Suchergebnisse

Islamic studies in the United States of America is a dense, productive, and globally acclaimed field because of the numerous academic opportunities and international publications in many languages, especially English. However, as in the general of Western universities, the Islamic philosophy/history studies at the universities of the U.S. is rather rare. In this article, firstly, the general state of Islamic Studies from the past to the present in the USA will be analyzed with a descriptive method and the rare position of Islamic Philosophy within the Islamic Studies will be examined. Secondly, the prominent names of the Islamic Philosophy in the Post-Orientalist process and their works will be evaluated. In conclusion, because of the general structure of the U.S. university system, it is revealed that the studies of Islamic Philosophy in the USA are quantitatively less than that in the European and Islamic geographies. This situation can be explicated by two ways. The first is the Islamic Philosophy's weak relation to the knowledge-power target which is the basic principle of the American state philosophy and to the political interests of the U.S. This circumstance forms the background of the Post-Orientalist tendency. The second is the growing interest in the phenomenological method and the dominant positions of cosmopolitanism and interdisciplinary approaches in the American higher education system.

Al enseñar filosofía surge una serie de preguntas ineludibles: qué enseñar, cómo y para qué. En este trabajo intentaremos responder a estos interrogantes didácticos, centrándonos específicamente en la enseñanza de la Filosofía Política en el Bachillerato de Bellas Artes. En particular, en el presente artículo se propondrán ciertos lineamientos con el objetivo de incluir una unidad de Filosofía Política en los programas de séptimo año de la mencionada institución empleando como marco teórico a la hermenéutica de Gadamer, la cual representa a nuestro entender un enriquecimiento de la modalidad histórica propuesta por G. Obiols y A. Cerletti para la enseñanza de la filosofía. ; Why, how and what to teach are some inescapable questions when trying to impart philosophy. In this study, we aimed to answer these questions by focusing on the school teaching of Political Philosophy at the Bachillerato de Bellas Artes. Particularly, we propose some guidelines with the aim of including a Political Philosophy subject in the last degree of that institution. We used Gadamer's hermeneutics as the theoretical framework, which represents an improvement to the G. Obiols'and A. Cerletti's historical approach. ; Bachillerato de Bellas Artes "Prof. Francisco A. De Santo"

IN CROATIAN: Inspirirana Kangrginom definicijom zavičaja kao mjesta gdje se osjećamo dobro autorica razmatra druge konotacije pojma dom kao mjesta brige nasilja, izgona, utopije i mita. Također razmatra mogućnosti bivanja subjektom demokracije za različite deprivilegirane grupe: zlostavljane žene, prognane, izbjegle i druge. --- IN ENGLISH: Inspired by Milan Kangrga's definition of 'home' as the place where we feel at ease (particularly elaborated in an essay by Hrvoje Jurić), I will study other, potential connotations of the term 'home' – as a place of care, hope, utopia and myth. I will also consider 'home' as a potential place for democracy subjects (abused women, displaced people, refugees, and others) for whom Kangrga's view of 'home' is questionable. The study of 'home' from the standpoint of particularity (starting from one's own home, region, people, nation, country, to the universe) versus democracy (studied from the same standpoint since it is a phenomenon subject to historical changes) shows that the mentioned phenomena manifest as privileges of only a few socially determined subjects. Therefore, some consider 'home' as a privilege, while the others see it as an empty or fictional place. The status of democracy subjects is treated in a similar way. Among other things the study points out that the relationship between the general and the particular is questionable, especially when it comes to issues dealt with in political philosophy. For example, what happens when the particular becomes dominant, or when it is denied by what is general, i.e. historically or politically dominant (for example, male or European by nature).

Kant's characterisation of honeste vive as an unenforceable duty of right owed to oneself poses two systematic problems: it conflicts with Kant's claims that (a) duties of right concern the external relation between distinct individuals and (b) duties of right are externally enforceable. Both of these claims speak against the possibility of a duty of right to oneself. This article addresses this interpretative problem. Regarding (a) I suggest that while honeste vive is a duty owed to oneself, the content of the duty concerns one's interaction with others. Regarding (b) I maintain that honeste vive is a general duty of right, and such duties are not externally enforceable. This view both allows for an understanding of the structure of obligation in the Doctrine of Right as a whole and forces us to reconsider two central aspects of Kant's concept of right—namely, that all rights are externally enforceable and owed to others. Not only does honeste vive belong to the Doctrine of Right but understanding the way in which it does can illuminate the significance and scope of duties belonging to Kant's political philosophy.

Kant's view of the relation between ethical and politico-juridical norms has been debated in the literature, especially his view in the Rechtslehre. Apart from the exegetical question about the accurate interpretation of Kant's practical philosophy, at stake is also the general issue of the kind of politico-juridical normgiving we think we should have in our society. I have claimed that the fundamental positions in the literature on Kant can be reconciled, and, on the basis of Kant's claims in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals, I have argued that ethical principles formulate in a complex way certain requirements that politico-juridical principles will have to meet in order to be appropriate principles for a society. I have also shown that the direct independentist position, according to which politico-juridical principles cannot be derived from the ethical ones, holds only when we regard principles from the perspective of subjective validity. In this paper, I examine the relation between ethical and politico-juridical principles on the basis of Kant's claims in the Tugendlehre. My claim is that the interpretation of his view needs to be adjusted in order to accommodate his claims in the Doctrine of Virtue. We will end up with an even more complex relation; on this revised interpretation, Kant would still regard politico-juridical principles as dependent in a complex way on ethical principles, but only on a specific subset of ethical principles. This will mean that the other ethical principles will not ground politicojuridical principles; the latter will be independent from the former, and this will be additional support for the independentist position.

I explore the idea that the state should love its citizens. It should not be indifferent towards them. Nor should it merely respect them. It should love them. I begin by looking at the bases of this idea. First, it can be grounded by a concern with state subordination. The state has enormous power over its citizens. This threatens them with subordination. Love ameliorates this threat. Second, it can be grounded by the state's lack of moral status. We all have reason to love everyone. But we beings with moral status have an excuse for not loving everyone: we have our own lives to lead. The state has no such excuse. So, the state should love everyone. I then explore the nature of the loving state. I argue that the loving state is a liberal state. It won't interfere in its citizens' personal spheres. It is a democratic state. It will adopt its citizens' ends as its own. It is a welfare state. It will be devoted to its citizens' well-being. And it is an egalitarian state. It will treat all its citizens equally. This constitutes a powerful third argument, an abductive argument, for the ideal of the loving state.

Animal sentience research cannot be divorced from its ethical and political implications. For example, discovering which animals are sentient is vital for deciding which require welfare protection. Two legal case-studies illustrate the importance of scientists in such debates: the UK Animal Welfare (Sentience) Act 2022 had input from animal sentience researchers, whereas the US Animal Welfare Act 1966 did not. The former defined sentient animals much more plausibly than the latter. I accordingly argue that sentience researchers should inform policy, and that this is achievable without sacrificing scientific integrity.

IN CROATIAN: Godine 2017. Hrvatsko filozofsko društvo obilježilo je dvije obljetnice: 500. obljetnicu protestantske reformacije i 100. obljetnicu Oktobarske revolucije. Početkom protestantske reformacije simbolično se određuje 31. listopada 1517. godine kada je Martin Luther na vrata crkve u Wittenbergu objesio svojih 95 teza o oprostima grijeha. Događaji koji su uslijedili, predvođeni pozivom više društvenih i vjerskih pokreta na crkvenu reformu, doveli su do raskola Zapadne crkve, nastanka protestantizma te brojnih drugih političkih, ekonomskih i društvenih promjena. Oktobarska revolucija 1917. godine predstavlja drugu i posljednju fazu Ruske revolucije kao odgovora carskom politikom nezadovoljnih seljaka, radnika i vojnika. Njezine su neposredne posljedice bile ukidanje apsolutističke monarhije na čelu s carem Nikolom II., a posredne inauguracija sovjetskog režima i nastanak Sovjetskog Saveza kao vodeće svjetske sile. Premda navedena povijesna zbivanja ne dijele ni mjesto ni trenutak, zajednička osobina protestantske reformacije i Oktobarske revolucije odnosi se na njihov neizmjeran politički, kulturni, ekonomski i intelektualni utjecaj na suvremenu sliku svijeta. Također, njihova je zajednička ontološka pretpostavka sadržana u društvenom momentumu, čiji su pokretači nezadovoljstvo i kritika postojećih okolnosti te nada (naivna ili učena) u mogućnost njihove promjene. Drugim riječima rečeno, u prirodi je reformacija i revolucija transgresija (za)danoga, pri čemu se reformacijske promjene najčešće određuju kao usmjerene k popravljanju, a revolucijske k rušenju postojećih društvenih struktura.Ova je distinkcija ujedno opterećena brojnim normativnim određenjima. S jedne strane, npr. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Hannah Arendt, Rosa Luxemburg i Gajo Petrović – premda, dakako, iz bitno različitih teorijskih ishodišta – promoviraju vrijednost revolucija i njihovu neumitnost za ostvarenje boljeg društva i svijeta. S druge strane, teoretičari poput Edmunda Burkea, Karla Poppera i Francisa Fukuyame revolucijama odriču trajnu i pozitivnu ulogu u promjeni postojećega jer one, u svojim krajnjim konsekvencama, parafraziramo li čuvenu Büchnerovu rečenicu, poput Saturna, jedu svoju djecu. Pritom oni revolucijama najčešće suprotstavljaju reformacije kao mirne i postupne mijene (obnove, poboljšanja ili usavršavanja), koje ne riskiraju pad u bezvlađe i kaos. Unatoč ovakvim analitičkim distinkcijama, granice između revolucija i reformacija propusne su, o čemu najbolje svjedoči upravo protestantska reformacija, a nerijetko su spoznatljive tek post festum. Imajući u vidu navedeno, interdisciplinarni simpozij s međunarodnim sudjelovanjem "Reformacije i revolucije. Povodom 500. obljetnice protestantske reformacije i 100. obljetnice Oktobarske revolucije", održan u Zagrebu 14.–16. prosinca 2017. godine, nije samo predstavio izlaganja u kojima se promišljalo filozofsko, geopolitičko, kulturno i ekonomsko nasljeđe protestantske reformacije i Oktobarske revolucije nego i izlaganja u kojima su se razmatrali pojmovi reformacije i revolucije kao takvi, njihovo značenje, položaj danas te njihove perspektive u budućnosti. Izbor radova koji su nastali na osnovi izlaganja sa spomenutog simpozija donosimo u ovoj knjizi. --- IN ENGLISH: In 2017, the Croatian Philosophical Society marked two anniversaries: the 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation and the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution. The beginning of the Protestant Reformation is symbolically set on October 31, 1517, when Martin Luther nailed his 95 theses on indulgences on the door of a church in Wittenberg. The events that followed, driven by the call of several social and religious movements for church reform, led to the schism of the Western Church, the emergence of Protestantism and many other political, economic and social changes. The October Revolution of 1917 represents the second and last phase of the Russian Revolution policy as a response of peasants, workers and soldiers dissatisfied by the tsarist policy. Its immediate consequences were the abolition of the absolutist monarchy led by Tsar Nicholas II, and indirect the inauguration of the Soviet regime and the emergence of the Soviet Union as the world's leading power. Although these historical events do not share a place or a moment, the common feature of the Protestant Reformation and the October Revolution relates to their immeasurable political, cultural, economic and intellectual impact on the contemporary image of the world. Also, their common ontological assumption is contained in the social momentum, whose drivers are dissatisfaction and criticism of existing circumstances, and hope (naïve or educated) in the possibility of their change. In other words, in the nature of the reformations and the revolutions is a transgression of the given, where the reformation changes are most often defined as aimed at repairing, and the revolutionary changes at the destruction of existing social structures. The latter distinction is burdened by numerous normative denotations. On the one hand, for example, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl Marx, Hannah Arendt, Rosa Luxemburg and Gajo Petrović – although, of course, from fundamentally different theoretical starting positions – promote the value of revolutions and their inevitability in the creation of a better society and world. On the other hand, theorists like Edmund Burke, Karl Popper, and Francis Fukuyama deny revolutions a lasting and positive role in changing the existing because they, in their ultimate consequences, to paraphrase Büchner's famous sentence, like Saturn, devour their own children. At the same time, they usually position revolutions in contrast to reformations, peaceful and gradual changes (renewals, improvements or refinements), which do not risk falling into anarchy and chaos. Despite such analytical distinctions, the boundaries between revolutions and reformations are blurred, as best demonstrated by the Protestant Reformation, and are often recognizable only post festum. With this in mind, an interdisciplinary symposium with international participation "Reformations and Revolutions. On the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the Protestant Reformation and the 100th anniversary of the October Revolution", held in Zagreb on 14-16 December 2017, not only presented talks reflecting on the philosophical, geopolitical, cultural and economic heritage of the Protestant Reformation and the October Revolution, but also those discussing the concepts of reformation and of revolution as such, their meaning, contemporary position and their future perspectives. The selection of papers from the mentioned symposium is presented in this book.

IN ENGLISH: Sport is still understood as a traditional bastion of masculinity that exalts physical qualities such as strength and speed, and psychological traits such as aggression and perseverance, deeming women's participation undesirable and unnecessary. Nevertheless, women for decades, in strict separation from men or within so-called "women's sports", were achieving results worthy of the attention of even the fiercest sceptics. Because of its nature founded in physicality, sport is still relatively seldom the area of political struggle for gender equality, although female athletes have occasionally done more for positive outcomes of that struggle than is acknowledged. In this paper, I discuss the ambivalent nature of sport contributing, on the one hand, to the essentialisation of genders in their differences and the petrification of power relations between them, and containing, on the other, indications of destruction or at least of corruption of the traditional, hierarchically established gender norms. The paper consists of four parts. In the first introductory part, I explain the reasons for concentrating my discussion on formalised competitive sports and approaches I am using. While emphasising the biopolitical aspects of the subject, I start my analysis with the description of a proclaimed guiding principles of contemporary sports contained in the spirit of Olympism. In the second part, I discuss the ontology of sport contained in the ideas of the founder of the modern Olympic Games Baron Pierre de Coubertin and the consequential factors influencing women 's participation in sports. These range from the perception of women's allegedly debilitating physical and psychological traits, through hypersexualisation of female athletes' body, or the attitude that it is not feminine enough, to the accusations that female athletes harm their health jeopardising, for example, the basic feminine duty – that of motherhood. In the third part, I put de Coubertin's arguments in the contemporary context emphasising the relevance the concept of hegemonic masculinity has on the contemporary understanding of masculinity and the role of sport in maintaining it. In the last, fourth part, I discuss emancipatory aspects of sports, concluding on their ability to disrupt both essentialised femininity and essentialised masculinity. --- IN CROATIAN: Sport se još uvijek razumijeva kao tradicionalni bastion muškosti koji veliča fizičke kvalitete poput snage i brzine te psihološke kvalitete poput agresivnosti i izdržljivosti određujući sudjelovanje žena nepoželjnim i nepotrebnim. Bez obzira na to žene su desetljećima, u strogoj razdvojenosti od muškaraca ili u takozvanim »ženskim sportovima«, postizale rezultate dostojne pažnje i najvećih skeptika. Zbog svoje prirode zasnovane u tjelesnosti sport je još uvijek rijetko područje političke borbe za rodnu ravnopravnost, premda sportašice povremeno više doprinose pozitivnim ishodima te borbe no što im se pripisuje. U ovom radu raspravljam o ambivalentnoj prirodi sporta koji, s jedne strane, doprinosi esencijalizaciji rodova u njihovoj različitosti te petrifikaciji međusobnih odnosa moći, a s druge strane sadrži pokazatelje destrukcije ili barem kvarenja tradicionalnih, hijerarhijski uspostavljenih rodnih normi. Rad se sastoji od četiri dijela. U prvom, uvodnom dijelu objašnjavam razloge svoje usmjerenosti na formalizirane kompetitivne sportove te pristupe koje koristim. Naglašavajući biopolitičke aspekte teme analizu započinjem opisom proklamiranih vodećih principa suvremenog sporta sadržanih u duhu olimpizma. U drugom dijelu raspravljam o ontologiji sporta sadržanoj u idejama osnivača suvremenih Olimpijskih igara baruna Pierrea de Coubertina te o posljedičnim čimbenicima koji su utjecali na sudjelovanje žena u sportu. Raspon spomenutih čimbenika seže od percepcije ženskih fizičkih i psihičkih osobina kao manjkavih, preko hiperseksualizacije tijela sportašica ili pak tvrdnji da nisu dovoljno ženstvene, do optužbi da ugrožavaju vlastito zdravlje dovodeći u opasnost primarnu žensku dužnost – majčinstvo. U trećem dijelu de Coubertinove argumente smještam u suvremeni kontekst, naglašavajući važnost koju koncept hegemonijske muškosti ima u suvremenom razumijevanju muškosti i ulogu sporta u održavanju iste. U posljednjem, četvrtom dijelu, raspravljam o emancipatornim aspektima sporta, zaključujući o njegovoj sposobnosti destrukcije kako esencijalizirane ženskosti tako i esencijalizirane muškosti.

In ENGLISH: In this paper, I discuss features of literary utopias that make them socially engaging. Understanding social engagement as a form of transcending the existent and creating a better life, a better society and a better world, in the first part of the paper I argue that contemporary social rejection of utopias is not primarily a consequence of their naivety or inconclusiveness but their promise and incitement of social change. There are four attributes that, I believe, can explain engaging capacities of literary utopias – feasibility, criticality, democracy of authorship and seductiveness. In the second part, I will describe and contextualize each one of them. Seductiveness of literary utopias lies in their ability to immerse readers into their imaginary worlds, describing life as it could and should be. Utopian feasibility reminds utopian readers of their responsibility for creating a better (or worse) world and future. Utopian criticality represents an articulation of awareness and attitude towards the real world. Utopian democracy of authorship refers to the opening up a space for different voices, different experiences and different visions. I will conclude on the dangers of giving up utopia not just for the fate of utopian literature and utopian thinking in general but the fate of social change as well. --- IN CROATIAN: U ovom radu raspravljam o onim značajkama književnih utopija koje potiču društveni angažman. Razumijevajući društveni angažman kao oblik transcendencije postojećeg s intencijom stvaranja boljeg postojanja, u prvom dijelu rada suvremenu društvenu kritiku utopija određujem posljedicom ne njihove navodne naivnosti već njihova inherentnog kapaciteta za poticanjem društvenih promjena. Značajke književnih utopija o kojima je riječ su zavodljivost, ostvarivost, kritičnost i demokratičnost autorstva. U drugom dijelu rada opisujem i kontekstualiziram svaku od njih. Zavodljivost književnih utopija leži u njihovoj sposobnosti da urone čitatelje/ice u svoj imaginarni svijet, opisujući život onakvim kakav bi on mogao i trebao (ili ne bi trebao) biti. Utopijska ostvarivost predstavljajući čovjeka jedinim odgovornim za vlastitu sudbinu kreira djelatnu vezu između čitatelja/ice i imaginarnog svijeta. Utopijska kritičnost predstavlja artikulaciju svijesti i odnosa prema postojećem svijetu. Utopijska demokratičnost autorstva odnosi se na otvaranje prostora za različite glasove, različita iskustva i različite vizije kao značajne odrednice svakog društvenog angažmana.

In spite of its dominance, there are well-known problems with Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium (MRE), as a method of justification in meta-ethics. One issue in particular has preoccupied commentators, namely, the capacity of this method to provide a convincing account of the objectivity of our moral beliefs. Call this the Lack-of-Objectivity Charge. One aim of this article is to examine the charge within the context of Rawls's later philosophy, and I claim that the lack-of-objectivity charge remains unanswered. A second aim of this article is to examine the extent to which, despite Rawls's express intention to avoid reliance on Kant's moral philosophy, supplementing Rawls's political constructivism with some Kantian elements, in particular Kant's idea of a universal principle of right, not only addresses some of the issues raised by the lack-of-objectivity charge, but also does so without compromising the ability of the Rawlsian account to accommodate the pluralism of conceptions of the good, which he takes to be a fact of modern democracies. I argue for a revised justificatory methodology, which combines Rawls's MRE and Kant's Critical Method.

Controversial view agnosticism (CVA) is the thesis that we are rationally obligated to withhold judgment about a large portion of our beliefs in controversial subject areas, such as philosophy, religion, morality and politics. Given that one's social identity is in no small part a function of one's positive commitments in controversial areas, CVA has unsurprisingly been regarded as objectionably 'spineless.' That said, CVA seems like an unavoidable consequence of a prominent view in the epistemology of disagreement—conformism—according to which the rational response to discovering that someone you identify as an epistemic peer or expert about p disagrees with you vis-à-vis p is to withhold judgment. This paper proposes a novel way to maintain the core conciliatory insight without devolving into an agnosticism that is objectionably spineless. The approach offered takes as a starting point the observation that–for reasons that will be made clear—the contemporary debate has bypassed the issue of the reasonableness of maintaining, rather than giving up, representational states weaker than belief in controversial areas. The new position developed and defended here explores this overlooked space; what results is a kind of controversial view

According to Oliver Sensen's book, Kant on Human Dignity, the notion of dignity which can be found in the Kantian corpus is fundamentally different from the notion that gains currency in politics-related contexts today, namely, dignity as a value inherent in human beings, a value that commands respect. According to Sensen, Kant's ethics makes it impossible for a value to be the foundation of a moral requirement; instead, Kant regards value as a prescription of reason, a prescription given by the moral law. Values are normatively secondary and determined by moral laws – call this the Strong Priority Thesis (SPT) of the moral law over values. In this paper, I formulate several objections to Sensen's SPT and I offer the Weaker Priority Thesis (WPT) as a philosophically and exegetically more compelling account of Kant's view. The WPT interprets Kant as advancing a more complex account of the relation between moral law, values and dignity than Sensen's SPT; moreover, I argue that, on the basis of the WPT, Kant's account becomes sufficiently complex to incorporate also the SPT

The secular interpretation of Kant is widespread and Kant is viewed as the most prestigious founding father of liberal secularism. At the same time, however, commentators note that Kant's position on secularism is in fact much more complex, and some go as far as to talk about an ambiguous secularism in his work. This paper defends a refined version of the secular interpretation. According to this refined version, Kant can offer a limited, political secularism on the basis of a simple argument which focuses on the distinct epistemic statuses of political and religious claims; however, the paper argues, a more general secularism is unwarranted on the basis of the same argument. If my argument is correct, then it will account at least in part for the plurality of interpretations. Moreover, any further attempt to show that Kant's relation to secularism is ambiguous or dismissive should take into consideration the argument from epistemic grounds presented here

In this article, I argue that autonomy has to be conceived substantively in order to serve as the qualifying condition for receiving the full set of individual liberal rights. I show that the common distinction between content‐neutral and substantive accounts of autonomy is riddled with confusion and ambiguities, and provide a clear alternative taxonomy. At least insofar as we are concerned with liberal settings, the real question is whether or not the value(s) and norm(s) implied by an account of autonomy are acceptable to reasonable people, not whether these accounts are content‐neutral, procedural or input‐focused. Finally, I demonstrate how substantive constraints are compatible with, or even implied in, the notion of autonomy at play in (Rawls's) political liberalism. Overall, I present a normative reconstruction, clarification, and internal critique of liberalism, drawing on case law and statutes from England and Wales.