THE MANY FACETS OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 251-263
ISSN: 1467-9981
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In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 251-263
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 293-297
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 353-357
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 307-310
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 339-344
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 363-366
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Metascience: an international review journal for the history, philosophy and social studies of science, Band 15, Heft 2, S. 371-374
ISSN: 1467-9981
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 57-65
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
Binmore analyzes the genetic basis of cooperation. Much of the literature doing this supposes that we must explain directly the cooperative tendency, whether by individual or group selection. A more effective way to go is to find something more general and likely more deeply embedded in personal traits that enables and even enhances cooperation. Hume, with whom Binmore claims affinities, long ago proposed a psychological phenomenon now called mirroring, which induces good relations through shared sentiments in a way that is essentially hard-wired. Mirroring indirectly contributes to cooperativeness. There may be other similarly indirect ways to account for human cooperativeness.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 66-70
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
David Hume is quoted in Binmore's book Natural Justice more than any other author, past or present, and throughout with a markedly positive attitude. It is argued that this affinity is reflected in many characteristic features of Binmore's approach to fairness and social justice and especially in the central role motivational issues are made to play in his theory. It is further argued that Binmore shares with Hume not only important strengths but also certain weaknesses, among them a tendency to derive from the limited evidence of past history far-reaching statements on human nature and the conditions thereby imposed on social morality.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 111-117
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
The following responses to the scholars who were kind enough to comment on my Natural Justice in this symposium have been kept to a minimum by addressing only issues where I think a misunderstanding may have arisen.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 83-88
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
Ken Binmore casts his naturalist theory of justice in opposition to theories of justice that claim authority on the grounds of some religious or moral doctrine. He thereby overlooks the possibility of a political conception of justice−a theory of justice based on the premise that there is an irreducible pluralism of metaphysical, epistemological, and moral doctrines. In my brief comment I shall argue that the naturalist theory of justice advocated by Binmore should be conceived of as belonging to one family of such doctrines, but not as overriding a political conception of justice.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 104-110
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
It is argued that a truly Humean approach to social interaction and to normative reflection on how we should interact needs to get even closer to the facts than the Binmore program suggests. In view of the facts Binmore's normative conclusions on bargaining as well as on the nature of the equilibria of the game of life both seem precarious.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 99-101
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
I raise a few questions about key points in the argument of Natural Justice. 1. The pivotal role assigned to the theory of indefinitely repeated games appears to be both implausible and unnecessary. 2. The evolutionary foundations of the Nash bargaining solution are not completely secure, and its role in the account of interpersonal comparisons of utility is questionable. 3. Free renegotiation behind the veil of ignorance appears neither to have an evolutionary rationale nor to be a brute fact about the way men are.
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 28, Heft 1, S. 13-31
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
The paper questions Binmore's identification of justice with fairness and his corresponding focus on bargains to the neglect of conventions, notably of ownership. Section 1 deals mainly with the role ascribed to man's earliest genetic heritage in shaping fairness norms and the putative effect of such norms on bargaining solutions. Section 2 argues that the scope of fairness as opposed to justice in determining the social order is quite narrow, It sketches a theory of fairness distinct from justice, derived from the principle of treating like cases alike.