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Bioterrorism is a complex and dynamic phenomenon, occurring in various forms. It is difficult now to define a uniform definition of terrorism that is changing under the influence of the development of civilization, and especially the rapid progress in scientific and technical knowledge. The terrorists perfectly use the latest achievements of biological sciences in their terrorist attacks. The purpose of this article is to bring the phenomenon of bioterrorism.

Bioterrorism is a multi-faceted phenomenon and dynamic, occurring in various forms. It is difficult now to define a uniform definition of terrorism that is changing under the influence of the development of civilization, and especially the rapid scientific progress. The terrorists perfectly use the latest achievements of biological sciences in their terrorist attacks. The purpose of this article is to bring the phenomenon of bioterrorism.

Ensuring internal security is one of the core objectives of European integration in the context of the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice of the European Union (E.U.). The aim of the internal security policy of the E.U. is to support Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security. In the last 20 years in the area of internal security of the E.U. many important initiatives, political agendas and legal instruments at the E.U. level have arisen. This article aims to show the development of the internal security policy of the E.U., its most important guidelines and the challenges in the coming years.

This article identifies the political challenges for Central Europe resulting from the Russian Federation conducting competition below the threshold of war. The main research methods, both inductive and deductive, were analysis and a survey of the existing literature. There is still aggression in international rivalry, and its level is deliberately regulated so as not to cross the threshold of open armed conflict as defined by international law. The contemporary rivalry of the Russian Federation takes on an unlimited scope and goes beyond the physical sphere: the main emphasis in its application is on non-military and non-lethal forms of influence that can be easily combined with kinetic ones. The exploitation of the space between the binary borders of war and peace was practically verified both under the Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. It has been confirmed that a great deal of importance in Russia is now attached to unconventional activities and that their application offers great opportunities to achieve strategic objectives without the need to resort to direct military confrontation.

The starting point of these considerations is the characteristics of the problem of "uncertain democracy" in the perspective of the Polish intellectual Leszek Kołakowski. After World War II, Europe revised its heritage which resulted in the rise of two totalitarianisms. The road to unification weakened particular national interests in favour of a guarantee of peace and the best possible democratic forms of conflict resolution. Despite this, democracy is currently in crisis. The uncertainty of the democratic era focuses on three problems: How to reconcile the diversity of national interests with the attempt to unify the rule of law in European countries? How does cultural relativism influence indifference to the atrocities of the world? How is a democratic Europe to protect itself from the undemocratic ideologies that are entering it? All three areas focus on the self‑degeneration that democracy is struggling with and its weakening in the face of the reemergence of radical forms of thinking, ideologies and worldviews that were to be the panacea after the tragedy of the war.

Artykuł przedstawia politykę USA wobec Turcji od zakończenia I wojny światowej do schyłku 1920 r. Politykę tę w zasadniczy sposób kształtowało antytureckie oraz proormiańskie nastawienie prezydenta Thomasa Woodrow Wilsona. Pomimo że USA nie były w stanie wojny z Turcją, delegacja amerykańska aktywnie uczestniczyła w dyskusjach konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu na temat przyszłości tego państwa. Amerykański prezydent miał także duży wpływ na decyzję o podziałach mandatowych Bliskiego Wschodu. The article presents the policy towards Turkey pursued by the United States in the period from the end of the Great War to the late 1920s. The policy was shaped to a large extent by anti-Turkish and pro-Armenian attitude of President Thomas Woodrow Wilson. Despite the fact that the United States were not at war with Turkey, the American delegation actively participated in talks of the Peace Conference in Paris about the future of Turkey. The American president had also great impact on the decision about mandate divisions of the Near East.

Artykuł przedstawia politykę USA wobec Turcji od zakończenia I wojny światowej do schyłku 1920 r. Politykę tę w zasadniczy sposób kształtowało antytureckie oraz proormiańskie nastawienie prezydenta Thomasa Woodrow Wilsona. Pomimo że USA nie były w stanie wojny z Turcją, delegacja amerykańska aktywnie uczestniczyła w dyskusjach konferencji pokojowej w Paryżu na temat przyszłości tego państwa. Amerykański prezydent miał także duży wpływ na decyzję o podziałach mandatowych Bliskiego Wschodu. The article presents the policy towards Turkey pursued by the United States in the period from the end of the Great War to the late 1920s. The policy was shaped to a large extent by anti-Turkish and pro-Armenian attitude of President Thomas Woodrow Wilson. Despite the fact that the United States were not at war with Turkey, the American delegation actively participated in talks of the Peace Conference in Paris about the future of Turkey. The American president had also great impact on the decision about mandate divisions of the Near East.

The article analyses the role of European Union (EU) and NATO in the system of the international security. The official documents often highlights that EU and NATO are unique and essential partners. Both organisations share common values and have 22 common members. Furthermore, it is stressed that UE and NATO can and should be complementary to one another and help one another in pressing area of international peace and security. Unfortunately co-operation between these both organisations still maintain difficult, complex and challenging problem. ; W artykule poddano analizie rolę Unii Europejskiej (UE) i NATO w systemie bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. W oficjalnych dokumentach często pojawia się stwierdzenie, że UE i NATO to wyjątkowi partnerzy. Obie organizacje łączą wspólne wartości, a 22 państwa członkowskie NATO należą też do UE. Podkreśla się, że UE i NATO mogą, a nawet powinny wzajemnie się wspierać i uzupełniać w dziedzinie międzynarodowego pokoju i bezpieczeństwa. Niestety, współpraca pomiędzy nimi stanowi trudny i złożony problem.

Differences between countries are the immanent feature of social growth but these days that situation had been complicated by globalization. The benefits of globalization are not so obvious because the new opportunities like: faster growth, higher living standards, promotion of democratic values aren't equally distributed and the global market is not yet underpinned by rules based on shared social objectives. That realities cause serious consequences for safety and peace in world. Those issues are the main challenge for international community. They determinate live standard of people and future of our planet. For that reasons author analyse what United Nations are making to find a solution to that problems and where are both - the main difficulties and weaknesses of international act system. Only that kind of Organizations have a legitimation to create an international forum which is necessary to find a solution for international issue. That is why autor is indicated those problems of inequality as a priority over national interests.

After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.

After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.

After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities. ; After the Peace Treaty of Riga had been signed, some Belarusian circles remained sceptical about the ensuing political situation and they planned to fight for the independent country. Similarly, the activists of Lithuanian national movement hoped that Vilnius, annexed by General L. Żeligowski, would be the capital city of their country. Thus, stirring up political and social unrest on North-Eastern territories of the Second Republic of Poland was in both Belarusian and Lithuanian interest. Thus, Lithuanians made Belarusian minority in Poland cooperate with them politically and militarily. Belarusian guerrilla groups, which were created so that they could participate in a future Polish-Lithuanian war, immediately started acts of sabotage. In Białystok and Hrodna Regions they attacked police stations, forester's lodges, manor houses and shops. Belarusian and Lithuanian armed forces did not, however, take any military actions together. On 15th March 1923 the Council of Ambassadors (of the League of Nations) recognised the demarcation line as the border between Poland and Lithuania. As a result, Lithuania stopped using Belarusian guerrilla groups to undermine the social and political order in Poland. Consequently, the sabotage units, deprived of Lithuanian military and political support, were eliminated by Polish authorities.

The article discusses critical opinions addressed at present to the UNO by the States and scholars. It was already during the San Francisco conference that the States raised objections to the adopted solutions. After 43 years of its existence, the UNO is still far from fulfilling the hopes which were fostered at the time of its foundation. The causes of shortcomings may be found in structural and managerial deficiencies. The complexity of the UNO structure influences the dissipation of efforts and makes the coordination more difficult. The waste of means on countless programmes, sub-programmes and projects has often been subject to criticism. The efforts to increase efficiency through establishing organs which were to improve the system failed (eg. Administrative Commitee on Co-ordination, Commitee on Programme and Co-ordination, Joint Inspection Unit). However, those organs helped to record and disclose shortcoming and their sources by way of Publishing critical reports. Managerial problems consist mostly in difficulties with poor professional qualifications of the UNO staff. The view that the professional level decreases constantly is shared by 69% of diplomats employed in the UNO-affiliated missions. Critical opinions are voiced also with respect to the unreality of projects, declarativity and mere talk present in the UN system. Particular organizations established on regional and political grounds, the number of which grows constantly and at present is close to 330, are far more efficient. The UNO documents indicate that the member-States most often call for the amendments of provisions on the Security Council, and in the first place on its composition and voting system. The author shares the view that multiplying agencies and organs, or abortive attempts to limit the role of superpowers in the Security Council will not bring adequate effects. Little efficiency of the UNO in maintaining the world peace may be eliminated not through a direct structure reform of the system but indirectly through activities aimed at improving the economic situation of the South. The UNO should work out a worldwide welfare programme which would influence indirectly the consolidation of the world peace through increasing the economic level of conflict-generating regions. Such a programme would have to adopt a system of preferences, for the existing free-market rules the disproportions between the North and the South. ; Digitalizacja i deponowanie archiwalnych zeszytów RPEiS sfinansowane przez MNiSW w ramach realizacji umowy nr 541/P-DUN/2016