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Includes: Constitution of the Canadian Political Science Association. ; Date from text. ; Cover title. ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

Bibliography: v. 1, p. 28; v.2, p.276; v.3, p. [530] ; Mode of access: Internet.

Includes list of members ; Cover title. ; Electronic reproduction. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; 44

Confusion reigns almost supreme in the field of political science, particularly when the meaning of terms is involved. Some of our most commonly used words have so many meanings, shades of meaning, and connotations that hearers and readers are frequently at a loss as to the meaning and significance of terms used unless the speaker or writer defines them as he uses them. A cursory examination of the term "state" brought to light no fewer than one hundred forty-five different definitions, even though only a few writers were included who might be classed as radical. Less than half of the definitions were in general agreement. Even this statement is based on the assumption that when the same words were used by two writers they were used to mean the same thing; and I doubt whether the assumption is entirely justifiable. Furthermore, "state" is not the only term in political science which is defined in multifold ways. A similar situation was found when others, especially "law," "government," "political," "administration," were investigated.The process of communication between political scientists, as well as between these scientists and laymen or between laymen and laymen, comes to be a guessing game. Consciously or unconsciously, it is suggested, we are spending much of our time guessing what the sender means when he uses even technical words.

A nomenclature is a system of names or signs, or both, used in any field of knowledge. Such systems are of value to scientists in a field if they enable positions to be seen more clearly or distinctions to be drawn more readily.In a recent article, Huntington Cairns says: "There prevails, secondly, confusion with respect to the instrument—linguistics—with which the anthropologist, the jurist, or the social scientist must pursue his investigations and through whose medium he must state his conclusions. … But once the social scientist passes from these simple aspects to the realm of theory, linguistics becomes a problem and it is in his struggle with this problem that he is most envious of the symbolism of the mathematician."1Confusion and uncertainty appear to be present in several sections of political science. Linguistics is a problem for us in theory; in addition, it is a serious one in teaching and in the field of research.When a problem appears in a field of knowledge which handicaps effective work, experiments are in order, not only to analyze the phenomenon itself, but, in addition, to find ways or means by which the causes producing the unfortunate circumstance may be removed, or at least reduced. Can the apparent confusion and uncertainty among political scientists concerning the meaning of terms, labels, or intellectual positions be reduced? This is an important problem which directs our attention to the possibility of developing a nomenclature for political science.

Advertisements on p. [1]-[2] at end. ; Mode of access: Internet. ; Exhibited September 6, 2016 - March 1, 2017 - Sacred Spaces: The Home and Poetry of Anne Spencer, Small Special Collections Library ; SPECIAL COLLECTIONS: Extensive annotations suggesting use in "Principles of Political Science" course by at least two students. Original green cloth. From the Papers of Anne Spencer, MSS 14204. ; 2 10

"Suppose," wrote William James in A Pluralistic Universe, "that a philosopher believes in what is called free-will. That a common man alongside of him should also share that belief, possessing it by a sort of inborn intuition, does not endear the man to the philosopher at all—he may even be ashamed to be associated with such a man. What interests the philosopher is the particular premises on which the free-will he believes in is established, the sense in which it is taken, the objections it eludes, the difficulties it takes account of, in short the whole form and temper and manner and technical apparatus that goes with the belief in question. A philosopher across the way who should use the same technical apparatus, making the same distinctions but drawing opposite conclusions and denying free-will entirely, would fascinate the first philosopher far more than the naif co-believer. Their common technical interests would unite them more than their opposite conclusions separate them. Each would feel an essential consanguinity in the other, would think of him, write at him, care for his good opinion. The simple-minded believer in free-will would be disregarded by either. Neither as ally nor as opponent would his vote be counted."