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This paper aims to explore the dynamics of competition in the Asia Pacific region. The analysis in this article used a qualitative approach based on secondary data. The data collected from the official reports and other relevant sources. The findings showed that there is instability in intrastate politics, it does not have much effect on regional political constellations. Geopolitical and geo-economic shifts in the region are ongoing so it is natural that there is a process of adaptation that creates a bit of friction with domestic politics. Economy and military serve as a power base for superpowers to be able to spread its influence in a minor power state. However, the power of the superpower is not always constant. The tide of the presence of force can affect the political constellation of the region and lead to changes in hegemony.

ABSTRACTIt is a widely shared belief that political instability is on the rise in European democracies. In order to test such a statement in a more rigorous manner we introduce a concept of political stability that is suitable for the description of the cross‐sectional and longitudinal variation in basic aspects of the political systems of Western Europe. A confirmatory factor analysis of standard indicators on political instability applied to European data indicates that six properties are semantically relevant: public sector deficit, inflation, governmental change, party system volatility, violence, and protests. The main findings from the cross‐sectional analysis are that political instability has become less a Latin phenomenon in Europe and that theories of political stability emphasizing two‐partyism or consociationalism encounter severe counter‐instances. The main findings from the longitudinal analysis are that political instability vanes over time and that it is not on the rise in the present situation. The combined cross‐sectional and longitudinal analysis shows clearly that it is not the case that nations are either stable or unstable in all aspects of the political system, but that the major dimensions of the concept of political stability vary extensively in relation to each other.

There exists a considerable ongoing debate in political science about past and future trends in the political legitimacy of Western democratic systems. While the empirical findings for historical periods are mixed and the indicators have a questionable validity across countries and time periods, assumptions and conditions of a scenario utilized in experimental runs with a formalized computer model indicate long-term decline in political legitimacy in five Western countries under study. The scenario implies increasing distributional conflicts and rising short-term maximization of goals by societal actors. This causes long-term decline in macro-economic performance. Following Eastonian terminology the politi cal section of the model differentiates between two layers of political support: support for the incumbent government and support for the political regime (legitimacy). As far as the data situation permits model parameters are "estimated" using a specific technique combining simulation and iterative parameter optimization

Henry Siegman asks whether the next US President can rescue a two-state solution to the Israel–Palestine conflict; Lakhdar Brahimi discusses Iran – war or peace in the Middle East?; Eric Rouleau assesses the Iranian nuclear threat; Walid Khadduri looks at concerns over the future of Iraq and regional implications.

This paper examines the role of institutional factors, primarily, political stability, in shaping the dynamics of innovation activity in today's modern society. Using panel data consisting of 26 African countries from the period between 1996 and 2016 as well as employing the negative binomial estimate, we model the impact of those factors on the number of applications for patents per resident. GDP per capita, education and also other institutional factors including the rule of law and financial freedom. The results reveal a strong positive effect of the rule of law on patenting activity. © Foundation of International Studies, 2020 © CSR, 2020. ; Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst, DAAD ; Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Minobrnauka ; Ministerstwo Nauki i Szkolnictwa Wyższego, MNiSW ; The authors are thankful to the Russian Ministry of Education and Science, DAAD, The Ministry of Science and Higher Education in Poland for financial support to carry out this research. Thanks (IOS, Regensburg) for hosting James Okrah for the period of his research internship with them, with special thanks to Dr Alexander Nepp (Supervisor), Dr. Olga Popova (IOS, Regensburg), Prof. Richard Frensch (IOS, Regensburg) and Dr Stefan Huber for their support.

This paper tries to examine in detail political stability in the European Union's (EU) countries during the period 2002-12. Firstly, it examines the causality relationship between political stability and economic growth, which is an issue that has puzzled scholars for decades. Using the Granger causality test the empirical findings suggest that in the case of the EU's countries, causality is one directional, moving from political stability to economic growth. Secondly, it examines the factors that affect political stability. Using the fixed effects panel data model, we may suggest that the long term recession, the increased unemployment ratios and the high levels of inflation significantly threaten political stability. However, there are other factors that are not exclusively due to economics, such as transparency, public health care, education etc., which may significantly reduce the previously mentioned consequences. Finally, this study suggests some reforms of the EU's regulation according to the migration policy that may smooth social and humanitarian disparities.

Political stability and security have become important factors of sustainable economic progress for the developingcountries, especially states with the experience of war and instability. Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) as a semi-autonomousregion tried to improve the level of political stability and security status, to gain more foreign direct investment (FDI)and economic growth. Consequently, KRI has become the safest region in Iraq and enjoyed political stability and safety.Therefore, during the last decade, KRI has occurred as a new destination of FDI in the Middle East and has receivednotable progress in most of the economic sectors. The aim of this study is to evaluate the role of political stability andsecurity status on the FDI attractions and their consequences on economic development. However, it will investigatethe factors that make the KRI safer than the rest of Iraq.

This essay presents a new analysis of Costa Rica's political stability in the last four decades. It underlines two basic features during this period: first, the efforts to redistribute wealth; second, the abolition of the army as a permanent institution.

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader's patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader's patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader's being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader's coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.

This research paper explores the evolution of the Senegalese government immediately after independence and the various factors contributing to its remarkable stability. It begins with a brief look at Senegal's history, both pre-colonial and colonial. The research then discusses the foundations of the Senegalese government structure and party system from just before independence to 1978. The highlighted elements of the story are the role of political parties and single-party dominance, Senghor's platform based on African socialism and négritude, and the formation and failure of the Mali Federation. This work also features party building, social groups that influence politics, the urban-rural cleavage, and some constitutional development. The focus of the research is on Léopold Sédar Senghor, the key figure in the stable governmental establishment in Senegal. It explores his relations with other key figures including Lamine Guèye, the facilitator of socialism's rise in Senegal and a major party leader, and Mamadou Dia, once a friend of Senghor's and his Prime Minister, who attempted a nonviolent coup; he was foiled and jailed in 1962. The various clans of Senegal (based on heredity) and the Islamic Brotherhoods, powerful religious organizations that have much sway over their members' political attitudes, also play an important role. This paper concludes with an exploration of Senghor's dynamic leadership as a foundation for political stability in Senegal, focusing on two major events: the disintegration of the extremely short-lived Mali Federation and the resulting independence of Senegal, and Dia's attempted coup and resulting arrest. The constitution was amended after Dia's jailing in 1962 to remove the post of prime minister, leaving the president as the sole head of government, and increasing Senghor's power and influence. The remainder of the research after the failed coup consists of exploring the ways in which Senghor made his party completely dominant and his role and contributions as president.

Concerns about international terrorism make the stability of failing states central to Western foreign aid policies. This paper explores how donors reduce the volatility of aid to avoid political destabilization of recipient countries. Using a formal model, we show that stability-oriented donors control the risk of conflict, but they never fully eliminate it. Recipient governments can exploit donor preferences for stability through increased rent extraction. As a result, stability-oriented aid reduces the risk of political destabilization only under narrow circumstances. If these conditions are not met, stability aid makes conflict more likely. We present evidence for key predictions of our model.