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The idea of military necessity lies at the centre of the law of armed conflict and yet it is less than fully understood. This book analyses which legal limits govern the commander's assessment of military necessity, and argues that military necessity itself is not a limitation. Military necessity calls for a highly discretionary exercise: the assessment. Yet, there is little guidance as to how this discretionary process should be exercised, apart from the notions of 'a reasonable military commander'. A reasonable assessment of 'excessive' civilian losses are presumed to be almost intuitive. Objective standards for determining excessive civilian losses are difficult to identify, particularly when that 'excessiveness' will be understood in relative terms. The perpetual question arises: are civilian losses acceptable if the war can be won? The result is a heavy burden of assessment placed on the shoulders of the military commander

Abstract
The modern laws of war are an integral foundation of 19th century efforts to establish and maintain order within the then emerging international society of states. But membership was conditional; only 'civilised' states were permitted entry to international society. Engaging with the concept of 'the standard of civilisation', the aim of this paper is to demonstrate a continuity of double standards as they relate to protections afforded by the modern laws of war. It will argue that these double standards have been, and continue to be, underpinned by attempts to de-humanise belligerents via the language of the 'standard of civilisation'. In making this argument, the paper will draw attention to the historical centrality of the state and the role it has played in establishing conditionality with regards to protections afforded by the modern laws of war through the language of raison d'état and the standard of civilisation.

What are chances and challenges of referring to human rights law in defining crimes under international law? Under what circumstances is a reference to human rights law dogmatically appropriate and practically likely? The answers to these questions are explored through a look at the theoretical framework, practical application in jurisprudence as well as empirically through interviews with judges. By highlighting the common roots and the differences between both areas of law, the existing inconsistencies in the application of the law, as well as approaches which could contribute to their solution, the book presents a crucial contribution to the debate on legal certainty and innovation in international criminal law

This contribution revisits the phenomenon of 'reverse discrimination in the light of the latest Treaty amendments, recent developments in the CJEU's case law and evolutions in the law of selected Member States. It follows that 'reverse discrimination' caused by national measures applying to internal situations in non-harmonized policy fields remains acceptable under EU law as a matter of principle. The Union's non-unitary constitutional structure compels the CJEU to exercise judicial restraint when reviewing such rules against the fundamental freedoms of the Treaties as long as the Union legislator does not address the issue. Although the CJEU's traditional and increasingly incoherent case-law on 'purely internal situations' is not a necessary corollary of this reasoning, alternative judicial approaches risk unduly undermining Member States' competences and constitutional identities. Whilst much of the academic debate on reverse discrimination focuses on possible remedies under EU law, this paper also looks at solutions available under national law. Member States are well equipped to address reverse discrimination and to progressively live up to their responsibility in this respect. Evidence from different Member States suggests that national law (subject to an external control of the ECtHR) can provide a valuable and effective tool to assess whether or not restrictions of individual freedoms can be justified by overriding constitutionally recognized principles.

The idea of military necessity lies at the centre of the law of armed conflict and yet it is less than fully understood. This book analyses which legal limits govern the commander's assessment of military necessity, and argues that military necessity itself is not a limitation. Military necessity calls for a highly discretionary exercise: the assessment. Yet, there is little guidance as to how this discretionary process should be exercised, apart from the notions of 'a reasonable military commander'. A reasonable assessment of 'excessive' civilian losses are presumed to be almost intuitive. Objective standards for determining excessive civilian losses are difficult to identify, particularly when that 'excessiveness' will be understood in relative terms. The perpetual question arises: are civilian losses acceptable if the war can be won? The result is a heavy burden of assessment placed on the shoulders of the military commander.

The idea of military necessity lies at the centre of the law of armed conflict and yet it is less than fully understood. This book analyses which legal limits govern the commander's assessment of military necessity, and argues that military necessity itself is not a limitation. Military necessity calls for a highly discretionary exercise: the assessment. Yet, there is little guidance as to how this discretionary process should be exercised, apart from the notions of 'a reasonable military commander'. A reasonable assessment of 'excessive' civilian losses are presumed to be almost intuitive. Objective standards for determining excessive civilian losses are difficult to identify, particularly when that 'excessiveness' will be understood in relative terms. The perpetual question arises: are civilian losses acceptable if the war can be won? The result is a heavy burden of assessment placed on the shoulders of the military commander.

Welche Chancen und Probleme bietet der Verweis auf Menschenrechte bei der Definition völkerstrafrechtlich relevanter Verbrechen? Unter welchen Voraussetzungen ist ein Verweis auf den Katalog des internationalen Menschenrechtsschutz dogmatisch angemessen und praktisch wahrscheinlich? Diese Fragen werden sowohl rechtstheoretisch, in der tatsächlichen Rechtsanwendung als auch empirisch durch Gespräche mit Richterinnen und Richtern an völkerstrafrechtlichen Gerichten ergründet.Durch das Aufzeigen der Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der beiden Rechtsgebiete, der vorherrschenden dogmatischen Unschärfen sowie Ansätzen zu deren Lösung, leistet der Band einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur Debatte über Rechtssicherheit und Innovation im Bereich des Völkerstrafrechts