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THE AUTHOR PRESENTS TWO REASONS FOR ECONOMIC CONVERSION PLANNING: FIRST, TO FACILITATE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE DAMAGE OWING TO A PERMANENT WAR ECONOMY; SECOND, TO RELIEVE DISARMAMENT REGUTIATORS OF THE FEAR THAT A REVERSAL OF THE ARMS RACE CARRIES UNACCEPTABLE ECONOMIC PENALTIES. TO THESE ENDS, ECONOMIC CONVERSION LAW IS REQUIRED BECAUSE MAJOR BARRIERS MUST BE OVERCOME TO SET IN MOTION THE NECESSARY PLANNING PROCESS FOR RELIABLE ECONOMIC PENALTIES. THE AUTHOR DESCRIBES TEN MAJOR COMPONENTS OF LAW FOR FACILITATING ECONOMIC CONVERSION PLANNING AND OPERATIONS.

Necessity and proportionality hold a firm place in the international law governing the use of force by states, as well as in the law of armed conflict. However, the precise contours of these two requirements are uncertain and controversial. The aim of Necessity and Proportionality in International Peace and Security Law is to explore how necessity and proportionality manifest themselves in the modern world under the law governing the use of force and the law of armed conflict, and how they relate to each other. The book explores the ways in which necessity and proportionality are applied in practice and addresses pressing legal issues in the law on the use of force, including the controversial "unwilling and unable" test for the use of force in self-defense, drones and targeted killing, the application of this legal regime during civil war, and the need for further transparency in states' justification for the use of force in self-defense. The analysis of the role of military necessity within the law of armed conflict on the modern battlefield focuses on the history and nature of the principle of military necessity, the proper application of the principle of proportionality, how commanders should account for mental harm in calculating proportionality, and the role artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons systems may play in proportionality analysis. The book concludes with a discussion of the potential role of proportionality in the law governing post-conflict contexts.

What does it mean to say that international humanitarian law (IHL) strikes a realistic and meaningful balance between military necessity and humanity, and that the law therefore 'accounts for' military necessity? To what consequences does the law 'accounting for' military necessity give rise? Through real-life examples and careful analysis, this book challenges received wisdom on the subject by devising a new theory that not only reaffirms Kriegsräson's fallacy but also explains why IHL has no reason to restrict or prohibit militarily unnecessary conduct on that ground alone. Additionally, the theory hypothesises greater normative significance for humanitarian and chivalrous imperatives when they conflict with IHL rules. By combining international law, jurisprudence, military history, strategic studies, and moral philosophy, this book reveals how rational fighting relates to ethical fighting, how IHL incorporates contrasting values that shape its rules, and how law and theory adapt themselves to war's evolutions.

1State responsibility — Necessity — Whether part of customary international law — Effect of a declaration of necessity on private contracts — Economic necessity based on a State's inability to pay — Temporary suspension of payments on sovereign bonds — Effect in relations between a State and a private individual under private law — International Law Commission Articles on State Responsibility, Article 25 — Whether declaratory of customary international lawEconomics, trade and finance — Sovereign debt — Foreign currency bonds — State suspending payments in foreign currency due to economic crisis — Whether justified by defence of necessity — The law of the Federal Republic of Germany

The main conclusion of the paper is that the issue of the legitimacy of extreme necessity as a basis for excluding unlawfulnesss has not been satisfactorily resolved. When it comes to the solution in the criminal law of Serbia, there is a serious deficit in terms of the legitimacy of the extreme necessity as a basis for the exclusion of unlawfulness, especially in the case when the threatened good and the one sacrificed are of the same value. Therefore, the prevailing interest theory cannot justify the existing solution. On the other hand, requiring the condition that the person invoking the extreme necessity did not cause danger (which is the specificity of that solution in CC of Serbia), to some extent facilitates solving the complex problem of justifying extreme necessity as a basis for excluding unlawfulnesss unlawfulnesss. Discussing the issue of justification, one should start from two approaches that dominate the theory of criminal law: the principle of predominant interest and the principle of solidarity. Those two principles are not so different that they could not be considered as one principle. Moreover, the principle of solidarity if it is based on the principle of predominant interest provides additional justification and persuasiveness. However, solidarity in a situation of extreme necessity must be of a limited nature, and therefore one can speak of the principle of limited solidarity, which is based on the principle of predominant interest. First of all, solidarity must be limited by the value of goods, ie. it can be expected from individuals (or imposed on them through legal norms) only when one sacrifices one's own good of lesser value in order to save someone else's good of greater value (by no means of the same value). Nor can it be expected that someone will sacrifice his own life, even if it would remove the danger from the lives of several people. The scope of solidarity, no matter how it is understood, cannot reach those limits. Furthermore, it is also limited by the fact that solidarity cannot be expected by the one who is responsible for creating the danger, so in this respect the solution from the CC of Serbia is in accordance with the principle of limited solidarity. Solidarity can justify the sacrifice of the goods of others, which legally narrows the limits of their free action. Nevertheless, it still remains an open question whether solidarity means that others voluntarily accept to sacrifice their goods (of lesser value) in order to save one's good (voluntariness could be based not only on altruism, but also on the expectation that the same will be done for apply to them if they find themselves in a situation of danger), or is it a legally imposed solidarity. Problems related to the legitimacy of extreme necessity as a basis for excluding unlawfulness are also significant for the interpretation of certain conditions for its application. The absence of a convincing justification of extreme necessity as a basis for excluding illegality should result not only in prescribing strict conditions for its existence, but it should also be reflected in its application.