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This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Contemporary Political Theory. The definitive publisher-authenticated version STAVRAKAKIS, Y. . et al, 2017. Populism, anti-populism and crisis. Contemporary Political Theory, 17 (1), pp.4–27. is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41296-017-0142-y ; This article focuses on two issues involved in the formation and political trajectory of populist representations within political antagonism. First, it explores the role of crisis in the articulation of populist discourse. This problematic is far from new within theories of populism but has recently taken a new turn. We thus purport to reconsider the way populism and crisis are related, mapping the different modalities this relation can take and advancing further their theorization from the point of view of a discursive theory of the political, drawing primarily on the Essex School perspective initially developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Second, this will involve focusing on the antagonistic language games developed around populist representations, something that has not attracted equal attention. Highlighting the need to study anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual constitution, we will test the ensuing theoretical framework in an analysis of SYRIZA, a recent and, as a result, under-researched example of egalitarian, inclusionary populism emerging within the European crisis landscape.

The paper develops two concepts, populism and neo-populism, to examine the government and the figure of president Alvaro Uribe Velez.The text presents the management of the media, economic policy, dealing with the Supreme Court, the relationship with the NGOs and, finally, elements of illegality and illegitimacy in their government. ; El articulo desarrolla dos conceptos, populismo y neopopulismo, para examinar el gobierno y la figura del expresidente Álvaro Uribe Vélez.El texto presenta el manejo de los medios de comunicación, la política económica, el trato con la Corte Suprema de Justicia, la relación con las Ongs y, por último, elementos de ilegalidad e ilegitimidad en su gobierno.

In their pursuit of being elected, politicians might not provide their constituents with independent viewpoints, but just try to outguess popular opinion. Although rational voters see through such populism, candidates can not resist resorting to it when the spoils of office are too large. For an intermediate parameter range, both populism and its opposite, "candor", can be sustained as equilibria. This means that the public's trust or distrust in politicians may be self-fulfilling prophecies. Importantly, the more informed politicians are about public opinion, the more likely it is that populist behavior can be avoided.

La idea de populismo se caracteriza por una polisemia radical que en no pocas ocasiones debilita su capacidad explicativa. La presente voz tiene el objetivo de exponer un doble movimiento para ganar en su comprensión: por un lado, reconstruir la historia, semántica y tipología del concepto, por otro, exponer las líneas generales de la teoría política del filósofo del populismo Ernesto Laclau. Finalmente, sugerimos que el sentido de los populismos está asociado al «nuevo espíritu del capitalismo postmoderno» como una de las formas de expresión del malestar social contemporáneo y que su encarnación política puede dirigirse tanto en una dirección emancipatoria como de «revolución pasiva». ; The idea of populism is characterized by a radical polysemy that on many occasions weakens its explanatory capacity. The present entry has the aim of exposing a double movement to gain understanding: on the one hand, to reconstruct the history, semantics and typology of the concept, on the other, to expose the general lines of the political theory of the philosopher of populism Ernesto Laclau. Finally, we suggest that the meaning of populisms is associated with the «new spirit of postmodern capitalism» as one of the forms of expression of contemporary social unrest and that its political incarnation can be directed in both an emancipatory direction and a «passive revolution».

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

This essay offers an explanation for the rise of contemporary "mediatized populisms." Disaggregating the idea of a singular media logic of populist politics, we examine the institutional and political-economic dynamics of mediatization and the variegated structures of mediated political fields in which contemporary populist political formations are embedded. Moving away from broad "global populism" approaches as well as case studies from Europe and the Americas that have thus far dominated discussions of populism, we make the case for empirically grounded comparative studies of populism from the particular standpoint of regional contexts across Asia that offer theoretical insights often missed in prevailing "technology-first" and election-focused approaches. We then outline three distinctive features of media-politics relations (and their transformations) that have enabled the contemporary rise of mediatized populism across the Inter-Asian region.

In this paper, I want to introduce a(n digital) ethnographic approach to populism that understands populism as a (digitally) mediatized chronotopic communicative and discursive relation. Populism, I argue, is not only constructed in a (mediatized) communicative relation between journalists, politicians and academics, but also in the relation to citizens, activists and computational agency. Attention to all these actors, and the media they use, is of crucial importance if we want to understand populism. Digital media are not just new media that populists use, their algorithms and affordances reshape their populism. In times of digitalization, we cannot understand populism by only looking at 'the input', the frame that actors prepare for uptake, it is about the uptake as well. More concretely, I will argue that digital media have given birth to a new form of populism: algorithmic populism. Understanding and focusing on populism as a 'communicative relation' between all these human and non-human actors allows use to analyze 'populism' more precisely.

We aim to explain petro populism - the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time. Hence, even a purely rent-seeking incumbent who only cares about his own welfare, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in office. While this incentive benefits citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it also has the adverse effect of motivating benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time. Our model explains how resource wealth may generate political competition that reduces the tenability of equilibrium policies.

We aim to explain petro populism - the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time. Hence, even a purely rent-seeking incumbent who only cares about his own welfare, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in office. While this incentive benefits citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it also has the adverse effect of motivating benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time. Our model explains how resource wealth may generate political competition that reduces the tenability of equilibrium policies. ; publishedVersion

In the last two decades, multiple Islamic parties have become incumbent parties and/or joined coalition governments. Such a development brought debate as to whether these parties could moderate into democratic actors à la Christian Democratic Parties in Western Europe, or whether they were aiming at the formation of an Islamist state and society through electoral means. What remains relatively unaddressed in the literature, however, is to what degree Islamic parties truly derive their socio-political agenda from Islam. Hence, this paper will ask, how do Islamic parties utilize Islam? To answer this question, this paper will use a single case-study approach to test and to rethink Islamic political parties and what is "Islamic" about them in the Turkish case. This paper will study the Turkish case because the country's incumbent party, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), has been governing Turkey since 2002, making the Party the longest ruling Islamic party still in power. Based on the literature on populism, this paper will argue that the way the JDP utilized Islam can be characterized as populism flavored by religion that is based on (i) a thin theological foundation, (ii) a majoritarian rather than a multivocal interpretation of Islam, and (iii) a Muslim unity rhetoric.

Discussions on the relation between populism and democracy have become growingly frequent in the literature. Some authors consider that there is a virtuous relation between both phenomena, while others define the relation between populism and democracy as ambiguous, and a third stream views populism as a threat for democracy. In this article I review three books that are paradigmatic examples of the mentioned currents, and I support the following position: populism is compatible with democracy, and it reinforces its participatory dimension, but it presents certain tensions with political pluralism. In addition, the analysis performed in the present article suggests that the relation between populism and democracy takes specific forms in each case, and systematic comparative research on populist and non-populist actors is needed to better identify the distinctive features of populism. ; Los debates sobre la relación entre populismo y democracia son cada vez más frecuentes en la literatura. Ciertos autores consideran que existe una relación virtuosa entre ambos fenómenos, mientras otros definen la relación entre populismo y democracia como ambigua, y una tercera corriente ve el populismo como una amenaza para la democracia. En este artículo analizo tres libros que son ejemplos paradigmáticos de las mencionadas corrientes y sostengo la siguiente postura: el populismo es compatible con la democracia y refuerza su dimensión participativa, pero el populismo presenta ciertas tensiones con el pluralismo político. Además, el análisis realizado en el presente artículo sugiere que la relación entre populismo y democracia adopta formas específicas en cada caso, y se necesita investigación comparada sistemática sobre actores populistas y no populistas para identificar mejor las características distintivas del populismo.

This study aims to describe the 212 movement as a phenomenon of Islamic populism based on socio-religious movements followed by various Islamic organizations and their contradictions with other Islamic organizations The results showed that the 212 movement phenomenon was followed by various religious groups, especially Islam, participation was based on various forms of motivation, demands, principles and organizational ideology. In addition, the research results show that not all Islamic organizations support the 212 movement, but there are contradictions among religious organizations regarding their perceptions of the 212 movement. Pros and cons tend to be based on interpretations of religious teachings as well as ideology and organizational principles. The results of the research are then analyzed using the concept of mass mobilization and Islamic populism in the study of social movements that lead to the populist movement. The research findings also show that there is a relationship between social movements and Islamic populism as evidenced by the finding of chains of equivalens and empty signifiers which have implications for the formation of political frointer in the Islamic populism movement 212. ; Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mendeskripsikan gerakan 212 sebagai suatu fenomena populisme Islam berbasis gerakan sosial keagamaan yang diikuti oleh berbagai organisasi Islam serta kontradiksinya dengan organisasi Islam lain. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan fenomena gerakan 212 diikuti oleh berbagai kelompok keagamaan khususnya Islam, keiikutsertaan didasari oleh berbagai bentuk motivasi, tuntutan, prinsip dan ideologi organisasi. Selain itu, hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa tidak semua organisasi Islam mendukung gerakan 212, namun terdapat kontradiksi diantara organisasi keagamaan mengenai persepsinya terhadap gerakan 212. Pro dan kontra cenderung didasari oleh pemaknaan mengenai ajaran agama dan juga ideologi serta prinsip organisasi. Hasil penelitian tersebut kemudian dianalisa menggunakan konsep mobilisasi massa dan populisme Islam dalam kajian gerakan sosial yang mengarah kepada gerakan populisme. Temuan penelitian juga menunjukkan terdapat keterkaitan antara gerakan sosial dengan populisme Islam dibuktikan dengan ditemukannya chains of equivalens dan empty signifier yang berimplikasi pada pembentukan political frointer dalam gerakan populisme Islam 212.

The 2019-2020 disClosure collective is thrilled to present the 29th volume of disClosure: A Journal of Social Theory. This volume focuses on theories of populism and brings together a wide range of perspectives relating to the phenomenon, experience, and study of populism. The recent uptick in populism signals political, economic, and/or social unrest across the globe, yet, populism remains a phenomenon that is difficult to define. Our goal with this volume was not to define populism. Instead, this issue engages conversations about the various types and origins of populisms, as it is our belief that the development and definition of populism is both historically and socially contingent.