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This title aims to trace the various uses of the concept of necessity in international law, with the goal of determining whether there is any overarching unity to these uses across the subdisciplines of international law. The authors not only discuss necessity in international humanitarian law and jus in bello, but also aim to situate necessity as understood in IHL within a larger discourse of international law generally, and to untangle the confusing and often inconsistent usages of the term 'necessity' in these broad areas of international law, including human rights law. The authors argue that the concept of necessity in international law has three different conceptions that cut across the various domains of international law: necessity as exception, necessity as license, and necessity as regulation

The right of States to use force extraterritorially is conditioned by requirements of necessity and proportionality. This book provides a detailed analysis of those requirements, and a coherent and up-to-date account of the applicable contemporary international law in this field.

Introduction -- The development of the treaty framework for the protection of cultural heritage -- The concept and scope of military necessity -- Military necessity within the framework for the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflicts -- The impact of individual criminal responsibility for offences against cultural property on military necessity -- Military necessity vis-à-vis the protection of cultural heritage in non-international armed conflicts -- Military necessity and the responsibility of states -- Lessons on necessity resulting from the interplay of environmental protection and armed conflict -- Concluding remarks.

Necessity and proportionality hold a firm place in the international law governing the use of force by states, as well as in the law of armed conflict. However, the precise contours of these two requirements are uncertain and controversial. The aim of Necessity and Proportionality in International Peace and Security Law is to explore how necessity and proportionality manifest themselves in the modern world under the law governing the use of force and the law of armed conflict, and how they relate to each other. The book explores the ways in which necessity and proportionality are applied in practice and addresses pressing legal issues in the law on the use of force, including the controversial "unwilling and unable" test for the use of force in self-defense, drones and targeted killing, the application of this legal regime during civil war, and the need for further transparency in states' justification for the use of force in self-defense. The analysis of the role of military necessity within the law of armed conflict on the modern battlefield focuses on the history and nature of the principle of military necessity, the proper application of the principle of proportionality, how commanders should account for mental harm in calculating proportionality, and the role artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems may play in proportionality analysis. The book concludes with a discussion of the potential role of proportionality in the law governing post-conflict contexts.

What does it mean to say that international humanitarian law (IHL) strikes a realistic and meaningful balance between military necessity and humanity, and that the law therefore 'accounts for' military necessity? To what consequences does the law 'accounting for' military necessity give rise? Through real-life examples and careful analysis, this book challenges received wisdom on the subject by devising a new theory that not only reaffirms Kriegsräson's fallacy but also explains why IHL has no reason to restrict or prohibit militarily unnecessary conduct on that ground alone. Additionally, the theory hypothesises greater normative significance for humanitarian and chivalrous imperatives when they conflict with IHL rules. By combining international law, jurisprudence, military history, strategic studies, and moral philosophy, this book reveals how rational fighting relates to ethical fighting, how IHL incorporates contrasting values that shape its rules, and how law and theory adapt themselves to war's evolutions.

The Netherlands Yearbook of International Law was first published in 1970. It has two main aims. It offers a forum for the publication of scholarly articles of a more general nature in the area of public international law including the law of the European Union. In addition, it aims to respond to the demand for information on state practice in the field of international law. Each Yearbook therefore includes an overview of state practice of the Netherlands.

The defences available to an agent accused of wrongdoing can be considered as justifications (which render acts lawful) or excuses (which shield the agent from the legal consequences of the wrongful act). This distinction is familiar to many domestic legal systems, and tracks analogous notions in moral philosophy and ordinary language. Nevertheless, it remains contested in some domestic jurisdictions where it is often argued that the distinction is purely theoretical and has no consequences in practice. In international law too the distinction has been fraught with controversy, though there are increasing calls for its recognition. This book is the first to comprehensively and thoroughly examine the distinction and its relevance to the international legal order. Combining an analysis of State practice, historical, doctrinal and theoretical developments, the book shows that the distinction is not only possible in international law but that it is also one that would have important practical implications

The right of States to use force extraterritorially is conditioned by requirements of necessity and proportionality. This book provides a much-needed detailed analysis of those requirements, and a coherent and up-to-date account of the applicable contemporary international law in this field.

The idea of military necessity lies at the centre of the law of armed conflict and yet it is less than fully understood. This book analyses which legal limits govern the commander's assessment of military necessity, and argues that military necessity itself is not a limitation. Military necessity calls for a highly discretionary exercise: the assessment. Yet, there is little guidance as to how this discretionary process should be exercised, apart from the notions of 'a reasonable military commander'. A reasonable assessment of 'excessive' civilian losses are presumed to be almost intuitive. Objective standards for determining excessive civilian losses are difficult to identify, particularly when that 'excessiveness' will be understood in relative terms. The perpetual question arises: are civilian losses acceptable if the war can be won? The result is a heavy burden of assessment placed on the shoulders of the military commander

What are chances and challenges of referring to human rights law in defining crimes under international law? Under what circumstances is a reference to human rights law dogmatically appropriate and practically likely? The answers to these questions are explored through a look at the theoretical framework, practical application in jurisprudence as well as empirically through interviews with judges. By highlighting the common roots and the differences between both areas of law, the existing inconsistencies in the application of the law, as well as approaches which could contribute to their solution, the book presents a crucial contribution to the debate on legal certainty and innovation in international criminal law

The idea of military necessity lies at the centre of the law of armed conflict and yet it is less than fully understood. This book analyses which legal limits govern the commander's assessment of military necessity, and argues that military necessity itself is not a limitation. Military necessity calls for a highly discretionary exercise: the assessment. Yet, there is little guidance as to how this discretionary process should be exercised, apart from the notions of 'a reasonable military commander'. A reasonable assessment of 'excessive' civilian losses are presumed to be almost intuitive. Objective standards for determining excessive civilian losses are difficult to identify, particularly when that 'excessiveness' will be understood in relative terms. The perpetual question arises: are civilian losses acceptable if the war can be won? The result is a heavy burden of assessment placed on the shoulders of the military commander.