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AbstractLady Lovelace's notes on Babbage's Analytical Engine (1843) never refer to the concept of surprise. Having some pretension to 'originate' something—unlike the Analytical Engine—is neither necessary nor sufficient to being able to surprise someone. Turing nevertheless translates Lovelace's 'this machine is incapable of originating something' in terms of a hypothetical 'computers cannot take us by surprise' objection to the idea that machines may be deemed capable of thinking. To understand the contemporary significance of what is missed in Turing's 'surprise' translation of Lovelace's insight, one needs to distinguish between trivial surprises (which stem from our limited ability to store data and process it) and those events, propositions or encounters that lead us to question our understanding of ourselves or what surrounds us. Only some of these non-trivial surprises are the product of originality endeavours. Not only is it uncommon for surprises to track such endeavours, the type of autonomy that would be required on the part of 'digital computers' for originality and surprise to intersect in that way goes far beyond the operational autonomy that can be achieved by 'learning machines'. This paper argues that a salient translation of Lovelace's originality insight—for contemporary and future 'learning machines'—is an upside-down version of Turing's surprise question: can computers be surprised by us in a non-trivial, 'co-produced' way?

I know just how pleased Charles Tilly was to receive the Albert O. Hirschman
Prize. The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) is an institution he cherished, and Hirschman is a person for whom Tilly had almost limitless admiration. He particularly esteemed the assertive analytic power and intellectual modesty that characterized Hirschman's "Rival Interpretations of Market Society," the brilliant 1982 Marc Bloch Lecture that addressed competing interpretations of modern markets as, respectively, "civilizing, destructive, or feeble." "However incompatible the various theories may be," Hirschman (1982: 1481) argued, "each might still have its 'hour of truth' and/or its 'country of truth' as it applies in a given country or group of countries during some stretch of time," and he concluded by asking whether it is "not in the interest of social science to embrace complexity, be it at some sacrifice of its claim to predictive power?" (ibid.: 1483). These features, too, were hallmarks of Tilly's audacious originality.

This article is a critical introduction to one of the principalsystematic answers on the question of justice in contemporary thought: Rawls' egalitarian liberalismo For Van Parijs, political philosophy must have relevance, i.e. it must respond to the problems of the world without ignoring the human spirit. Therefore, he says that we need to study the sources of the solidarity schools of thought -marxism, utilitarianism and egalitarian liberalism- to answer thechallenge of libertarianism, the philosophical spearhead of neoliberal thinking. The text does not restrict itself to interpretation: it goes deeply into each argument, contrasting and criticizing the various hypotheses made, exploring the implications of each, drawing out points of controversy and adopting an attitude of critical sympathy to libertarians and marxists, liberals and communitarians. He does this to sustain dialogue, wi thout abandoning his personal convictions or falling into invective or exegesis. ; Este artículo es una introducción crítica a una de las principales respuestas sistemáticas sobre la cuestión de la justicia dentro del pensamiento contemporáneo: el liberalismo igualitario de Rawls. Para Van Parijs, la filosofía política debe ser pertinente, es decir, debe responder a los problemas del mundo sin renunciar al espíritu. En cumplimiento de ese propósito, considera necesario estudiar las fuentes del pensamiento solidarista –marxismo, el utilitarismo y liberalismo igualitario- para responder a los desafíos del libertarianismo, punta de lanza filosófica del pensamiento neoliberal. El texto no se limita a la interpretación: profundiza los diferentes argumentos, contrasta y critica las distintas hipótesis, explora las implicaciones de unas y otras, aclara los puntos en controversia y adapta una actitud de simpatía critica frente a libertarianos y marxistas, liberales y comunitarios. Todo ello para que haya dialogo, sin renunciar a las convicciones personales y sin caer en la invectiva ni en la exégesis.