Suchergebnisse

Following the military defeat of the secular strategic orientation ("Drang nach Westen") in Croatia of Serbian political and intellectual elite, a question arises: which are the feasible strategic options of Serbian nationalist elites? Theoretically, three options are possible: (1) radical strategic reorientation: giving up entirely on the existing orientation and setting up new strategic priorities; (2) a respite and mustering strength for a new round (a reprise of the tactical variant of 1991); (3) hatching a novel, long-term tactical variation which would enable the achievement of strategic objectives step by step, by "peaceful means". The author finds the third option most viable, though there are no hints that such a choice has actually been made. However, supposing this option might eventually be acted upon, the author goes on to envisage the quandaries and dilemmas which political and intellectual elites in Serbia might be faced with. (SOI : PM: S. 44)

An analysis of the US foreign policy strategy shows that a more intensive advocacy of human rights and democracy is us usually a characteristic for democratic American presidents and their administrations. The numerous challenges of the new world order which Bill Clinton was faced with, required the redefinition of the role, goals, and interests of the sole remaining superpower in the new international community. The promotion of democracy and liberal market values and the protection of universal human rights have been the guidelines for Clinton's administration's foreign policy during both of his mandates. Due to the specific features and intensity of geopolitical changes, which resulted in armed conflicts in the South-Eastern Europe, the consequence of the American policy towards the newly-created countries (the so-called young democracies on the Old Continent, including the new Russia) was that the first NATO's military "out of area" campaign on Kosovo was justified as an attempt to stem the flood of refugees and to make an end to the violation of ethnic and other human rights. Since the US have announced their intention to intervene when and if (and based on their interests), they deem that basic human rights and democratic values are violated, it can be said that a new pattern of behaviour has emerged which would have to be adopted by the other members of the new world order as well. (SOI : PM: S. 122)

The aim of this article, through an analysis of Veljko Vujacic's text and other pamphlets and manifestos by the Serbian political elite, was to show that the Serbian elite and the Serbian society have not got rid of their nationalist bias in explaining the events which led to the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. They claim that the main culprit for this failure was the communist national policy and the failure to use adequate means (meaning Rankovic's technology of violence) in order to preserve the unity of the state. The second part of the article serves to demonstrate how Weber's view on the politics of power does not suffice to explain away the bolshevist and the communist form of the populist Serbian nationalism. The moment when the former Yugoslav political elite split into the anticommunist and anticentralist on the one hand, and the bolshevist and the centralist on the other, there was no possibility for a compromise. The third part suggests that Vujacic (and not only he) thinks that a way of overcoming the Serbian "dominant" nationalism is the catharsis of Serbian intellectuals and the Serbian society. However, as the latest events and proclamations of the Serbian elite show, his is a solitary case. (SOI : PM: S. 37)

In the introduction, the author analyses Clinton's approach to Europe and the European NATO allies, particularly his wish to develop the partnership and to expand the Alliance. The new post-cold-war relations in Europe contributed to the stronger American-European ties - the foundation of atlantism. This new model of relations is discussed in relation to the emerging challenges that pose the key questions: the creation of a new joint strategy, the problems of NATO's "out of area" interventions and the creation of such European relations that will not provoke uncalled-for Russian reactions. Seen within such a framework, NATO is going to remain the chief proponent of military-political actions of the developed world in which US is to play the leading role. (SOI : S. 102)