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ABSTRACTIt is a widely shared belief that political instability is on the rise in European democracies. In order to test such a statement in a more rigorous manner we introduce a concept of political stability that is suitable for the description of the cross‐sectional and longitudinal variation in basic aspects of the political systems of Western Europe. A confirmatory factor analysis of standard indicators on political instability applied to European data indicates that six properties are semantically relevant: public sector deficit, inflation, governmental change, party system volatility, violence, and protests. The main findings from the cross‐sectional analysis are that political instability has become less a Latin phenomenon in Europe and that theories of political stability emphasizing two‐partyism or consociationalism encounter severe counter‐instances. The main findings from the longitudinal analysis are that political instability vanes over time and that it is not on the rise in the present situation. The combined cross‐sectional and longitudinal analysis shows clearly that it is not the case that nations are either stable or unstable in all aspects of the political system, but that the major dimensions of the concept of political stability vary extensively in relation to each other.

There exists a considerable ongoing debate in political science about past and future trends in the political legitimacy of Western democratic systems. While the empirical findings for historical periods are mixed and the indicators have a questionable validity across countries and time periods, assumptions and conditions of a scenario utilized in experimental runs with a formalized computer model indicate long-term decline in political legitimacy in five Western countries under study. The scenario implies increasing distributional conflicts and rising short-term maximization of goals by societal actors. This causes long-term decline in macro-economic performance. Following Eastonian terminology the politi cal section of the model differentiates between two layers of political support: support for the incumbent government and support for the political regime (legitimacy). As far as the data situation permits model parameters are "estimated" using a specific technique combining simulation and iterative parameter optimization

Der erfolgreiche Verlauf der Transformationsstrategie in den baltischen Staaten ist wesentlich auf die friktionslose Art des Machtwechsels nach den jeweiligen parlamentarischen Wahlen und die damit ermöglichte politische Kontinuität zurückzuführen. Diesem Umstand liegt maßgeblich die Tatsache zugrunde, daß das Parteiensystem in diesen Ländern nicht durch ethnische Spaltungen gekennzeichnet und vergleichsweise homogen ist. Dadurch ist es den Parteien möglich, sich stärker auf politische und ideologische Fragen zu konzentrieren. (BIOst-Mrk)

Analyzes Costa Rica's political stability over the last four decades. Two basic features are emphasized: (1) the efforts to redistribute wealth; & (2) the abolition of the army as a permanent institution. Adapted from the source document.

This essay presents a new analysis of Costa Rica's political stability in the last four decades. It underlines two basic features during this period: first, the efforts to redistribute wealth; second, the abolition of the army as a permanent institution.

Political conflict across Africa is often linked to the pervasive use of patronage in retaining control of the state. However, few sources of data have been available to systematically examine the relationship between a leader's patronage strategies and the likelihood of an extraconstitutional change in power. This article employs ministerial appointments to the cabinet as a proxy for changes in the size of a leader's patronage coalition. With time-series cross-section data on 40 African countries, this study shows that the size of cabinets varies systematically according to regime type, resource constraints, ethnic fractionalization, and total population. It then shows that African leaders extend their tenure in office by expanding their patronage coalition through cabinet appointments. A proportional hazards model of regime duration indicates that cabinet expansion lowers the probability of a leader's being deposed through a coup. The appointment of one additional minister to the cabinet lowers a leader's coup risk by a greater extent than does a 1-percentage-point increase in economic growth.