are civilian losses acceptable if the war can be won? The result is a heavy burden of assessment placed on the shoulders of the military commander.