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This paper aims to analyze the question of legal personality of European Union to show the interpretation of this current aspect. The EU's personality has been recognized progressively to the Member States & to the International Organizations. The legal personality is a kind of "added value," vested by an appropriate international rule ad hoc to recognize personality to all corporate bodies, which have got the typical features of the sovereignty: people & territory. Recent years have seen a new debate on the future of Europe. In 2001, after the Treaty of Nice, the European Council adopted the Declaration on the future of EU, committing the Union to becoming more democratic, transparent & effective. It agreed to draft the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the Europe. This was the basis for the text adopted in the 2004, signed in Rome by the Heads of State & Government of the Member States. The text set out the values of the EU. It put the Charter of Fundamental Rights at the heart of the EU law, strengthening the guarantee of civil & political rights for all European citizens. The draft Treaty gave personality to the EU enabling it to sign International Agreements. The Berlin Declaration of the 2007 had meant the symbol of a reunited Europe. In the end of 2007 had been signed the Treaty of Lisbon by the 27 Member States. Our reality, in a so rapid evolution, faces the globalization of the economics, the climatic changes, the demographic evolution, the safety & the energy: the Europeans must to learn to have confidence in EU. The Treaty of Lisbon has gone into effect in the end of 2009. Adapted from the source document.

The authors question the idea, as stated by the Italian Penal Code, that a forensic psychiatrist can judge about the insanity of criminal behaviour out of the firm ground of relevant psychopathology as described in the official international classifications (ICD and DSM). This conservative approach also applies to the nosographic category of personality disorders, which cannot become the new widespread psychopathological framework through which criteria of mental incapacity are attributed to law offenders. The authors question the idea, as stated by the Italian Penal Code, that a forensic psychiatrist may judge about the insanity of a criminal behaviour out of the firm ground of relevant psychopathology as described in the official international classifications (ICD and DSM). This conservative approach applies also to the nosographic category of personality disorders, which can not become the new widespread psychopathological framework through which, in an easier way, criteria of mental incapacity are attributed to law offenders. Too many times in courts we witnessed sentences which seemed founded on the concept of insanity of a criminal behaviour out of any strictly nosographic category, in particular of present international nosography. Even more worrying, a judgement of incapacity has often been founded only on the mere will incapacity of an indicted person, in disregard of the principle that the concept of will incapacity belongs strongly to the judicial tradition but it is still very uncertain in the field of neuroscientific research, to the point that there are some proposals (found in a few foreign Criminal Laws) advising to neglect this concept in a forensic evaluation as ambiguous. Thus the authors underline how there is, in the first place, the need to balance and standardize even in the forensic psychiatric practice the same taxonomic standards used in the international scientific publications, so that a psychiatric forensic evaluation does not turn out to be just an exercise of rhetoric. In the second place, in the light of the great discrepancy still existing between neuroscientific research, though promising, and the judicial category of mental capacity, the authors consider to introduce, especially in the evaluation of personality disorders applied to criminal actions, two concepts described by Antonio Damasio. This proposal is that the neuroscientific categories of "core consciousness" and "extended (biographic) consciousness" may be helpful in analysing the mental capacity of an indicted offender once a clear diagnosis, either of a temporary or of a permanent illness, including personality disorders, has been established. The use of these two criteria we propose, "core consciousness" and "extended (biographic) consciousness", could allow to face the problem of the capacity/incapacity evaluation of an indicted person in a more substantive manner and along standardized guidelines which could also be coherent with scientific research in a broader sense. Doing so, the role of a forensic psychiatrist can be rendered stricter and less vague in front of a judge giving him a precise task: to state not just a general evaluation of incapacity regarding a criminal behaviour, but if this behaviour can be founded on the basis of strict scientific criteria. In this way also the concept of personality disorders, in the field of forensic psychiatry, should be regarded only in the view of its possibility to alter these neuroscientific criteria, so influencing behaviour. The authors also hope that their view could be useful towards new developments both in the field of scientific research and legislation. A stronger and stricter consideration of psychopathology and of the concept of incapacity regarding a criminal behaviour inside the framework we propose, could hopefully influence a different legislation concerning this field, so that an indicted person, who is eventually acquitted being mentally ill, can be treated (and, in case of need, restricted) not in a Judiciary Mental Asylum. ; Gli autori criticano l'idea, così com'è stabilito dal Codice Penale italiano, che uno psichiatra forense possa attribuire "valore di malattia" ad un comportamento criminale senza fare riferimento a quel saldo terreno che è garantito dalla psicopatologia così come descritta nelle classificazioni ufficiali in uso internazionalmente (ICD e DSM). Questo approccio conservativo è da applicarsi anche alla categoria nosografica dei "disturbi di personalità", categoria che non può di per sé divenire la nuova e diffusa cornice psicopatologica attraverso la quale attribuire, in modo più semplicistico, criteri di "incapacità" a chi commetta reati. Troppe volte si è assistito nelle aule di tribunale a giudizi che parevano fondati sul concetto di "valore di malattia" d'un atto criminale al di fuori di ogni categoria strettamente nosografica, in particolare della nosografia internazionale corrente. Fatto ancor più preoccupante, il giudizio d'incapacità spesso è risultato fondato solo sulla semplice incapacità di volere dell'imputato, senza tener conto di quanto tale nozione sia invalsa per la Legge, ma ancora completamente avvolta da incertezza per la ricerca neuroscientifica, al punto che vi sono proposte (in alcuni ordinamenti penali stranieri) di espungere tale criterio dal giudizio psichiatrico–forense in quanto ambiguo. Gli autori sottolineano quindi come vi sia innanzitutto necessità di armonizzare e standardizzare anche nella pratica psichiatrico–forense gli stessi criteri tassonomici in uso nella letteratura scientifica internazionale, perché la perizia psichiatrica non debba risultare solo un mero esercizio retorico. In secondo luogo, alla luce della ancor grande discrepanza che esiste tra la ricerca neuroscientifica, per quanto promettente, e le categorie giuridiche di capacità d'intendere e di volere, gli autori propongono di introdurre, specialmente nella valutazione dei disturbi di personalità applicata ai comportamenti criminali, due concetti descritti da Antonio Damasio. Si suggerisce come le categorie neuroscientifiche di "coscienza nucleare" e di "coscienza estesa" (biografica) possano essere d'aiuto nell'analisi della capacità mentale d'un imputato una volta stabilita una chiara diagnosi, si tratti di condizione che comporti sia malattia temporanea sia permanente, compreso l'ambito dei disturbi di personalità. Il ricorso a questi due criteri proposti,quello appunto di "coscienza nucleare"e di "coscienza estesa", permetterebbe di affrontare il giudizio di imputabilità su ambiti maggiormente sostantitivi, standardizzati e coerenti con la ricerca neuroscientifica in senso lato. Ciò al fine di rendere più cogente e meno vago il ruolo del perito psichiatra di fronte al giudice, conferendogli un mandato preciso: quello di stabilire, più che un generico "valore di malattia" di un atto criminale, se tale "valore di malattia" possa essere fondato sulla base di stringenti criteri scientifici. In questo modo anche il concetto di disturbo di personalità, ai fini psichiatrico–forensi, dovrebbe essere rivisto nell'ottica di una sua diretta influenza nell'alterare questi criteri neuroscientifici e quindi comportamentali. Gli autori auspicano anche che una tale linea di pensiero sia foriera di possibili sviluppi sia d'ordine scientifico e psichiatrico che d'ordine giuridico. Una maggiore e più coerente determinazione degli aspetti psicopatologici e del "valore di malattia" di un atto criminale all'interno della cornice proposta, potrebbe forse anche consentire un diverso sviluppo dell'aspetto legislativo che concerne la materia, cosicché possa essere rivisto il concetto di controllo dell'imputato prosciolto senza ricorso all'Ospedale Psichiatrico Giudiziario.

Cover -- Occhiello -- Dedica -- Indice -- Introduzione -- Capitolo 1 - La persona ed il mercato: una possibile coesistenza -- Capitolo 2 - Persona e Mercato. Una prospettiva comparatistica -- Capitolo 3 - Nuovi Beni. Il contenuto patrimoniale dei diritti della personalità -- Finito di stampare -- Volumi pubblicati.

In the essay Bilse und ich (1905) Thomas Mann, who would utilize the literary essay repeatedly to clarify fundamental aspects of his own poetry, makes his first attempt at working out in a systematic manner the supporting principles for his personal conception of writing. The opportunity presents itself with a trial regarding giving offence, in which The Buddenbrooks (1901) was compared by the public prosecutor to works by Fritz Oswald Bilse, a soldier, who, some time previously, had gained a certain notoriety for publishing a roman à clef in which unpleasant events taking place in the military unit where he was serving, had been revealed. Rejecting this comparison, Mann reflects on certain paradigms conventionally associated with the sphere of aesthetic creativity, discussing critically the nexus between invention and narrative effectiveness.

This paper attempts to find a much-needed balance between data protection rights and trade secret rights on customer information in the European Union framework. Our analysis proposes a "shared management" of secret data between businesses and customers based on an operation of de-contextualization of customer databases. Several rights are in conflict in these two legal domains. For instance, the right to access to personal data and the new proposed right to "data portability" conflict with the interests of trade secret holders. What is even more problematic is that both analyzed legal frameworks are more and more based on a "proprietary" approach to data: they are both a form of abstract "monopoly". In a first step we analyze, in comparison with USA law, when and how the scope of data protection and trade secret protection coincide in practice, according to the proposed EU reforms in the field. As illustrated by literature, balancing rules in these two frameworks are vague and schizophrenic. However, from a literal interpretation of the analyzed it is possible to understand a "favor" for data protection rights. In analyzing the apparent favor to personality rights compared to other (e.g., economic) rights we investigate (both in USA and selected European states) trade secrets in the perspective of personality rights and data protection rights. As a result of our study we propose a change in perspective from the contrast between customers and businesses, to the conflict between customers and businessmen that enables us to verify whether and when personality rights of data subjects affect the above-mentioned personality rights of businessman in practice. the paper proposes to "decontextualize" secret data so that customers can access only data strictly related to their biographical information while trade secret holders can be free not to disclose the output of their data processing (behavior evaluation, forecast, studies on life expectancy, personalized marketing plan, pricing, etc.) if disclosure can adversely affect their interests. In this framework the "proprietary" approach of European laws must be caught as an opportunity, not as an obstacle: we can consider secret data as a "shared good" of customers and businessmen. A multi-level management of data should be based on interests that are common to customers and trade secret holders (secrecy and data updating).

A history of the sort of impact Bruno Leoni & his publication, Il Politico, had on the study of political science, economics, & other subjects due to Leoni's personality & beliefs. The author also discusses the changes under the leadership of the other chief editor, Scaramozzino, & why Leoni's contributions will not be forgotten. E. Miller