Suchergebnisse

Aventurar-se no pensamento em filosofia não depende, a princípio, do uso necessário dos arsenais da razão. Antes, seria necessário lançar-se em seus domínios e ficar à espreita dos seus acontecimentos. Somente quando esses ocorrerem teremos como distinguir os que coincidem enormemente com o que já fazemos e pensamos, e os que trazem o novo. Talvez aí, de fato, algum empenho tenha sentido. Assim, ao me deparar com os escritos da filosofia da diferença, de maneira especial com os de Deleuze, Guattari e Foucault, foi possível deslocar a minha prática docente em filosofia dos moldes da filosofia maior e vislumbrar a filosofia em sua menoridade. Aliás, pelo inusitado dos acontecimentos que atravessam nossas salas de aula, penso que seja possível sugerir aos alunos que inventem suas próprias regras de fazer filosofia, segundo uma nova maneira de confecção, um novo estilo que lhes seja próprio, ou seja, que tomem os autores da história do pensamento como matéria de entretimento, por meio de novas composições que não aquelas que os textos filosóficos já oferecem; que selecionem autores que endossam aquilo em que pensam, fazendo uso intensivo deles; que traiam os autores, respeitando-os o máximo, sem reproduzi-los.

O artigo visa partir da filosofia dos valores de Nietzsche para pensar a educação desde a consideração de que a avaliação dos valores é fundamental para concepções e conteúdos educacionais. A exposição principia pela discussão com Thomas E. Hart e seu livro Nietzsche, cultura and education (Nietzsche, cultura e educação), visando apresentar aproximações e distanciamentos com a análise empreendida; e, posteriormente, propõe investigar a relação entre educação e filosofia dos valores, desde suas perspectivas e consequências.

In the present article we analyze the understanding and the use of the Kantian philosophy by the German physicist Werner Heisenberg, Nobel Prize of Physics of 1932, formulator of the principle of uncertainty. Heisenberg seems to adopt a neo-Kantian understanding of the nature of science, according to which science would not deal with the real itself, but only with the way it appears, which inescapably depends on the interaction between the subject and the object of knowledge. However, in spite of this conception, Heisenberg considers that the Kantian definitions of "space", "time" and "causality" are not compatible with the developments of the quantum mechanics. In this opportunity we will see more carefully the conception of science and the problem of causality.

The text presents and discusses the theme of interdisciplinarity with special focus on the human sciences from two articulated movements. (A) In the first part we are dedicated to the elaboration of the problem of cultural fragmentation (which brings us to the interdisciplinary challenge) by allusion to the "modern ambience" as a historically determined way of relating to culture and knowledge, for what Thomas Kuhn calls "normal science." (B) In the second part, and starting of such historical and epistemological considerations of modern subjectivation, it is important to point out the challenges involved in the design of an interdisciplinary formation and at the same time signaling to some strategy of facing the problem of "cultural fragmentation" - regarded as a deeply anchored historical phenomenon. The broad "cultural fragmentation" that multiple interdisciplinary strategies aim to combat in the school setting is especially experienced as a disciplinary compartmentalization of the curriculum in general and of the human sciences we are looking at here. In this context, we maintain that the curricular component of philosophy, but also the philosophical spirit pedagogically dilated, respectively, constitute a promising epistemological formation and strategy for confronting cultural fragmentation in the interdisciplinarity register.

This article proposes to raise a series of problems to try to think of the possibilities of teaching philosophy as a process of resistance and struggle against what Deleuze and Guattari called 'enemies of philosophy: the post-Kantians, the German philosopher Friedrich Hegel and especially, marketing. Based on the criticism developed, we will also address how the teaching of philosophy could create escape lines from what Silvio Gallo called 'higher education'. We intend to think about philosophy and education based on the philosophy of difference by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The idea is to treat philosophy as a concept creator based on the idea of ​​'concept pedagogy', which would enable us to problematize a philosophy teaching practice, establishing as a field of conversation, the philosophy of difference and its teaching, that is, such formative practice intends to act through loopholes, giving rise to the possibilities of students to escape, as far as possible, from control forms and devices.

Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), French philosopher, followed a period of ruptures, that is, of conceptual and methodological changes in contemporary physics. He is one of several thinkers who presented important reflections for the understanding of contemporary atomistics. This article highlights the main philosophical reflections of Gaston Bachelard about the foundations of quantum mechanics. For that, it uses important concepts of its epistemology without which its ideas become incomprehensible. Thus, this work highlights how this science breaks with traditional scientific and philosophical ideas in the first half of the 20th century by presenting a new object of knowledge, namely, the quantum corpuscles. Furthermore, in order to characterize the philosophy of bachelardian quantum physics, according to the author, the nature of atomic particles stands out, as the scientific activity of this science in the creation of new phenomena is emphasized and its rationalism applied as philosophy is emphasized best suited to the new physics. Finally, it is emphasized in this work that Bachelard's ideas are different from other interpretations of quantum mechanics.

Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), French philosopher, followed a period of ruptures, that is, of conceptual and methodological changes in contemporary physics. He is one of several thinkers who presented important reflections for the understanding of contemporary atomistics. This article highlights the main philosophical reflections of Gaston Bachelard about the foundations of quantum mechanics. For that, it uses important concepts of its epistemology without which its ideas become incomprehensible. Thus, this work highlights how this science breaks with traditional scientific and philosophical ideas in the first half of the 20th century by presenting a new object of knowledge, namely, the quantum corpuscles. Furthermore, in order to characterize the philosophy of bachelardian quantum physics, according to the author, the nature of atomic particles stands out, as the scientific activity of this science in the creation of new phenomena is emphasized and its rationalism applied as philosophy is emphasized best suited to the new physics. Finally, it is emphasized in this work that Bachelard's ideas are different from other interpretations of quantum mechanics.

In 'The Oxford Handbook of Wittgenstein', Michael Potter's essay 'Wittgenstein on mathematics' offers not only an analysis on why Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics is so controversial among philosophers and mathematicians but also justifies such controversy. For that purpose, Potter emphasizes that Wittgenstein's discussions on math are unfinished. This article sheds light on some inconsistencies and contradictions pertaining Wittgenstein's mathematic thoughts which, although reinforcing the decade-long criticism on the author, did not interest scholars as much as Wittgenstein's comments on Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorems and his dialogues with Alan Turing on the foundations of mathematics.

This paper is an introduction on the Causal Theory of Memory, one of the most discussed theories in philosophy of memory in the present days. We begin with Martin & Deutscher's formulation of the theory, in which the authors present three criteria in order for a given mental state to be considered an instance of memory, amongst them, the famous causal criterion, which stipulates that a memory must be causally connected to the past experience. Subsequently, we discuss if these criteria are necessary and sufficient for memory and we present two theories that complement these criteria with an epistemic and a phenomenological criterion, i.e., the Causal Epistemic Theory and the Causal Autonoetic Theory. We then introduce the concept of memory traces, which are, according to Martin & Deutscher, the causal link between the memory and the past experience which created this memory; we present the model of traces as structural analogues and the model of distributed traces and discuss the problems which arise for each of these models of traces. Afterwards we focus on the concept of causality and present the Causal Procedural Theory, which offers a different conception of causality that does not focus on the memory traces, but on causal process itself. Lastly, we present the theory called Discontinuism, a theory about the relation between memory and imagination, which follows directly from the Causal Theory of Memory.

This article intends to indicate a propositional use of the notion of image of thought, present in the work Diferença and Repetição by Gilles Deleuze, because according to this reference, repetition is typical of asserting itself, allowing the emergence of what differs. On the other hand, the notion of image of thought occurs in Deleuze's philosophy on three occasions, in the works Nietzsche and Philosophy, Proust and the Signs and in Difference and Repetition and in these works, this perspective does not always coincide, moving from a more critical use for more positive use. In strategic terms and methodological, it is precisely this last approach, of a constructive nature, that we will base ourselves on. The discussion revolves around an affirmative image of thought in philosophy in the face of difference in the act of repetition, which means that difference in philosophy would bring with it, in its movement, an internal process of differentiation, whose power repeats it, but not of the same way, if not transmuting it into other possibilities of what it means to think.

In this paper, I analyze John Dewey's concept of philosophy, in relation with its specificity within the pragmatic philosophical tradition. For this, I will approach the problem of the reconstruction of philosophy as Dewey presents in his work Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), a work in which he completely and explicitly exposes his concept of and what he believes to be the role of philosophy. In particular, I will characterize Dewey's concept of philosophy from his critique to what he think to be the problems of modern or traditional philosophies. From this point of view, I will examine Dewey's use of his postulate of immediate empiricism as a philosophical methodology to avoid the alleged misconceptions of past philosophies and to develop a philosophy of concrete experience.

The purpose of this article is to try to clarify the origins and philosophical importance of the concept of objective logical validity in Frege's thinking. Our argument will try to locate Frege's philosophy within an analytic semantic tradition that arises in the nineteenth century through the thinking of Bolzano and Lotze and which is also characterized by antinaturalism, antipsychologism and by the belief in an a priori objectivity as a characteristic of logically valid units, but not real. The article will identify common points between the philosophy of these three thinkers, but above all, we want to seek in the philosophies of Bolzano and Lotze the roots to understand the distinction between the three kingdoms and the Platonic semanticism present in Frege's philosophy.

The objective this article is to investigate the problem of the formalism in moral giving emphasis to G. W. F. Hegel and its Philosophy of Right as proposal of objectivation of the normative contents of acting. The intention is to present the version of Hegel for the problem of the formalism in relation the determination of acting in the sphere ethical, politics and legal. For the concretion of such task it is necessary to investigate the consideration concerning the 'Moralität and Sittlichkeit', estimated basic to build a project stuffed for a 'Philosophy of Right' and the figure of the State politician. The contributions of Hegel to effectuate the proposal of overcoming of the formalism if find in 'Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts: Über die wissenscaftischen Behandlungsarten der Naturrechts and Phänomenologie des Geistes'. The author apresents a clarification some of the main aspects in such a way of the objections how much of the attempts of reply to the problem.

The subject of this article is the antagonism among two philosophical "schools" developed from opposites principles: the ionian and italic "schools". The former developed since Thales, passing through Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus... wich philosophy is called materialist. The second, from Parmenides, Zenon... till mainly Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, wich is called idealist. The proposal is a scheme rereading of this history and a minimun questioning of its consequences. Since the Antiquity it can be seeing that the philosophers used to reconize the existence of that antagonism and wittingly used to battle among themselves, and as the history tells, the victorious were the idealists. It is not a exaustiv study about each one of those philosophers but only a few, those that I consider the most exemplary in the beggining of the greek phillosphy. It is considered yet how this antagonism has been negligected by the manuals of philosophy history. As the only way to show it is through the texts and testimonials themselves of the philosopheres thinking, the lector will find with greater emphasis an analysis of the atomism development by Leucippus from Anaximenes philosophy, in the opposite way of the usual assertion according to wich atomism has been arised from Parmenides doctrine of the Being.

In My Philosophical Development, Bertrand Russell states that Ludwig Wittgenstein's second philosophy seemed completely unintelligible, composed by trivial positive doctrines and unfounded negative doctrines. Such critique is still currently considered a development of Russell's misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's later ideas. In opposition to that judgement, this article argues that Wittgenstein's posthumous diagnosis of autism provides a new interpretation of his positive doctrines and of his negative doctrines alike, proposing a revaluation of Russell's reaction to them.