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First hypothesis is falsified – in accordance with other similar works (f.e., Gupta, 2008), no relation between democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence is found. However, empirical analysis strongly supports the second hypothesis: there is a statistically significant relationship between the regime capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence. The probability that regime will experience higher levels of collective violence (if it occurs) is raised greatly when the regime capacity is lower. As it is expected from these findings, third hypothesis is only partially supported: higher levels of collective violence are indeed observed in the low capacity-undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis).

First hypothesis is falsified – in accordance with other similar works (f.e., Gupta, 2008), no relation between democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence is found. However, empirical analysis strongly supports the second hypothesis: there is a statistically significant relationship between the regime capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence. The probability that regime will experience higher levels of collective violence (if it occurs) is raised greatly when the regime capacity is lower. As it is expected from these findings, third hypothesis is only partially supported: higher levels of collective violence are indeed observed in the low capacity-undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis).

First hypothesis is falsified – in accordance with other similar works (f.e., Gupta, 2008), no relation between democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence is found. However, empirical analysis strongly supports the second hypothesis: there is a statistically significant relationship between the regime capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence. The probability that regime will experience higher levels of collective violence (if it occurs) is raised greatly when the regime capacity is lower. As it is expected from these findings, third hypothesis is only partially supported: higher levels of collective violence are indeed observed in the low capacity-undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis).

First hypothesis is falsified – in accordance with other similar works (f.e., Gupta, 2008), no relation between democracy level and degree/occurrence of collective violence is found. However, empirical analysis strongly supports the second hypothesis: there is a statistically significant relationship between the regime capacity (measured as polity fragmentation index) and degree of collective violence. The probability that regime will experience higher levels of collective violence (if it occurs) is raised greatly when the regime capacity is lower. As it is expected from these findings, third hypothesis is only partially supported: higher levels of collective violence are indeed observed in the low capacity-undemocratic regimes, but the most successful in terms of containment of collective violence are high-capacity undemocratic regimes (not high capacity-democratic, as formulated in the hypothesis).

The goal of the study was to analyze communication about parents' experiences of political oppression in Lithuania (deportation to Siberia or political imprisonment) among second generation survivors during the Communism regime. We assumed that survivors' traumatic experiences have an impact on adult o.spring of survivors, and communication might involve avoidance in talking about parents political violence experiences. Materials and methods. One Hundred Forty-Five second generation survivors, who had at least one parent whom experienced political imprisonment or forced displacement during the Soviet occupation in Lithuania participated in our study. Mailed questionnaires included demographic data and open questions about communication with their parents concerning the parents political oppression. Thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. Results and conclusions. Second generation participants found out about the forced displacement and political imprisonment of their parents during childhood. For some of the participants these memories were interesting and had a positive impact, for example, they were proud of their parents. For other participants, the topic of their parents oppression was painful and caused negative feelings such as fear and anger. While there was no direct question in the questionnaire concerning the topic of oppression, it was still mentioned in the participants' answers. One characteristic feature of communication about oppression is silence and mystery. This was partly determined by the social and political circumstances of the soviet regime.

The goal of the study was to analyze communication about parents' experiences of political oppression in Lithuania (deportation to Siberia or political imprisonment) among second generation survivors during the Communism regime. We assumed that survivors' traumatic experiences have an impact on adult o.spring of survivors, and communication might involve avoidance in talking about parents political violence experiences. Materials and methods. One Hundred Forty-Five second generation survivors, who had at least one parent whom experienced political imprisonment or forced displacement during the Soviet occupation in Lithuania participated in our study. Mailed questionnaires included demographic data and open questions about communication with their parents concerning the parents political oppression. Thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. Results and conclusions. Second generation participants found out about the forced displacement and political imprisonment of their parents during childhood. For some of the participants these memories were interesting and had a positive impact, for example, they were proud of their parents. For other participants, the topic of their parents oppression was painful and caused negative feelings such as fear and anger. While there was no direct question in the questionnaire concerning the topic of oppression, it was still mentioned in the participants' answers. One characteristic feature of communication about oppression is silence and mystery. This was partly determined by the social and political circumstances of the soviet regime.

The goal of the study was to analyze communication about parents' experiences of political oppression in Lithuania (deportation to Siberia or political imprisonment) among second generation survivors during the Communism regime. We assumed that survivors' traumatic experiences have an impact on adult o.spring of survivors, and communication might involve avoidance in talking about parents political violence experiences. Materials and methods. One Hundred Forty-Five second generation survivors, who had at least one parent whom experienced political imprisonment or forced displacement during the Soviet occupation in Lithuania participated in our study. Mailed questionnaires included demographic data and open questions about communication with their parents concerning the parents political oppression. Thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. Results and conclusions. Second generation participants found out about the forced displacement and political imprisonment of their parents during childhood. For some of the participants these memories were interesting and had a positive impact, for example, they were proud of their parents. For other participants, the topic of their parents oppression was painful and caused negative feelings such as fear and anger. While there was no direct question in the questionnaire concerning the topic of oppression, it was still mentioned in the participants' answers. One characteristic feature of communication about oppression is silence and mystery. This was partly determined by the social and political circumstances of the soviet regime.

The goal of the study was to analyze communication about parents' experiences of political oppression in Lithuania (deportation to Siberia or political imprisonment) among second generation survivors during the Communism regime. We assumed that survivors' traumatic experiences have an impact on adult o.spring of survivors, and communication might involve avoidance in talking about parents political violence experiences. Materials and methods. One Hundred Forty-Five second generation survivors, who had at least one parent whom experienced political imprisonment or forced displacement during the Soviet occupation in Lithuania participated in our study. Mailed questionnaires included demographic data and open questions about communication with their parents concerning the parents political oppression. Thematic analysis was used to analyze qualitative data. Results and conclusions. Second generation participants found out about the forced displacement and political imprisonment of their parents during childhood. For some of the participants these memories were interesting and had a positive impact, for example, they were proud of their parents. For other participants, the topic of their parents oppression was painful and caused negative feelings such as fear and anger. While there was no direct question in the questionnaire concerning the topic of oppression, it was still mentioned in the participants' answers. One characteristic feature of communication about oppression is silence and mystery. This was partly determined by the social and political circumstances of the soviet regime.

During Nazi and Soviet occupations in the years 1940-1958 one third of Lithuanian population were killed or deported to Siberia. Almost 300,000 people were deported to highly remote regions of Siberia. Former political prisoners and deportees experienced prolonged torture and persecutions, even after release from prison. Little is known in traumatic stress literature about effects of such extreme and prolonged traumatisation. The aim of the present study was to find out predictors of posttraumatic reactions in the group of survivors of political imprisonment. Methods: Former political prisoners (n = 724) were randomly selected from the national registry of Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania. All former political prisoners are officially acknowledged as victims of Soviet repression by Lithuanifully rehabilitated. The mean age of political prisoners was 75.8 (SD = 5,8) years. Questionnaires covering questions about lifetime traumatic experiences, exposure to political violence, posttraumatic symtoms as well as possible mediating factors between trauma and consequences have been mailed toparticipants of the study. Posttraumatic reactions were assessedusing Lithuanian version of Traumatic Symptom Checlist (TSC-35). Results: Posttraumatic reactions correlated with demographic factors (gender, level of education), health effects, traumatic experiences and sence of coherence. Variables using hierarchical stepwise model were entered into multiple regression analysis. Demographic factors explained 8.1 % of posttraumatic reactions variance. Both health effects and demographic variables explained 19.6 % of variance. Traumatic experiences increased prediction of posttraumatic reactions to 31.6 %. Final equation, with sense of coherence entered on the fourth step, explained 43.7 % of posttraumatic symptom variance Significant predictors of posttraumatic reactions among former Lithuanian political prisoners were: accumulative lifetime traumatic experiences, sense of coherence, gender (women showing higher levels of victimization), death of spouse, somatic complains immediately after imprisonment or forced deportation, and attribution of current poor health status to experienced political violence.

During Nazi and Soviet occupations in the years 1940-1958 one third of Lithuanian population were killed or deported to Siberia. Almost 300,000 people were deported to highly remote regions of Siberia. Former political prisoners and deportees experienced prolonged torture and persecutions, even after release from prison. Little is known in traumatic stress literature about effects of such extreme and prolonged traumatisation. The aim of the present study was to find out predictors of posttraumatic reactions in the group of survivors of political imprisonment. Methods: Former political prisoners (n = 724) were randomly selected from the national registry of Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania. All former political prisoners are officially acknowledged as victims of Soviet repression by Lithuanifully rehabilitated. The mean age of political prisoners was 75.8 (SD = 5,8) years. Questionnaires covering questions about lifetime traumatic experiences, exposure to political violence, posttraumatic symtoms as well as possible mediating factors between trauma and consequences have been mailed toparticipants of the study. Posttraumatic reactions were assessedusing Lithuanian version of Traumatic Symptom Checlist (TSC-35). Results: Posttraumatic reactions correlated with demographic factors (gender, level of education), health effects, traumatic experiences and sence of coherence. Variables using hierarchical stepwise model were entered into multiple regression analysis. Demographic factors explained 8.1 % of posttraumatic reactions variance. Both health effects and demographic variables explained 19.6 % of variance. Traumatic experiences increased prediction of posttraumatic reactions to 31.6 %. Final equation, with sense of coherence entered on the fourth step, explained 43.7 % of posttraumatic symptom variance Significant predictors of posttraumatic reactions among former Lithuanian political prisoners were: accumulative lifetime traumatic experiences, sense of coherence, gender (women showing higher levels of victimization), death of spouse, somatic complains immediately after imprisonment or forced deportation, and attribution of current poor health status to experienced political violence.

During Nazi and Soviet occupations in the years 1940-1958 one third of Lithuanian population were killed or deported to Siberia. Almost 300,000 people were deported to highly remote regions of Siberia. Former political prisoners and deportees experienced prolonged torture and persecutions, even after release from prison. Little is known in traumatic stress literature about effects of such extreme and prolonged traumatisation. The aim of the present study was to find out predictors of posttraumatic reactions in the group of survivors of political imprisonment. Methods: Former political prisoners (n = 724) were randomly selected from the national registry of Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania. All former political prisoners are officially acknowledged as victims of Soviet repression by Lithuanifully rehabilitated. The mean age of political prisoners was 75.8 (SD = 5,8) years. Questionnaires covering questions about lifetime traumatic experiences, exposure to political violence, posttraumatic symtoms as well as possible mediating factors between trauma and consequences have been mailed toparticipants of the study. Posttraumatic reactions were assessedusing Lithuanian version of Traumatic Symptom Checlist (TSC-35). Results: Posttraumatic reactions correlated with demographic factors (gender, level of education), health effects, traumatic experiences and sence of coherence. Variables using hierarchical stepwise model were entered into multiple regression analysis. Demographic factors explained 8.1 % of posttraumatic reactions variance. Both health effects and demographic variables explained 19.6 % of variance. Traumatic experiences increased prediction of posttraumatic reactions to 31.6 %. Final equation, with sense of coherence entered on the fourth step, explained 43.7 % of posttraumatic symptom variance Significant predictors of posttraumatic reactions among former Lithuanian political prisoners were: accumulative lifetime traumatic experiences, sense of coherence, gender (women showing higher levels of victimization), death of spouse, somatic complains immediately after imprisonment or forced deportation, and attribution of current poor health status to experienced political violence.

During Nazi and Soviet occupations in the years 1940-1958 one third of Lithuanian population were killed or deported to Siberia. Almost 300,000 people were deported to highly remote regions of Siberia. Former political prisoners and deportees experienced prolonged torture and persecutions, even after release from prison. Little is known in traumatic stress literature about effects of such extreme and prolonged traumatisation. The aim of the present study was to find out predictors of posttraumatic reactions in the group of survivors of political imprisonment. Methods: Former political prisoners (n = 724) were randomly selected from the national registry of Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania. All former political prisoners are officially acknowledged as victims of Soviet repression by Lithuanifully rehabilitated. The mean age of political prisoners was 75.8 (SD = 5,8) years. Questionnaires covering questions about lifetime traumatic experiences, exposure to political violence, posttraumatic symtoms as well as possible mediating factors between trauma and consequences have been mailed toparticipants of the study. Posttraumatic reactions were assessedusing Lithuanian version of Traumatic Symptom Checlist (TSC-35). Results: Posttraumatic reactions correlated with demographic factors (gender, level of education), health effects, traumatic experiences and sence of coherence. Variables using hierarchical stepwise model were entered into multiple regression analysis. Demographic factors explained 8.1 % of posttraumatic reactions variance. Both health effects and demographic variables explained 19.6 % of variance. Traumatic experiences increased prediction of posttraumatic reactions to 31.6 %. Final equation, with sense of coherence entered on the fourth step, explained 43.7 % of posttraumatic symptom variance Significant predictors of posttraumatic reactions among former Lithuanian political prisoners were: accumulative lifetime traumatic experiences, sense of coherence, gender (women showing higher levels of victimization), death of spouse, somatic complains immediately after imprisonment or forced deportation, and attribution of current poor health status to experienced political violence.

This article deals with the phenomenon of political violence. The concept of "armed resistance" (Lithuanian: ginkluotas pasipriešinimas) is introduced to describe political violence perpetrated by non-state actors or subnational groups. The Lithuanian concept of "armed resistance" in general corresponds to the English concept of "insurgency". Many problems related to the definitions of concepts of "insurgency", "guerrilla warfare" and "terrorism" are pointed out. The article states that the identified concepts are often used incorrectly in foreign and Lithuanian academic publications. Very often these concepts of "insurgent", "guerrilla fighter", and "terrorist" are used as synonyms. One of the main reasons for misuse of the mentioned concepts is the lack of related academic literature. Misuse of the terms insurgents, guerrillas and terrorists by official governmental institutions is also underlined. It is argued in the article that proper understanding of the armed resistance is needed. To get such an understanding one needs to distinguish political violence and non-political or apolitical violence. Violence used by armed resistance groups (guerrilla and terrorist groups) is inevitably political in its aims and motives. That is why it is called political violence. Criminals and pathological murders also use violence but their aims and motives are different. Criminal groups use violence to obtain money or to acquire material goods. Pathological murders see violence as an end in itself. Usually they are not interested in politics, profit or material goods. The main idea of this article is that, because of the numerous recent researches made in the field of political violence (insurgency, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare), different strategies of armed resistance may be more or less clearly defined. Guerrilla warfare and terrorism are different strategies or different strategic approaches used by various non-state actors. The author argues that guerrillas and terrorists should be distinguished according to four criteria: 1) targets; 2) identification signs; 3) control of territory; 4) size of operational units. Terrorists' targets are mostly civilian ones. Guerrillas' targets are mostly military. Terrorists do not use uniforms or other signs to identify them as combatants. Guerrillas usually have some sort of identification signs. Terrorists are not interested in control of the territory. Guerrillas want to seize or hold on territory. Terrorists usually operate in units ranging from lone assassin to five-member teams. Guerrillas mostly wage their war in platoon or company size units. The distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is of crucial importance because it helps to better understand the nature of armed resistance. It should be pointed out that on the understanding and clear definitions of terrorism and guerrilla warfare depends the quality of an academic research. In addition, the distinction of guerrilla warfare and terrorism is important for the success of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns.

This article deals with the phenomenon of political violence. The concept of "armed resistance" (Lithuanian: ginkluotas pasipriešinimas) is introduced to describe political violence perpetrated by non-state actors or subnational groups. The Lithuanian concept of "armed resistance" in general corresponds to the English concept of "insurgency". Many problems related to the definitions of concepts of "insurgency", "guerrilla warfare" and "terrorism" are pointed out. The article states that the identified concepts are often used incorrectly in foreign and Lithuanian academic publications. Very often these concepts of "insurgent", "guerrilla fighter", and "terrorist" are used as synonyms. One of the main reasons for misuse of the mentioned concepts is the lack of related academic literature. Misuse of the terms insurgents, guerrillas and terrorists by official governmental institutions is also underlined. It is argued in the article that proper understanding of the armed resistance is needed. To get such an understanding one needs to distinguish political violence and non-political or apolitical violence. Violence used by armed resistance groups (guerrilla and terrorist groups) is inevitably political in its aims and motives. That is why it is called political violence. Criminals and pathological murders also use violence but their aims and motives are different. Criminal groups use violence to obtain money or to acquire material goods. Pathological murders see violence as an end in itself. Usually they are not interested in politics, profit or material goods. The main idea of this article is that, because of the numerous recent researches made in the field of political violence (insurgency, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare), different strategies of armed resistance may be more or less clearly defined. Guerrilla warfare and terrorism are different strategies or different strategic approaches used by various non-state actors. The author argues that guerrillas and terrorists should be distinguished according to four criteria: 1) targets; 2) identification signs; 3) control of territory; 4) size of operational units. Terrorists' targets are mostly civilian ones. Guerrillas' targets are mostly military. Terrorists do not use uniforms or other signs to identify them as combatants. Guerrillas usually have some sort of identification signs. Terrorists are not interested in control of the territory. Guerrillas want to seize or hold on territory. Terrorists usually operate in units ranging from lone assassin to five-member teams. Guerrillas mostly wage their war in platoon or company size units. The distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is of crucial importance because it helps to better understand the nature of armed resistance. It should be pointed out that on the understanding and clear definitions of terrorism and guerrilla warfare depends the quality of an academic research. In addition, the distinction of guerrilla warfare and terrorism is important for the success of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns.

This article deals with the phenomenon of political violence. The concept of "armed resistance" (Lithuanian: ginkluotas pasipriešinimas) is introduced to describe political violence perpetrated by non-state actors or subnational groups. The Lithuanian concept of "armed resistance" in general corresponds to the English concept of "insurgency". Many problems related to the definitions of concepts of "insurgency", "guerrilla warfare" and "terrorism" are pointed out. The article states that the identified concepts are often used incorrectly in foreign and Lithuanian academic publications. Very often these concepts of "insurgent", "guerrilla fighter", and "terrorist" are used as synonyms. One of the main reasons for misuse of the mentioned concepts is the lack of related academic literature. Misuse of the terms insurgents, guerrillas and terrorists by official governmental institutions is also underlined. It is argued in the article that proper understanding of the armed resistance is needed. To get such an understanding one needs to distinguish political violence and non-political or apolitical violence. Violence used by armed resistance groups (guerrilla and terrorist groups) is inevitably political in its aims and motives. That is why it is called political violence. Criminals and pathological murders also use violence but their aims and motives are different. Criminal groups use violence to obtain money or to acquire material goods. Pathological murders see violence as an end in itself. Usually they are not interested in politics, profit or material goods. The main idea of this article is that, because of the numerous recent researches made in the field of political violence (insurgency, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare), different strategies of armed resistance may be more or less clearly defined. Guerrilla warfare and terrorism are different strategies or different strategic approaches used by various non-state actors. The author argues that guerrillas and terrorists should be distinguished according to four criteria: 1) targets; 2) identification signs; 3) control of territory; 4) size of operational units. Terrorists' targets are mostly civilian ones. Guerrillas' targets are mostly military. Terrorists do not use uniforms or other signs to identify them as combatants. Guerrillas usually have some sort of identification signs. Terrorists are not interested in control of the territory. Guerrillas want to seize or hold on territory. Terrorists usually operate in units ranging from lone assassin to five-member teams. Guerrillas mostly wage their war in platoon or company size units. The distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is of crucial importance because it helps to better understand the nature of armed resistance. It should be pointed out that on the understanding and clear definitions of terrorism and guerrilla warfare depends the quality of an academic research. In addition, the distinction of guerrilla warfare and terrorism is important for the success of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns.