Over the last 50 years there has been a paradigmatic shift in the climate of ideas and governing orthodoxy from Keynesian-corporatism to neoliberalism. Such paradigms provide the philosophical goals that are pursued by policy and practice and determine what are considered to be the legitimate means of attaining those goals. We use evolving policy and practice relating to the protection and management of street trees as a vehicle for examining the relations between the competing paradigms of corporatism and neoliberalism, and the ways that they are expressed 'on the ground'. In doing so we highlight the tensions between the amenity value and the economic value of street trees and between techniques for their estimation. The legitimacy of measures of the former, such as Helliwell and CAVAT, that embody corporatist concepts are subject to continuing challenges based on their (lack of) scientific rigour or economic principle. The strengths of measures of the latter, such as i-Tree, are emphasised on the same grounds. Such is the success of these efforts that the equation of the value of a street tree with an estimation of the price that people will pay for the ecosystem services it delivers is not seen as controversial.
Social inequalities fuel a debate about the meaning of political equality. Formal procedural equality is criticised for reproducing discriminatory outcomes against disadvantaged groups but affirmative action, particularly in the form of group quotas, is also contested. When opposing conceptions of substantive equality support divergent views about which procedural rule genuinely respects political equality, democracies cannot identify a standard or rule of procedural fairness to be widely accepted as fair. This dispute over procedural fairness can carry on indefinitely and could challenge democracy's legitimacy claim. I argue that democracies can renew their legitimacy claim by embracing this debate and by accommodating it through constitutional deliberation that must be as impartial and meaningful as possible. Impartiality ideally requires the presence of every citizen in this process because each of them has a unique and evolving experience of inequality. Meaningful deliberation is about offering periodic opportunities for constitutional reform, allowing for continuous feedback, reflection, and learning.
What factors might explain the cross-country variations in COVID-19 public performances and what lessons can be drawn to be better-prepared for future pandemics? This study focuses on the effects of policy stringency on COVID-19 public health outcomes to gain insights into national-level state responses to COVID-19 and the conditions for their effectiveness. Using data from 136 countries comprising 91.4% of the global population, we find that more stringent policies lead to lower infection and death rates. More importantly, the negative effects of restrictive policies on infection and death rates are moderated by political trust and democracy levels, possibly through the mechanism of popular compliance with government policies. Under conditions of higher political trust and lower democracy levels, the policy effects on infection and death rates are greater. However, while the results suggest the importance of policy stringency and political trust, we should not draw the conclusion that authoritarian political systems are more conducive to policy effectiveness. When comparing the moderating effects of political trust and democracy, political trust is more important as a facilitating factor. Therefore, in addition to making scientifically-supported policies, fostering political trust should be an important goal for governments to be better prepared for future pandemics.
The Gnassingbé clan has ruled the country since 1967. The demand for political alternance, initiated by institutional and electoral reforms, constituted the major contentious issue between the government and the challengers of the Gnassingbé regime throughout the survey period. The legislative elections of 20 December 2018, boycotted by the major opposition parties, resulted in an easy victory of the ruling party. The first local elections since more than 30 years took finally place on 30 June 2019 and resulted in the victory of the ruling party. Shortly afterwards, in February 2020, the President won also the disputed presidential elections and even consolidated his power, assisted by the loyal army and security services. The outbreak of the Corona epidemic in Togo in April and the subsequent economic recession may have contributed to limit popular protest against the Gnassingbé regime. The human rights record of the government has improved but remains poor. Despite undeniable improvements to the framework and appearance of the regime's key institutions during the review period, democracy remains far from complete. However, the international community, notably Togo's African peers, the AU and ECOWAS, followed a 'laissez-faire' approach in the interests of regional stability and their national interests in dealing with Togo. Economic growth remained stable at about 5% per annum (before Corona). Public investment in infrastructure and increases in agricultural productivity, notably of export crops, had been the key drivers of economic growth. However, growth remains vulnerable to external shocks and the climate and has not been inclusive. Positive growth was overshadowed by increasing inter-personal and regional inequality as well as an increase in extreme poverty. Moreover, money-laundering, illegal money transfers and trafficking grew alarmingly. The business climate improved considerably nevertheless. ; Author's enhanced version ; RÉSUMÉ: Le clan Gnassingbé dirige le pays depuis 1967. La revendication d'alternance politique, initiée par des réformes institutionnelles et électorales, a constitué le principal litige entre le gouvernement et les challengers du régime Gnassingbé tout au long de la période d'enquête. Les élections législatives du 20 décembre 2018, boycottées par les principaux partis d'opposition, se sont soldées par une victoire facile du parti au pouvoir. Les premières élections locales depuis plus de 30 ans ont finalement eu lieu le 30 juin 2019 et ont abouti à la victoire du parti au pouvoir. Peu de temps après, en février 2020, le président a remporté également les élections présidentielles contestées. Par cela il a même consolidé son pouvoir, aidé par l'armée fidèle et les services de sécurité. Le déclenchement de l'épidémie de Corona au Togo en avril 2020 et la récession économique qui a suivi, ont peut-être contribué à limiter les protestations populaires contre le régime de Gnassingbé. Le bilan du gouvernement en matière de droits humains s'est amélioré, mais reste médiocre. Malgré des améliorations indéniables du cadre et de l'apparence des principales institutions du régime pendant la période à l'examen, la démocratie reste loin d'être achevée. Cependant, la communauté internationale, notamment les pairs africains du Togo, l'UA et la CEDEAO, ont suivi une approche de «laissez-faire» dans l'intérêt de la stabilité régionale et de leurs intérêts nationaux face au Togo. La croissance économique est restée stable à environ 5 % par an (avant Corona). Les investissements publics dans les infrastructures et les augmentations de la productivité agricole, notamment des cultures d'exportation, ont été les principaux moteurs de la croissance économique. Cependant, la croissance reste vulnérable aux chocs externes et au climat, et le développement n'a pas été inclusive. La croissance positive a été éclipsée par l'augmentation des inégalités interpersonnelles et régionales ainsi que par une augmentation de l'extrême pauvreté. En outre, le blanchiment d'argent, les transferts d'argent illégaux et le trafic ont augmenté de façon alarmante. Le climat des affaires s'est néanmoins considérablement amélioré. --- ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Der Gnassingbé-Clan regiert das Land seit 1967. Die Forderung nach politischer Abwechslung, die durch institutionelle Reformen und Wahlreformen ausgelöst wurde, war das Hauptstreitpunkt zwischen der Regierung und den Herausforderern des Gnassingbé-Regimes während des gesamten Untersuchungszeitraums. Die von den großen Oppositionsparteien boykottierten Parlamentswahlen vom 20. Dezember 2018 führten zu einem leichten Sieg der Regierungspartei. Die ersten Kommunalwahlen seit mehr als 30 Jahren fanden schließlich am 30. Juni 2019 statt und führten zum Sieg der Regierungspartei. Kurz darauf, im Februar 2020, gewann der Präsident auch die umstrittenen Präsidentschaftswahlen. Somit festigte er sogar seine Macht, unterstützt von der loyalen Armee und den Sicherheitsdiensten. Der Ausbruch der Corona-Epidemie in Togo im April und die anschließende wirtschaftliche Rezession haben möglicherweise dazu beigetragen, den Protest der Bevölkerung gegen das Gnassingbé-Regime zu begrenzen. Die Menschenrechtsbilanz der Regierung hat sich verbessert, ist aber weiterhin schlecht. Trotz unbestreitbarer Verbesserungen des Rahmens und des Erscheinungsbilds der wichtigsten Institutionen des Regimes im Berichtszeitraum bleibt die Demokratie bei weitem nicht umfassend. Die internationale Gemeinschaft, insbesondere die afrikanischen Kollegen Faure Gnassingbés in der AU und ECOWAS, verfolgten jedoch im Interesse der regionalen Stabilität und in ihren nationalen Interessen im Umgang mit Togo einen "Laissez-Faire"-Ansatz. Das Wirtschaftswachstum blieb stabil bei etwa 5% pro Jahr (vor Corona). Öffentliche Investitionen in die Infrastruktur und die Steigerung der landwirtschaftlichen Produktivität, insbesondere in Exportkulturen, waren die Haupttreiber des Wirtschaftswachstums. Das Wachstum bleibt jedoch anfällig für externe Schocks und das Klima und war nicht inklusiv. Das positive Wachstum wurde durch die zunehmende zwischenmenschliche und regionale Ungleichheit sowie die Zunahme der extremen Armut überschattet. Darüber hinaus nahmen Geldwäsche, illegale Geldtransfers und Menschenhandel alarmierend zu. Das Geschäftsklima hat sich dennoch erheblich verbessert.
The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labelled "pro-democratic dynasties", show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on July 10, 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress
The philosophical and political advantages tied to a break with Marxist thinking have been notable. With such a break with Marxism, economic and scientific determinism have been discounted – and it is in this sort of determinism that a classic critique of Marxism finds a reason for discrediting the Marxist-Leninist project. However, it seems the cost of totally abandoning Marxist thinking has not been sufficiently examined. This article seeks to remedy this with a comparative study of two philosophers' conceptions of conflict: Mouffe's perspective will be examined and compared to Castoriadis' view of radical democracy and its treatment of conflict. The paper seeks to show that a full break with Karl Marx weakens political radicalism. In other words, by opting for a perspective on conflict which fully renounces the Marxist view, Mouffe is doing away with both the idea of direct democracy and/or that of a revolutionary project. Her approach differs from that of Castoriadis who seeks, in some sense, to remain faithful to the emancipatory aspects of Marxian thought. ; Peer reviewed
Background Nursing should have a fundamental role in the development of health policies. The current state of the educational system regarding leadership-related skills and political competence in nursing students is a field to explore. Objectives To explore Spanish nursing students' perceptions about their political competence. Design Cross-sectional study that was carried out between December 2019 and June 2020. Settings and participants Students of the Degree in Nursing at the Universitat Jaume I (Spain). Methods An ad hoc scale composed of 33 items was designed. Sociodemographic variables of interest for the study were collected, such as participation in organizations. A descriptive analysis of the sample and the scale and a bivariate analysis were carried out. Results 91.8% (n = 90) of items were answered by women. The 2nd (40.8%, n = 40) and 4th (29.6%, n = 29) courses were the most represented. 29.6% (n = 29) belonged to some association or organization, with sports (31.1%, n = 9), NGOs (17.2%, n = 5), cultural (17.2%, n = 5) and student organizations (13.8%, n = 4) being the most represented. Within these associations, 48.3% (n = 14) of participants claimed to have an active role. Statistically significant differences were observed by course in the Political Knowledge category (p = 0.030). The variables "belonging to an organization" and "having an active role" in it seemed to have more influence on the scale than the rest of the sociodemographic variables. Conclusions Learning strategies must benefit from skills and prior experiences of students to strengthen new learning. It also seems to be important to emphasize that the theoretical basis is important, but that promoting civic participation among students can be very relevant for the acquisition of political competence.
Classical works on authoritarian politics mostly considered political institutions under nondemocratic regimes as mere window dressing. Yet, contemporary works dispute that idea and argue that political institutions are used to facilitate survival in power. This dissertation explored how political institutions are manipulated by the political class and the potential factors why this has contributed to political instability and lack of survival in power in Guinea-Bissau from 1994-2019, differently from what we observe in other non-democratic societies. To achieve this goal, qualitative methods and thematic analysis were carried out with three major themes emerging. First, the manipulation of institutions for survival; second, the use of institutions for co-optation and the challenges of power-sharing; third, credible threat in relation to minimization of loss. Findings of this work show the following; first, institutions in Guinea-Bissau; the legislature and political parties are the root causes of instability rather than survival. Second, leaders do co-opt potential opponents but they do not redistribute rent and power sufficiently to ensure that co-optation eliminates the risk of coups. Third, political parties are important but with weak structures, very vertical and unable to distribute rent and to anticipate threats. Fourth, political parties pose credible threats to each other due to their use of military force but access to government and parliamentary or party positions are not a guarantee that opponents will not try to oppressively remove leaders from power. Therefore, the risk of manipulating institutions for survival comes with threats, and these threats have been the driven force for instability since 1994. ; A maioria dos clássicos sobre política autoritária considerava as instituições políticas em regimes não-democráticos como mera fachada. No entanto, as obras contemporâneas tendem a disputar essa ideia e argumentam que as instituições políticas são usadas para facilitar a sobrevivência no poder. Esta dissertação explora a forma como as instituições políticas são manipuladas pela classe política e os possíveis fatores que fazem com que as instituições contribuam para a instabilidade política e a falta de sobrevivência no poder na Guiné-Bissau entre 1994-2019 contrariamente ao que se sucede na maioria dos regimes não democráticos. A fim de alcançar este objetivo, foram utilizados métodos qualitativos e uma análise de três grandes temas. Primeiro, a manipulação de instituições para a sobrevivência; segundo, a utilização de instituições para a cooptação e os desafios da partilha de poder; terceiro, a ameaça credível em relação à minimização da perda. Os resultados deste trabalho mostram o seguinte: primeiro, as instituições na Guiné-Bissau, o parlamento e os partidos políticos são as causas profundas da instabilidade e não da sobrevivência; segundo, os líderes cooptam potenciais opositores mas não redistribuem suficientemente a renda e o poder para assegurar que a cooptação elimina o risco de golpes de Estado; terceiro, os partidos políticos são importantes mas têm estruturas fracas, muito verticais e incapazes de distribuir a renda e de antecipar ameaças; quarto, os partidos políticos representam ameaças credíveis entre si devido ao uso da força militar mas o acesso ao governo e as posições parlamentares ou partidárias não são garantia de que os opositores não tentem remover opressivamente os líderes do poder. Por conseguinte, o risco de manipulação das instituições para sobreviver no poder vem com ameaças, e estas ameaças têm sido a força motriz da instabilidade desde 1994.
The idea of hegemony, in its Gramscian sense, contributed to the renewal of several fields of social sciences in the 1970s and 1980s. This idea circulates between different geocultural spaces and different times. The approach adopted in this article starts from the contexts in which this idea is mobilized, in order to show to which theoretical and practical stakes it answers. Focusing on four authors (Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe and Pablo Iglesias) and on the transfers from one author to another, the aim is to highlight the social conditions conducive to the deployment of this idea and to identify the (dis)continuities that punctuate its history. Throughout the socio-historical course marked out by the written productions of these four authors, one constant appears: the vitality of the concept of hegemony seems linked to periods of crisis - theoretical and / or strategic - of the left. ; Peer reviewed
L'idée d'hégémonie, dans son acception gramscienne, a contribué au renouvellement de plusieurs pans des sciences sociales au cours des années 1970-1980. Cette idée circule entre différents champs, différents espaces géoculturels et différentes époques. La démarche adoptée dans cet article part des contextes dans lequel cette idée est mobilisée, afin de montrer à quels enjeux théoriques et pratiques elle répond. En se focalisant sur quatre auteurs (Antonio Gramsci, Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe et Pablo Iglesias) et sur les transferts d'un auteur à l'autre, il s'agit de mettre en exergue les conditions sociales propices au déploiement de cette idée et d'identifier les (dis)continuités qui jalonnent son histoire. A travers le parcours socio-historique jalonné par les productions écrites de ces quatre auteurs, une constante apparaît : la vitalité de l'idée d'hégémonie semble liée à des périodes de crise – théorique et/ou stratégique – de la gauche. ; Peer reviewed
Chantal Mouffe's is presented as one of the leading theoreticians of the radical left, as a disciple of Carl Schmitt and as a resolute opponent of the liberal tradition. However, according to the her own admission, Chantal Mouffe is more in the "social democratic" camp than in the "radical left" camp, she marks a fundamental difference with regard to Carl Schmitt and she claims her attachment to the liberal ideal. Starting from these discrepancies, this article defends the idea that Chantal Mouffe's thought is perceived as more radical than it really is. Chantal Mouffe intends to reform the liberal tradition rather than denying it. ; Peer reviewed
[16], 100 p. ; Identification of printer from STC. ; The first leaf is blank. ; Reproduction of the original in the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery.
[30], 393, [5] p. ; Translator's dedication signed: I.D., i.e. John Dee?. ; The first leaf and the last leaf are blank. ; Reproduction of the original in the British Library.
