Suchergebnisse

Predmet rada su činioci i struktura političke kulture mladih u Srbiji. Politička kultura shvaćena je kao sveukupnost političkih i politički relevantnih orijentacija među pripadnicima jedne političke zajednice koja obuhvata nekoliko tipova orijentacije: kognitivne, afektivne, motivacione, vrednosne i ponašajne. ; The paper explores the factors and structure of youth political culture in Serbia. Political culture is defined as a comprehensive sum of political and politically relevant orientations of the members of a political community and comprises several types of orientations: cognitive, affective, motivational, evaluative and behavioural. Accordingly, five components of youth political culture were distinguished and operationalised by a large number of indicators. The empirical basis for the thesis is a survey conducted in 25 randomly selected secondary schools from the city of Belgrade. The total of 788 students from four different types of secondary school participated in the research: grammar schools (N=202), technical (N=207), economic (N=211) and medical (N=168). The sample was restricted to students of the final year (average age M=18.10, SD=.40). Three-quarters of students (75%) in the sample attend urban secondary schools and one quarter suburban (25%). There were more female participants (58%) than male (42%). Research results indicate that the level of youth political knowledge is low. The majority are not informed about topical social and political issues nor acquainted with certain basic rules regarding the functioning of the Serbian political system, such as the election threshold, government composition or the number of MPs. The prevailing feelings towards numerous analysed political objects are negative. Young people are highly dissatisfied with the current socioeconomic situation. The President, the Government, the Parliament, police, judiciary, the European Union or NATO, are not much trusted. Political cynicism is dominant, while for the majority politics is not the field of interest nor is considered important in life. Most students believe that they cannot influence political affairs (however, surprisingly, they are ready to vote in the following elections) while their opinions on social activism are divided. The attitude towards pro-system values is often ambiguous and vague. The attitude towards democracy is predominantly positive. However, the majority of students do not perceive favourably the newly established mechanisms and institutions of market economy and are hence more inclined towards the socialist than (pro-)market orientation. It can be said that they do not support the freedom of speech, multi-party system and rule of law.

The author discusses the crucial question of whether Serbia truly pursues the path of modernization and European integration, or just a simulation of these processes. The author proposes the thesis that there are numerous obstacles on Serbia's transitional path toward the (post)modern European society. Therefore, he tries to discover the essential reasons for the citizens' reluctance and resistance, the reasons which are related to the modernization of the Serbian society. Serbia is today at the crossroads of the traditional and modern understanding of life. It contains some elements of (post)modernization, but still with a strong influence of its traditional (conservative) heritage. The processes of re-traditionalization (re-mythologization and pseudo-mythologization) represent a major obstacle to the liberation of the society from the grip of the past and to its orientation towards European values. According to the author, the main creators of retrograde flows can be found in the political establishment of contemporary Serbia. He labels them, ironically and derogatorily, the 'guardians' of tradition, who use demagogic statements, populist paroles, and media information control (for their personal and party interests) to slow down Serbia on its European path.

The essay describes the evolution of the concept of political culture, from th concepts such as Comte's 'consensus', Durkheim's 'collective awareness', Weber's 'significance of individual actions', to Parson's 'action frame of reference', and Mead's 'national character'. The development began with Comte's search for differentia specifica of social sciences in relation to oth positive sciences and finished in 1963 with the introduction of the concept of political culture into political science by G. Mmond and S. Verba. Our analysis has shown that many definitions of political culture point out that i essence lies in people's beliefs since political culture is a set of beliefs regarding politics. As much as it may seem a paradox, it cannot be reduced to mere individual beliefs, but represents a system of inter-subjective opinions on various political objects. This explains the possible discrepancies between the political events and the political beliefs of the people, between their behaviour and political culture, and so on. Contrary to the belief of some authors, it has been shown how political culture may and should be taken as a common denominator for a variety of opinions on politics. Political attitudes, values, norms, public opinion and political ideologies are nothing but different manifestations of political culture. Thus, the concept of political culture includes diverse facets of the subjective attitude of people towards politics. This is the asset and not the downside of this concept, as some authors would have it. It is pointed out that the manifold manifestations of political culture do not carry the same 'weight' in explaining the political activism of people and the functioning of political systems. The relationship between these manifestations is extremely complex and a challenge for research. It is this very relationship that could explain the stable and less stable (i.e. stable and vacillating) reactions of people in their political activity. (SOI : PM: S. 128)

Тематски Зборник Свакодневна култура у постсоцијалистичком периоду настао је као резултат научне сарадње Етнографског института САНУи Етнографског института и музеја БАН. Велике политичке и друштвене промене током деведесетих година 20.века озбиљно су се одразиле на свакодневну културу балканских земаља. Управо у периоду кризе, две суседне етнолошке установе, бугарска и српска, које више деценија током социјалисатичког периода нису сарађивале, отпочеле су заједнички рад на истраживању свакодневне културе. Зборник показује у ком правацу су се одвијали културни процеси у Србији и Бугарској, које су сличности и разлике међу њима, али и шта се дешава у постсоцијалистичком периоду у појединим сегментима свакодневне култура Словака, Руса и Македонаца. ; The Collection of Papers entitled ―Everyday Culture in post-socialist period is a result of collaboration between the Institute of Ethnography, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and the Institute of Ethnography and Museum, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. The enormous political and social changes during the 1990's influenced also everyday culture of the Balkans states. After decades of hinder, and precisely in the period of crisis, two neighboring ethnological institutions, the Bulgarian and Serbian, started to cooperate together in the study of everyday culture.The Collection of Papers demonstrates the directions of the cultural processes in Serbia and Bulgaria, accentuating the differences and similarities among the two states, and also explains the deeds within certain segments of everyday cultures of Slovaks, Russians and Macedonians. ; Зборник радова Етнографског института САНУ 22 / Collection of Papers of the Institute of Ethnography SASA 22

The analysis has shown that both approaches are legitimate and useful in understanding and maintaining democracy. Of course, the interactional approaches are more complex, as well as more important and more vital for understanding democracy. The analysis has shown how political culture (democratic legitimation or political trust, support for civil freedoms, satisfaction with the functioning of democracy, etc.) often depend on the elements of the very political structure (party systems and coalition models, election patterns, patterns of democracy, positions in power structure, etc.). Political culture is autonomous in relation to political structure, but frequently its role greatly depends on the relations among political actors and the variables of the political culture itself. The analysis has also demonstrated how these investigations into the interaction (combined effects) between political culture and structure are extremely sophisticated and that in the future they are going to become the most fruitful part of political science, making possible not only a deeper understanding of the "dynamic regularities" in the functioning of democracy but also the attempts at its "innovative sustainment" and gradual development. (SOI : PM: S. 131) + The purpose of this essay is to prove the connection among political culture, political structure and democracy. All the arguments pointing to such a connection have been analysed within the framework of two fundamental approaches to the relationship between culture and structure i.e. within the framework of the classical approach to their correspondence (which claims - primarily in line with the functional theory of culture - that there is a functional concordance between culture and structure, that democracy is mirrored by the civic political culture, i.e. that "culture is a structure's way of life", that culture determines the structure) and the contemporary interactional approach (in which - primarily in line with the theory of culture "as meaning" or "social functioning" - complex relations among various cultural variables and structural variables are analysed as well as their combined effect on democracy as the consequence of these relations). The latter approach considers democracy not as a "fixed condition" but rather as a dynamic phenomenon or the end result of the combined interactional relationships between culture and structure

Defining the dimensions of political culture is a precondition in the elaboration of the theory of this phenomenon and for its systematic empirical study. It has been demonstrated that Almond-Verba's concept of the dimensions of political culture, in the form of a matrix of the three orientations (cognitive, affective, and evaluative) times four political objects ("system", "input-objects", "output-objects" and "I" as an object) is not plausible. If political culture is defined as a set of beliefs about polit (which it indeed is), then it is clear that each belief at the same time contains an intricate mix of knowledge, emotions, and evaluations. This makes it difficult to determine the dimensions according to the mentioned orientations. It seems this was sensed by Almond himself in one of his later works. Using his more recent concept, we define the dimensions of political culture according to the "objects" of politics and not vice versa, according to the orientations in relation to these "objects". Thus we have elaborated on the three fundamental dimensions according to the three fundamental objects of politics: the "system" as a universal object, the "process" as a dynamic object of politics, and the "conduct" as a manner of decision-making and the outcome of governing. It has been found that each of these basic dimensions of political culture has a series of subdimensions (a total of about twenty-five). Surely, this matrix may be added to or perhaps amended, but basically it is unassailable, since it represents a sort of a map of political culture. (SOI : PM: S. 137)

The author analyses the relationship between the constitutional law and the political reality. Using the historical material of the German constitutional legal practice to analyze this relationship, the author concludes that a good constitution can function solely in the setting of a good political culture of state's citizens. Citizenry of a certain political culture always goes hand in hand with a good constitution. (SOI : PM: S. 148)

The author points up the proverbial complexity of Yugoslavia and the inadequacy of its political structure, officially made up of six republics, five peoples, four languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one party. That is why the subjective orientations of its many peoples went counter to its existence, leading to its disintegration following the first multiparty elections. Serbs and Montenegrins were its partisans and due to a lack of democratic political culture they launched the war for the preservation of Yugoslavia. The properties of the political culture of the peoples living on its territory had acted as trip-wires for that war, defined its form, course and intensity. Due to their national identification with Yugoslavia and insufficient democratic political culture, Serbs and Montenegrins started the war for the territories of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aggressors belong to the Eastern civilisational sphere, speak the Serbian language, write in the Cyrillic alphabet. are culturally tribally oriented, want to live in Yugoslavia and Greater Serbia which would be socialist, and are adherents of repressive types of political culture. The victims belong to the Western civilisational sphere, they are Catholics and Moslems, speak Croatian, write in the Latin alphabet, are culturally communally oriented, and favour the participatory political culture. During the Serbian and Monetenegrian aggression, two civil wars erupted in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (1) between the Muslims and the Croats and (2) between the Muslims. The participants of this war all swear their allegiance to the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but differ in their visions of its political structure. The Moslems wish a unitarian state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croats want it to be a federal state, while the Serbs are against any separate state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. (SOI: PM: S. 242)

The author presents the thesis about the difference between the cultural/historical and the political identity by distinguishing the cultural/historical majorities and minorities from the political winners and losers. He points to the democratic paradox according to which states are not ruled by the losers' political majorities but by the winners' political minorities. According to the author, in multi-ethnic societies it is necessary to equally develop the popular and the political culture - that is the culture and political tolerance. (SOI : PM: S. 56)

The author has tried to prove that interethnic relations in democracy cannot be handled solely by means of legal, economic and institutional means; political culture, i.e. civic democratic political culture can have a significant role. The analysis has shown that there is room for the build-up of a trans-national democratic citizenry, free from all ascriptive criteria and identities such as religion, ethnicity, etc. It has also revealed how classic liberalism neglects various identities (ethnic, national etc.) while communitarian liberalism overlooks the excluding force of various identities. It has also demonstrated that there are several concepts of civic identities (liberal, communitarian and social/group) and that each of these concepts can exert profound influence on the relationship between citizens and their political community. And finally, the relation between patriotism and inter-ethnic relations in democracy are reviewed. Patriotism, in the circumstances of growing social pluralisation, and despite a plethora of political integrations, can play a prominent role in bridging the political and cultural atomisations and conflicts in society. It can undertake this role only if constituted in th civic and not the crude (fixed) ethnic sense - though the national defines the limits and the meaning of this constitution - provided it evolves into the loyalty to one's homeland and going hand in hand with the development of democracy and human rights. In short, the purpose of this paper is to provide evidence that it is necessary to expand democratic political culture which might aid in resolving intricate and sensitive relations among various ethnic and cultural communities. Patriotism can assume a decisive role in this. It lays down the limits and legitimacy to each meaningful political discourse and to each genuine political subject. (SOI : PM: S. 49)

The author defines the state of law as a typical product of German political culture which corresponds to, but also differs from, both the experience of the English rule of law and that of the French l'Etat-Nation. The author pays particular attention to the issue of the legitimacy of the state of law. He focuses on two different approaches to this issue in the works of Volker Gerhardt and Ernst Wolfgang Böckenförd. Following a critical analysis of their fundamental assumptions the author goes on to divulge the thesis on the necessity of a balance between rights and power in the functioning of modern political systems. (SOI : PM: S. 13)

In Serbia, in the aftermath of 5 October 2000, the process of desecularization, including the revitalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), overlapped with the democratization of its political institutions, as well as with the political and social pluralism. The desecularization of the Serbian society had already started in the socialist Yugoslavia, but the process itself intensified in the early period of political pluralism and establishment of the democratic political institutions. Is Orthodoxy compatible with democracy, viewed not only as the will of the majority or an election procedure, but also as a political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Is Orthodoxy possible as a "civic" church, in line with the European political tradition of democracy and pluralism? The author contends that the contemporary Orthodoxy, including the SOC, accepts globalization in its technical, technological and economic sense, with a parallel tendency towards cultural fragmentation. Thus one needs a consensus between the SOC, state and society in Serbia concerning the basic values, such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance and individual human rights. ; In Serbia, in the aftermath of 5 October 2000, the process of desecularization, including the revitalization of the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC), overlapped with the democratization of its political institutions, as well as with the political and social pluralism. The desecularization of the Serbian society had already started in the socialist Yugoslavia, but the process itself intensified in the early period of political pluralism and establishment of the democratic political institutions. Is Orthodoxy compatible with democracy, viewed not only as the will of the majority or an election procedure, but also as a political culture of pluralism and rule of law? Is Orthodoxy possible as a "civic" church, in line with the European political tradition of democracy and pluralism? The author contends that the contemporary Orthodoxy, including the SOC, accepts globalization in its technical, technological and economic sense, with a parallel tendency towards cultural fragmentation. Thus one needs a consensus between the SOC, state and society in Serbia concerning the basic values, such as: democracy, civil society, pluralistic discourse, secular tolerance and individual human rights.