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AbstractThis article has two objectives: one is to distinguish and explicate four concepts of solidarity which are found in the writings of Hannah Arendt; the other is to show how Arendt's respect for facts and suspicion of sentiment publicly displayed are justified. The first concept of solidarity is exclusive solidarity. It is limited to those who are suffering from exploitation or oppression. The second conception of solidarity is inclusive: it includes those who suffer but can also accommodate those who make common cause with them. This is the only kind of solidarity that Arendt specifically analyzes. A third concept of solidarity is universal: its proximate constituent parts are the different "peoples" who collectively make up humankind. Finally, there is natural solidarity. This variety of solidarity, the author argues, is conceptually inadequate and confused. In the development and articulation of each of these four concepts, some attention is given to the relative contributions of emotion and cognition in determining one's understanding of solidarity.

AbstractThis article deals with the conception of the State defended by libertarian author Murray N. Rothbard. An American economist, Rothbard has been for more than three decades the foremost advocate and theoretician of anarcho-capitalism. The purpose of the article is to show that the theses put forward by Rothbard regarding the nature, origin and legitimacy of the State do not square with the methodological prescriptions and the fundamental axioms that he himself upholds as the ultimate judgment criteria of a theory. In fact, neither the definition of human action as end-governed, nor methodological individualism, nor the concept of demonstrated preference can be reconciled with explanations in which conspiration, manipulation and involuntary ignorance play a decisive part.

AbstractRobert Nozick argues that inviolable capitalist property rights are a necessary corollary of the free society. This view is grounded in his commitment to the classical liberal principle of equal liberty. This article tests the internal coherence of Nozick's perspective with reference to the demands set by this principle. It is argued that his laissez-faire proposals cannot satisfy these demands. This prompts a consideration of the type of socio-economic arrangements that could respond to the dilemmas posed by the equal liberty principle, the suggestion being that a participatory democratic framework would promote a response superior to Nozick's.