Abstract. In the article, we discuss how the political communication and interpersonal influence found in discussion networks add to fragmentation of the political space and the strengthening of political parties at the extremes of the political continuum. To this end, we analyse the mobilisation potential held by discussion networks of people who position themselves on the margins of the left–right political spectrum and compare them with the networks of those positioned in the centre and those who do not align themselves politically. The analysis focuses on four features of discussion networks: size, homogeneity, frequency of political discussion, and frequency of trying to persuade others. The results of the analysis show the most extensive mobilisation potential is found among people in the centre of the political continuum, while people on the far right and far left have networks that are the basis of intense political communication with people holding different political views but lack opportunities for the broad network dissemination of their political views and attitudes. Keywords: discussion networks, political communication, left-right political orientation
We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; We find ourselves in a time that has brought significant changes to the way we communicate. The technological progress and rise of social media have shaped both the news media and the contemporary political landscape, impacting and altering political discourse. As a result, the role of social media in political communication has become pervasive, and politicians now tend to communicate more directly with the public without the intermediary of traditional media. The position of the mainstream media as a neutral actor in reporting the news has also been tainted as the media has become increasingly dependent on advertising and thus more vulnerable to the pressures of corporate or state sponsors. Combined, we find ourselves situated in an era where more people are turning to social media for their news, while terms such as disinformation, fake news, post-truth, hate speech and conspiracy theory have become commonplace. In this new public square of communication, it often happens that one person's conspiracy theory is another person's truth, one person's facts are another's fake news, and one person's hate speech is someone else's freedom of speech. ; Današnji čas je prinesel pomembne spremembe v načinu, kako komuniciramo drug z drugim. Tehnološki napredek in razmah družbenih medijev sta vplivala tako na informativne medije kot na sodobni politični prostor, kar ima pomembne posledice za politični govor. Vloga družbenih medijev v politični komunikaciji se je povečala, saj politiki čedalje bolj neposredno komunicirajo z javnostjo brez posredništva tradicionalnih medijev. Poleg tega je čedalje bolj pod vprašajem nevtralnost osrednjih medijev pri poročanju, saj so vedno bolj odvisni od oglaševanja in tako pod posrednim ali neposrednim vplivom različnih korporativnih ali državnih sponzorjev. Tako smo se znašli v času, ko vse več ljudi informacije pridobi v družbenih medijih, medtem ko so izrazi dezinformacija, lažne novice, postresničnost, sovražni govor in teorije zarote postali vsakdanji del govora. V novem javnem prostoru komunikacije se pogosto zgodi, da je to, kar kdo dojema kot teorijo zarote, za koga drugega resničnost, da so to, kar kdo dojema kot dejstva, za koga drugega lažne novice, in da je to, kar kdo dojema kot sovražni govor, za koga drugega svoboda govora.
"Ich habe keine Ahnung." (Kermani, 2009, 86) Das behauptet Navid Kermani in seinem Essay Die Terroristen sind unter uns, der 2009 im Band Wer ist Wir? Deutschland und seine Muslime erschienen ist. Es ist ein sehr wichtiger, ja zentraler Satz, der oft gedacht, aber selten öffentlich ausgesprochen wird. Niemand, der eine leitende Position in der Politik, der Wirtschaft oder beim Militär bekleidet, darf es sich leisten, diesen Satz in den Medien zu äußern, aber auch im Wissenschaftsdiskurs darf er nicht verwendet werden, es sei denn als Zitat. Es gibt mindestens drei Eigenschaften dieser Aussage, die sie für die erwähnten Diskurse ungeeignet machen. Erstens das Sprachniveau: durch den etwas saloppen Beiklang lässt sich die Aussage dem umgangssprachlichen Niveau zuordnen und nicht dem Niveau offizieller oder wissenschaftlicher Reden. Zweitens ihre Struktur: durch die Ich-Form wird der Satz zur Aussage des sprechenden Subjekts über sich selbst, nicht über einen Sachverhalt. Und drittens die Semantik: Das verneinte Substantiv spricht dem Subjekt nicht nur jedes rationale Wissen ab, das sich argumentieren und belegen ließe, sondern auch jede andere Grundlage, auf der sich eine Aussage zu einem Sachverhalt formulieren ließe, also auch Vermutungen, Vorurteile, Spekulationen, Gefühle oder die Intuition. Das Problem dabei ist nicht, dass auch diese alternativen Grundlagen fehlen, sondern dass sie, durch die Wahl des Substantivs "Ahnung", überhaupt als Möglichkeit eingeräumt werden. Wenn durch diese Merkmale die zitierte Aussage aus dem Rahmen fachbezogener Diskurse fällt und sogar für journalistische Textformen unpassend ist, so ist sie im literarischen Diskurs durchaus zulässig. ; The essays of the German writer and professor of Middle East Studies, Navid Kermani, focus on current political and social issues, such as migration, terrorism and the problems of multicultural societies. The article offers an analysis of selected essays and gives a brief overview of their context, including a discussion about the relation between literature and politics as it evolved after World War II in Germany. The analysis makes it possible to see Kermani's essays in the tradition of open dialogical essays that goes back to the writings of Michel de Montaigne, as shown in the theories of Peter V. Zima. The processes of fictionalization that are used by Kermani in his political essays are compared with those used in so called "post-truth" political discourse. Although these processes are comparable and their effects unpredictable, it is possible to locate some basic differences in their narrative structures that can either suggest that the narrator is all-knowing, which reinforces his position of power, or can stress the narrator's tentativeness, which opens the possibility for the reader to enter into a dialogue with him, thus leading to the kind of constructive dialogue that is of fundamental importance for democratic societies. It is the raising of questions and articulation of doubt that Kermani sees as his main task when writing his essays. ; Navid Kermani, nemški pisatelj in profesor orientalistike, se v svojih esejih posveča aktualnim političnim in socialnim vprašanjem, kot so migracije, terorizem in večkulturne družbe. Članek podaja podrobnejšo analizo izbranih Kermanijevih esejev ter jih umesti v tradicijo dialoško odprte esejistike (kakor jo po teoriji Petra V. Zime zastopa na primer Michel de Montaigne) in v kontekst nemških povojnih razprav o razmerju med literaturo in politiko. Nato postopke fikcionalizacije, kakor se kažejo v Kermanijevih političnih esejih, primerja s postopki v tako imenovanih postfaktičnih političnih diskurzih. Čeprav so postopki primerljivi in njihovi učinki načelno nepredvidljivi, je mogoče locirati temeljne razlike v njihovi narativni strukturi, ki lahko sugerira vsevednost pripovedovalca in s tem krepi njegovo pozicijo moči ali poudarja njegovo negotovost ter tako bralcu odpira možnost, da z njim stopi v konstruktiven dialog, ki je temeljnega pomena za demokratične družbe. Prav v odpiranju vprašanj in artikuliranju dvomov Kermani kot avtor esejev vidi svoje pisateljsko poslanstvo.
Abstract. The article explores the significance held by political myths for legitimacy and politics. To that end, we examine political myth in line with the contemporary theory of political myth, which understands political myths as an integral part of all political communities that is not inherent to just authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. Every political community has their own stories/narratives that are accepted by most of the population and form the base of the legitimacy of the political order, whether it be a democratic or a non-democratic political order. In the final part of the article, we examine which narratives had such a legitimising power by analysing the political speeches of Franjo Tuđman while he was in office. Keywords: legitimacy, politics, political myth, political speech analysis, Tuđman.
Abstract. This study considers how today's growing consumer culture affects political trends in representative democracies. In recent years, a significant populist upsurge has been seen around the world. While political approaches are vital, to properly understand populism it is also necessary to take sociological perspectives into account. The questions considered in the study are therefore examined from both political and sociological perspectives. The results of the study show that today's increasing consumer culture is paving the way for the rise of populism in representative democracies. Should the consumer culture experience a significant crisis, populism is likely to become stronger through the support provided by abstaining, blank and pragmatist voters. Keywords: Populism, democracy, consumer society, consumerism, politics
Abstract. Among twentieth-century political philosophers, Americans John Rawls and Robert Nozick are generally recognized as giants – both for the boldness of their arguments and for the influence they have exerted. They sketched rival visions. Rawls, inspired by Immanuel Kant, argued for a world characterized by tolerance, equality, and justice as fairness. Nozick, claiming a Lockean heritage but actually inspired by Adam Smith (the "invisible hand") and Herbert Spencer ("survival of the fittest"), outlined a program for a minimal state, with very little taxation, offering no cushion at all against poverty, and providing no state assistance for the poor, the sick, the disabled, or the widowed. Rawls' vision is clearly part of the liberal tradition, while Nozick's championing of a minimal state contains illiberal elements. Keywords: John Rawls, Robert Nozick, political liberalism, libertarianism, taxation, equality, justice.
Evropski parlament je politično telo, ki že dolgo časa razdvaja javnost. Njegovi nasprotniki po eni strani trdijo, da je tako politično in kulturno heterogen organ nezmožen učinkovitega delovanja, po drugi strani pa naj bi evropski poslanci hitro izgubili stik s svojimi volivci ter glasovali predvsem tako, kot jim to naročijo vodje skupin. Zanimalo nas je, če evropski poslanci glasujejo dovolj avtomatično in predvidljivo, da bi lahko rezultate glasovanj uspešno napovedovali z modelom strojnega učenja. Da smo zmanjšali časovno kompleksnost smo se odločili za napovedovaje rezultatov glasovanj po političnih strankah. Najprej smo implementirali spletne pajke, s katerimi smo pridobili čim več rezultatov glasovanj in z njimi povezanih podatkov. Iz teh smo nato z interdisciplinarno kombinacijo metod podatkovnega rudarjenja ter strokovnega geopolitičnega znanja izluščili značilke in zgradili model. Rezultati so pokazali približno 80% uspešnost napovedovanja rezultatov glasovanj (uteženi oceni f1 in roc-auc). Napovedovanje je bilo bistveno bolj uspešno pri strankah s proevropsko,liberalno in globalistično politično usmeritvijo kot to velja za evroskeptične, ekonomsko socialne in nacionalistične stranke. S tem smo dodatno podprli tezo o obstoju in pomembnosti nove nacionalistično-globalistične politične delitve. Poleg tega predstavlja problem tudi razred vzdržanih glasovanj, ki ga je težko napovedati že s pomočjo človeške inteligence. ; European parliament is the major political legislative body of the EU that causes divides in public opinion since its beginning. While some of its opponents usually point out its political and culutural heterogenity as a major weakness and cause of inability to function eciently, others claim that MEPs often quickly lose their connection with voters and vote mainly as it is directed to them by the leaders of their politival groups. We wanted to nd out if MEPs voting patterns are predictable enough to be successfully predicted with machine-learning based computer model. To reduce time complexity of the problem we rather focused on joint votes of (national) political parties than individual MEPs. At rst we implemented web crawlers that we used to extract as many roll-call voting oriented data as we can. Than we combined data mining with expert geopolitcal approach to extract the features and build a model for voting prediction. Our predictions were overall nearly 80% successful (weighted f1, roc-auc), however results vary greatly between political groups. It became clear that we could easily predict votes of coallition parties with liberal-globalist political orientation while eurosceptic, economic social and nationalist parties seemed to be much more unpredictable. With that information we further backed the importance of the new nationalist-globalist political cleavage. A challenge to the model presents also a class of votes of abstention, which is hard to successfully predict even with expert human-knowledge.
This paper analyzes the issue of nations without states in contemporary Europe between the Atlantic and the Urals. The political map of the continent comprises forty-seven countries, most of which are nation-states. However, the cultural mosaic of Europe is far more complex; there are around fifty ethnic groups (in addition to historical, territorial, or indigenous ethnic minorities and an enormous number of immigrant ethnic communities) lacking a state-based organization. Together, these people add up to 78 million, or almost 15% of the European population. Twenty-seven groups can be considered nations without states; they are culturally and ethnically based and have various forms of territorial integrity and political organization. However, they did not create a state organization, despite many attempts by some through history. Without a state organization, those communities have poorer opportunities to protect their folk culture and to reproduce various elements of ethnic identity. This is why they seek territorial autonomy or independent statehood through nationalist movements. In many cases, these ambitions are encompassed in regional movements. These movements have been popular in Europe, particularly because the idea of a "Europe of regions" as part of the European Union has had broad political support and acceptance. However, it has not actually succeeded. The EU and Europe as a whole are still a Europe of (nation)-states. In general, regional movements have been successful and through this some nations without states have attained part of their political ambitions in the form of territorial autonomy. The regionalization of former centralist states (e.g., Spain and the United Kingdom) increased the chances of ethnic survival for the Catalans, Basques, Scots, and Welsh. On the other hand, the regionalization of nations without states represented territorial division, a kind of "divide and rule" strategy serving to reduce their ambitions towards national independence. The territorial and political reconstruction of nation-states has been successful, but it did not solve all ethnic problems. The European political map reveals another interesting phenomenon: a double state for some nations. These are particularly typical for the Balkans. Because of political and territorial development after the Second World War and during the transition period in the 1990s and beyond, the principle of immutable political borders (logically encompassing the creation of new nation-states as well) led to further political and territorial divisions and (in fact, paradoxically) fragmentation. Some of these "inner" autonomous territories are functioning as de facto states. The cases of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina are good examples of these processes. This development has not garnered much political support in most European countries or at the EU level. However, it is an undesirable reality and is certainly one of changes among the political and territorial (or even greater) challenges for the Europe of tomorrow. It forces a reexamination of the phenomenon and value of nations. The existence of nations without states represents a potential for the creation of new (nation) states.
Politična korektnost predstavlja velik problem v današnji družbi, ki skuša biti inkluzivna. V inkluzivni družbi je namreč pomemben jezik, ki ga uporabljamo, saj ne želimo nikogar diskriminirati ali izključiti iz družbe. Magistrsko delo se osredotoča na politično korektne in nekorektne izraze, ki se pojavijo na socialnem omrežju Twitter v času predvolilne kampanje v ZDA in v Avstriji. Zanimal me je predvsem jezik štirih predsedniških kandidatov: Donalda Trumpa in Hillary Clinton iz ZDA ter Norberta Hoferja in Alexandra van der Bellena iz Avstrije. S pomočjo izbranih objav na socialnem omrežju Twitter sem skušala poiskati povezave med Avstrijo in ZDA. V teoretičnem delu sem navedla vse potrebne definicije in prikazala politično korektnost v povezavi z drugimi jezikovnimi fenomeni, kot so tabuji, stereotipi in predsodki. Ločeno sem obravnavala politično korektnost v Avstriji in politično korektnost v ZDA. Zanimala me je tudi povezava politične korektnosti s svobodo govora. Raziskala sem, s katerimi zakoni je urejena pravica do svobode govora v Avstriji oz. Evropi ter v ZDA. V empiričnem delu sledi analiza izbranih objav. Vse politično nekorektne in politično korektne izraze, ki so se pojavili v času predvolilne kampanje, sem razdelila v kategorije in jih analizirala tako statistično kot tudi jezikovno. Rezultati so pokazali razliko med ZDA in Avstrijo glede rabe politično korektnega jezika in zmage na volitvah. V ZDA je namreč zmagal kandidat, ki je med kampanjo uporabil največ politično nekorektnih izrazov. V Avstriji pa je zmagal politično najbolj korekten kandidat. Največ različnih politično nekorektnih izrazov se je pojavilo na področju rasnega/etničnega razlikovanja, kar sem tudi pričakovala. ; Political correctness matters for inclusive society. Language that we use is very important in an inclusive society because we do not want to discriminate or exclude anyone from society. This master's thesis focuses on politically correct and politically incorrect terms that appeared in the social network Twitter during the election campaign in the USA and Austria. I was interested in the language of the four presidential candidates, Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton from the USA, and Norbert Hofer and Alexander Van der Bellen from Austria. I tried to find similarities and differences between Austria and the USA with the help of selected posts on Twitter. The theoretical part, contains the definition of political correctness and show political correctness in relation to other linguistic phenomena, such as taboos, stereotypes and prejudices. Political correctness in Austria and political correctness in the USA are compared and political correctness is associated to the freedom of speech. The legislation regulating right to the freedom of speech in Austria and in the USA is discussed. The empirical part presents an analysis of selected Twitter posts. All politically incorrect and politically correct terms that were found during the election campaign were divided into categories and analyzed both statistically as well as linguistically. I have found out that politically correct language is not necessary for an election victory. In the USA a candidate who used the most politically incorrect expressions during the campaign won. In Austria, on the other hand, the most politically correct candidate won. Most politically incorrect expressions appeared in the category racial/ethnical discrimination, which was expected.
Politična participacija je ključnega pomena za delovanje in razvoj koncepta demokracije, saj predstavlja orodje, prek katerega lahko državljani izvajajo pritiske na politično elito. To vlogo zavzema poleg konvencionalne tudi nekonvencionalna politična participacija. Osrednji poudarek bo namenjen protestni participaciji, ki se najpogosteje opredeljuje kot ena izmed kompleksnejših oblik kolektivne akcije, skozi katero državljani najvidneje izražajo svoja prepričanja, hkrati pa najbolj jasno odraža nezadovoljstvo državljanov. Osredotočili se bomo na protestno participacijo v obdobju ekonomske krize, ki je leta 2008 zajela države Evropske unije. V okviru empirične analize se tako osredotočamo na dejavnike, ki so v zastavljenem obdobju privedli do izbruha protestne participacije, pri čemer nas zanimajo predvsem različne kombinacije vzročnih poti, ki jih ti dejavniki tvorijo. Ključno raziskovalno vprašanje se nanaša na možne kombinacije pogojev, ki v obdobju ekonomske krize rezultirajo v prisotnosti ali odsotnosti protestov v državah EU. Te kombinacije tvorijo naslednji dejavniki: materialna deprivacija, brezposelnost, razvitost civilne družbe in razvitost demokracije. Empirična analiza temelji na kvalitativni primerjalni analizi (QCA) oziroma bolj specifično na crisp-set QCA. Slednjo se uporablja za obdelavo kompleksnejših binarnih podatkov, pri čemer je cilj poenostavitev teh podatkovnih struktur v preprost in logičen zapis. S pomočjo izbrane metode analize smo prišli do ugotovitve, da do zastavljenega izida ne vodi le en sam pogoj ali ena sama kombinacija pogojev, temveč nastane več raznolikih vzročnih poti, ki lahko rezultirajo tako v odsotnosti kot v prisotnosti izida (protestnih akcij). ; Political participation is crucial for the functioning and development of the concept of democracy, as it represents a communication tool through which citizens can exert pressure on the political elite. Besides the conventional form, unconventional political participation has this role, too. The main focus will be on protest participation, which is most often identified as one of the more complex forms of collective action, through which citizens most visibly express their beliefs ; at the same time it reflects dissatisfaction of citizens most transparently. The highlight will therefore be on protest participation in the period of economic crisis affecting the countries of the European Union since 2008. In the context of the empirical analysis we focus on factors that led to an outbreak of protest participation within the set period. We are particularly interested in the various combinations of causal paths formed by these factors. The key research question therefore refers to the possible combinations of conditions, resulting in the presence or in the absence of protests in EU countries in times of economic crisis. These combinations are formed by the following factors: material deprivation, unemployment, development of civil society and development of democracy. Empirical analysis is based on qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) or more specifically on the crisp-set QCA. The latter is used to process more complex binary data, the aim being to simplify these data structures into a simple and logical notation. By using the selected method of analysis, we came to the conclusion that not only one condition or a single combination of conditions leads to the set outcome. Rather there emerges a variety of causal paths, which can result in both the absence and in the presence of the outcome (protest actions).
V pričujoči raziskavi smo preučili strukturo, dejavnike in posledice politične kulture in državljanske participacije v postjugoslovanskih družbah. Uporabljenih je bilo več virov kvantitativnih podatkov, med drugim raziskava 2.178 študentov družboslovja v osmih postjugoslovanskih entitetah (M starost = 19,8 leta, SD = 1,89) ; reprezentativni vzorci Evropske raziskave vrednot (2008) ; pretekli valovi Svetovne raziskave vrednot (1995/8) in podatki raziskave jugoslovanske mladine (Jupio, 1986). Analiza na agregatni ravni je pokazala, da so v socioekonomsko manj razvitih okoljih (Kosovo, BiH in NJR Makedonija) v večji meri prisotni elementi podložniške politične kulture (Almond in Verba, 1963), v okviru katere so se kot ključni elementi na individualni ravni izkazali avtoritarnost, splošni tradicionalizem, tradicionalni pogled na spolne vloge in nacionalizem. Medentitetne razlike na merah ekonomske kulture (ekonomski egalitarizem in državni paternalizem) so povečini majhne in statistično neznačilne, saj vse entitete na obeh indikatorjih dosegajo visoke povprečne vrednosti. V skladu s predvidevanji dopolnjene modernizacijske teorije je demokratična politična kultura bolj koherentna v socioekonomsko bolj razvitih postjugoslovanskih državah, v nasprotju s teorijo pa manj razvite države dosegajo višje povprečne ravni državljanske participacije. Starost in socioekonomski status sta se izkazala za najmočnejša sociodemografska dejavnika politične kulture in državljanske participacije. Višje stopnje učinkovite demokracije (Inglehart in Welzel, 2007) dosegajo socioekonomsko bolj razvite države, ki izkazujejo tudi najvišje stopnje demokratične politične kulture. Longitudinalna analiza ni pokazala enotne smeri političnokulturnih sprememb ; slednje so v zadnjih dveh desetletjih bile v smeri večanja tako demokratičnih kot tudi nekaterih podložniških orientacij (npr. avtoritarnosti). Avtorji sklenejo, da proces demokratične konsolidacije, tako političnokulturne kot tudi institucionalne, v večini postjugoslovanskih družb še ni končan. Na koncu so predstavljene implikacije raziskave. ; The present study examined structures, determinants and consequences of political culture and citizen participation in post-Yugoslav societies. Several empirical data sources were employed, among others a survey of 2,178 social science students in eight post-Yugoslav entities (M age = 19.8 years, SD = 1.89) ; representative samples from European Values Study (2008), earlier waves of World Values Survey (1995/8) and a study of Yugoslav youth Jupio carried out in 1985. The aggregate level results indicated that socio-economically less developed entities (Kosovo, BiH, and FYR Macedonia) scored higher on subject political culture (Almond and Verba, 1963), which was at the individual level found to be characterized by its four core components: authoritarianism, general traditionalism, traditional gender roles attitudes, and nationalism. Between-country differences on measures of economic cultural orientations (economic egalitarianism and state paternalism) were largely minor or insignificant, since all entities scored high on both measures. As predicted by revised modernization theory democratic political culture was found to be more coherent in socioeconomically more developed post-Yugoslav countries. Inconsistent with modernization approach results demonstrated higher levels of citizen participation in less well-off countries. Age and socioeconomic status proved to be the most potent sociodemographic predictors of political culture and citizen participation. Finally, democracy was found to be more effective (Inglehart and Welzel, 2007) in socioeconomically more developed countries, which also scored highest on measures of democratic political culture. Longitudinal analysis did not uniformly confirm substantive political culture changes with changes in the last two decades taking place in both democratic as well as authoritarian direction. Authors conclude that the process of democratic consolidation, both political-cultural as well as institutional, is far from over in the majority of post-Yugoslav entities. Implications of the results are discussed.