Political Stability
In: Politics and Society in Western Europe, S. 294-321
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In: Politics and Society in Western Europe, S. 294-321
In: Great Games, Local Rules, S. 116-133
In: Environmental Security in the Arctic Ocean; NATO Science for Peace and Security Series C: Environmental Security, S. 297-311
In: 23. Deutscher Soziologentag 1986: Sektions- und Ad-hoc-Gruppen, S. 25-28
In: Japan since 1945, S. 70-95
In: Russian challenges: between freedom, and energy, S. 153-164
In: Russian Challenges
In: Croatian accession to the European Union. Vol. 2, Institutional challenges, S. 301-326
This paper provides a comparative empirical analysis of social values in Croatia, the European Union (EU), the countries joining in the first round, and a group of European countries outside the EU. Following up on the analysis of the data obtained in international research into European
values carried out at the end of the 90's on national samples of most European countries, the authors have endeavoured to determine the differences in the spread of post-material values and the scope of social capital. The objective is to define where, in terms of social values, Croatia is currently located, and thus to sketch out its readiness or lack of readiness for joining the EU. In the second part, the paper offers a comparative analysis of factors that affect the level of public confidence in the EU.
In: Supra-National Integration and Domestic Economic Growth
In: Handbook on International Political Economy, S. 89-106
In: What are Campaigns For?, S. 83-114
It is argued that, for large electorates, the operation of direct democracy is well-behaved in the sense of possessing a stable equilibrium. Drawing on the rational-choice political economy literature & the example of the European Council of Ministers, a model of representative democracy is proposed based on the notion of a political heart, defined as a geometric version of an uncovered set of preferences. It is suggested that formal institutional rules allow the computation of the heart between a given set of actors if that dimension is below the institutionally determined instability dimension. In this case, outcomes may be expected to lie in the heart determined by the structure of the rules. Application of this model to data on the US electorate reveals that it successfully predicts a stable outcome. Based on these findings, it is asserted that, barring a political game that resembles a zero-sum situation, representative institutions are able to produce centrist outcomes that tend toward stability. 1 Table, 11 Figures. D. M. Smith
The major political parties have long dominated Australian politics, limiting election at the federal level to those supported by one of three party labels -- Liberal, National, or Labor. Once in the legislature, the majority party determines the agenda, & cross-party voting is almost unknown. Compared with the situation in other advanced democracies, the major parties in Australia have remained strong, leaving little room for minor parties to develop. The explanation for this lies in the development of the country's political culture. What took root in Australia when it split from Britain in the 19th century were the utilitarian ideas of Jeremy Bentham, which have been expressed in "the reliance on an instrumental view of the political process," ie, an understanding of the state's major function as the resolution of disputes, not in the support of individual liberty but in the provision of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." While recent years have seen some erosion of party support in terms of strength, their direction remains solid. Without some fundamental shift in the political culture, the three major parties will likely retain their hegemony. Tables, References. J. Stanton
In: Social Justice and Individual Ethics in an Open Society; Studies in Economic Ethics and Philosophy, S. 261-285
In: Rethinking Order