Suchergebnisse

This is an exploratory study of populist political movement Sme rodina – Boris Kollár (We Are a Family – Boris Kollár, since November 2019 only Sme rodina). The paper first locates this movement into a lose concept/sui generis family of political parties (the niche party), arguing in contrast to some typologies that this is primarily protest populist party presenting some niche issues, and only secondarily, an entrepreneurial party. The paper also answers the question why this party is considered as being populist by many political and non-political actors and analysts. The paper also suggests that there is actually non-existent, but assumed direct correlation between the support for this party and the decline in the standard of living, as sometimes presented in public discourse. In contrast, it is suggested here that there may be stronger links between relative poverty, feeling of being abandoned by political elites/parties, and low educational levels. Moreover, there played an important role previous knowledge (celebrity status) of the party leader who was often presented and discussed in tabloid media. For this reason, many young females voted for this party. The party also managed to raise a widely perceived problematic issue that was seen as not tackled sufficiently or at all by the previous governments and other competing political parties (the niche or salient issue).

A régiók nem csak a közelmúltban jelentek meg az európai politika színpadán, mint önálló szereplők, tevékenységüket már évtizedek óta jegyzik. Ennek középpontjában mindenekelőtt a régiók határokon átnyúló együttműködése áll, ezt egészítették ki a régiók transznacionális megállapodásaival, amelyek arra szolgáltak, hogy a nemzetállamok kormányaival valamint a nemzetközi szervezetekkel, különösképpen az Európa Tanáccsal és az Európai Közösséggel szemben érdekképviseletüket gyakorolják. Az utóbbi időben a régiók egyre energikusabban és követelőbben hívták fel magukra a figyelmet. Tevékenységük súlypontja jelenleg nyilvánvalóan az EU és az integrációs folyamatokon belül helyezkedik el. A régiók mint az EU-kontextus politikai tényezői igen sokrétű tevékenységet mutatnak fel, amelyek az "Európa régiói" megjelölésben foglalhatók össze. Az elnevezésből, mint sokszor használatos szlogenből azonban hiányzik egy egyértelmű és ugyanakkor közös megegyezéssel alapuló, elfogadott tartalom. Regions appeared as autonomous entities on the European political stage not only in recent years. The activity of regions has been recorded for decades. It focuses above all on the cross-border cooperation of regions, and was supplemented by the trans-national agreements of regions, which served to practice their representation against the governments of nation states as well as international organisations, in particular, the European Council and the European Community. Most recently, regions have drawn attention to their presence more and more and when doing so have found increasing attention. Their centre of activity is now obviously located within the EU and the integration processes. Regions as the political factors of the EU context show a wide range of activities that can be summarized under the label of 'the regions of Europe'. The name, as a frequently used slogan, is lacking a clear and at the same time jointly agreed, accepted content. Regions and regionalism are rather flourishing in Europe. But what do regionalism and the expression Europe of regions exactly mean? There are many approaches to the question, the concept of cross-border interregionality between the Member States of the European Union, or the effort to make regions the basic building blocks of European integration instead of states, and the objective to introduce a three-tier structure to the European Union which would extend the already existing tiers of the European Union and the Member States with a third one, the territorial units within nation states. The first approach has long been adopted, the second approach is rather utopian. The third one is subject to fierce debates: a three-tier European Union with European, nation state and regional levels.

As a motivational factor of action, political efficacy is an important predictor of political behaviour. The term was invented to capture the extent to which people feel that they can effectively participate in politics and shape political processes. Today, we have a comprehensive knowledge of the individual-level factors (socio-demographic variables, political preferences etc.) that shape the level of internal and external dimensions of political efficacy. However, while it is widely demonstrated that media consumption influences the level of political efficacy, the country-level media context factors affecting it have rarely been studied. This paper reports the findings of extensive research on how two crucial features of the media context, the political significance of the media and the level of political parallelism in the media system, shape the level of external and internal political efficacy. The investigation draws upon the dataset of the seventh round (2014 – 2015) of the European Social Survey (ESS) and includes more than twenty-two thousand respondents from nineteen European democracies. The research hypothesizes that in countries where the media play a more important role, people have lower levels of external and higher levels of internal political efficacy. Political parallelism, which shows the extent to which media outlets are driven by distinct political orientations and interests within a particular media system, is expected to directly increase both external and internal political efficacy. Its indirect effect is also hypothesized, arguing that partisan media amplifies the winner-loser gap in political efficacy as a kind of "echo chamber". The findings show that in countries where the media play a major role in shaping political discourse, people have lower levels of external political efficacy, while the political parallelism of the media system indirectly affects the external dimensions of political efficacy. Internal political efficacy is, however, not related to these context-level factors.

This contribution offers a reminder of the state of political forces in France and the course of the health crisis, which initially took place in a context of strong political tensions, particularly as a result of the controversial pension reform decided by Macron. The COVID crisis allowed populist parties to develop 'naming' and 'blaming' strategies, initially mobilized in different proportions, to attack the President of the Republic Macron. The analysis shows that the decision to introduce a lockdown led the two leaders of the parties described as populist to harden their criticism to similar proportions but also to 'claim' rapid responses to the crisis. These speeches are also part of the medical polemics that will have been omnipresent throughout the pandemic. Finally, we observe that these strategies have not been beneficial to the populist parties, since during the municipal elections the two parties did not manage to take advantage on this health and political sequence.