Suchergebnisse

I / Preliminary Distinctions -- 1. Language and Linguistic Utterances -- 2. Descriptive Statements -- 3. The Use and Mention of Signs -- II / Theories of Meaning -- 1. Realistic Semantic Theories -- 2. Behavioristic Theories of Meaning -- 3. Quine's Philosophy of Language -- 4. Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Language in the Philosophical Investigations -- III / Theories of Grammar -- 1. Traditional Grammar -- 2. Logical Grammar -- 3. Generative Grammar -- IV / Language and Reality -- 1. The Thesis of the Role Language Plays in Experience -- 2. The Role of Vocabulary -- 3. The Role of Grammar -- 4. The Epistemological Problematic of the Relativity Thesis -- Index of Subjects -- Index of Logical Symbols.

In this bold new book, Jim Vernon develops the general theory of language implicitly contained in the writings of G.W.F. Hegel. Vernon offers novel readings of Hegel's central works in order to explain his views on some long neglected topics and as such demonstrates that his accounts of representation, the concept and the speculative sentence can be used to create sophisticated theories of language acquisition, universal grammar and linguistic practice. Hegel's defence of a scientific philosophy that is necessary and universal seems to eliminate the need for a philosophical linguistics. Since

Russell and the linguistic philosophy -- I. The quest for logical form -- Reference and meaning -- Two senses of "logical form" -- Logical form, propositional constituents, and reconstructionism -- The "logically perfect" language -- The theory of acquaintance -- Proper names -- The "minimum vocabulary" -- Summary and conclusion -- II. The uses of reconstructionism -- The theory of descriptions -- The analysis of class-symbols -- The logical construction of physical objects -- Conclusion -- III. Critique of Russell's philosophy of language -- The theory of acquaintance -- The doctrine of logical form -- Philosophical analysis as elucidation of ontological structure -- Selected Bibliography.

Habermas does not rule out the possibility of violence in language. In fact his account explicitly licenses a broad conception of violence as 'systematically distorted communication'. Yet he does rule out the possibility that language simultaneously imposes as it discloses. That is, his argument precludes the possibility of recognizing that there is an antinomy at the heart of language and philosophical reason. This occlusion of the simultaneously world-disclosing and world-imposing character of language feeds and sustains Habermas's legal and political arguments, where he states that in order to achieve consensus rational deliberation must eliminate force. In this paper, I claim that this argument operates through a manoeuvre that leaves Habermas's position curiously blind to its own predicament. To explain why, I turn to Kant's treatment of the problem of evil in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. Here, as in the Western philosophical tradition more generally, evil has no separate existence: it is folded back into Kant's philosophical scheme. Arendt notes that as soon as Kant identifies the problem of evil he rationalizes it into comprehensible motives. I will show how, through a move that is structurally similar to Kant's rationalization of evil, Habermas rationalizes and attempts to eliminate violence from his consideration of law and language. In Habermas's work, law and language appear as ciphers for reason. The case to be made here is that Habermas's inability to recognize the paradoxical character of language and reason makes his work blind to the violence in which it is unavoidably implicated.