Suchergebnisse

Im April 2016 veröffentlichte das »International Consortium of Investigative Journalists« die sogenannten »Panama Papers«, die Einblicke in ein System von Steueroasen und Briefkastenfirmen boten. Alfons J. Weichenrieder, Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, sieht den politischen Druck auf die internationalen Steueroasen erhöht. Im Vordergrund stünden dabei bi- und multilaterale Abkommen zum Informationsaustausch. Es bleibe abzuwarten, ob die ausgetauschten Informationen tatsächlich verwertbar seien. Friedrich Schneider, Universität Linz, betont, dass die Gründung einer Briefkastenfirma zwar grundsätzlich legal sei, sie aber häufig zum Steuerbetrug oder zur Geldwäsche benutzt werden. Wichtig wäre unter anderem, dass Länder wie Panama den internationalen Standard zum automatischen Informationsaustausch über Finanzkonten und die Geldwäscherichtlinie, die in Europa entwickelt wurde, verabschieden. Für Norbert Walter-Borjans, Finanzminister des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, gilt es, international für einen Transparenzstandard einzutreten und die Verhandlungspartner, bei denen Vorbehalte bestehen, zu überzeugen. Auch Michael Meister, Staatssekretär beim Bundesministerium der Finanzen, sieht in einer erhöhten Transparenz einen Schlüssel zur Lösung des Problems einer ausufernden Nutzung von Briefkastenfirmen zur Verschleierung von Vermögensverhältnissen. Lukas Hakelberg, Europäisches Hochschulinstitut, Florenz, und Thomas Rixen, Universität Bamberg, sehen in der Beschränkung des Marktzugangs ein Instrument zur Bekämpfung finanzieller Intransparenz. So sollten die Regierungen der großen Industrieländer den Zugang zu ihren Finanzmärkten von der Teilnahme an den Transparenzinitiativen abhängig machen. Für Jörg R. Werner, Frankfurt School of Finance & Management, liegt eine Gefahr der Reformbemühungen darin, dass die Sanktionierung von Steuersparmodellen nicht mehr nur auf illegale Steuerhinterziehung, sondern auch auf legale Steuervermeidung abzielt.

The study has investigated the role of news channels in portraying Panama Papers in Pakistan. More specifically, it has examined the public perceptions towards coverage of Panama Papers by Pakistani TV channels. A sample size of 400 respondents was drawn from political science, media and communication students, who watch TV channels for collection of data through a questionnaire. Findings revealed that Panama Papers is the most debated topic in Pakistani media. The results showed that Pakistan media has mainly concentrated on the former Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and his family while reporting Panama issue. Findings also revealed that Pakistani media has been successful in changing the mindset of the people on this issue.

The article discusses the implications of Panama Papers on the 2017 general election in Malta. ; peer-reviewed

Abstract The Panama Papers is a collection of 11.5 million leaked records that contain information for more than 214,488 offshore entities. This collection is growing rapidly as more leaked records become available online. In this paper, we present a work in progress on a web browser plugin that detects company names from the Panama Papers and alerts the user by means of unobtrusive visual cues. We matched a random sample of company names from the Public Works and Government Services Canada registry against the Panama Papers using three different string matching techniques. Monge-Elkan is found to provide the best matching results but at increased computational cost. Levenshtein-based approach is found to provide the best tradeoff between matching and computational cost, while Jacquard index like approach is found to be less sensitive to slight textual change.

Four years after the Panama Papers scandal, tax avoidance remains an urgent moral-political problem. Moving beyond both the academic and policy mainstream, I advocate the "democratization of tax enforcement," by which I mean systematic efforts to make tax avoiders accountable to the judgment of ordinary citizens. Both individual oligarchs and multinational corporations have access to sophisticated tax avoidance strategies that impose significant fiscal costs on democracies and exacerbate preexisting distributive and political inequalities. Yet much contemporary tax sheltering occurs within the letter of the law, rendering criminal sanctions ineffective. In response, I argue for the creation of Citizen Tax Juries, deliberative minipublics empowered to scrutinize tax avoiders, demand accountability, and facilitate concrete reforms. This proposal thus responds to the wider aspiration, within contemporary democratic theory, to secure more popular control over essential economic processes.

Four years after the Panama Papers scandal, tax avoidance remains an urgent moral-political problem. Moving beyond both the academic and policy mainstream, I advocate the "democratization of tax enforcement," by which I mean systematic efforts to make tax avoiders accountable to the judgment of ordinary citizens. Both individual oligarchs and multinational corporations have access to sophisticated tax avoidance strategies that impose significant fiscal costs on democracies and exacerbate preexisting distributive and political inequalities. Yet much contemporary tax sheltering occurs within the letter of the law, rendering criminal sanctions ineffective. In response, I argue for the creation of Citizen Tax Juries, deliberative minipublics empowered to scrutinize tax avoiders, demand accountability, and facilitate concrete reforms. This proposal thus responds to the wider aspiration, within contemporary democratic theory, to secure more popular control over essential economic processes.

Four years after the Panama Papers scandal, tax avoidance remains an urgent moral-political problem. Moving beyond both the academic and policy mainstream, I advocate the "democratization of tax enforcement," by which I mean systematic efforts to make tax avoiders accountable to the judgment of ordinary citizens. Both individual oligarchs and multinational corporations have access to sophisticated tax avoidance strategies that impose significant fiscal costs on democracies and exacerbate preexisting distributive and political inequalities. Yet much contemporary tax sheltering occurs within the letter of the law, rendering criminal sanctions ineffective. In response, I argue for the creation of Citizen Tax Juries, deliberative minipublics empowered to scrutinize tax avoiders, demand accountability, and facilitate concrete reforms. This proposal thus responds to the wider aspiration, within contemporary democratic theory, to secure more popular control over essential economic processes.