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The objective of the paper is to analyse two very closely related categories, economic nationalism and economic populism. They intertwine both in the lived politics on the ground and in intellectual debates. Despite a rich interdisciplinary discourse, scholars interested in economic nationalism and economic populism still disagree not only how to explain them, but more fundamentally – about what they are and what their relation is. This paper answers this deficit by addressing the question of the intertwining connections between economic nationalism and populism. In the first instance it reconstructs the basic definitions of economic nationalism – its constitutive elements, its historicity and periodization as well as its main categorisations. The next section focuses on economic populism, it starts with reconstructing the general definitions of populism and then consequently emphasises its economic dimension. In the conclusive part, as well as in throughout the argumentation of whole text, the author highlights the relations between economic nationalism and populism, their overlapping components and elements that they do not share. The origins of populism (as a movement) were economic in nature. Economic populism (as an empty-hearted ideology) is intertwined with nationalism in many of its contemporary (re)incarnations. Both economic nationalism and populism are increasingly important due to their raising political popularity and they require a closer look and scholarly attention. ; Celem niniejszego artykułu jest zaprezentowanie analizy dwóch, bardzo ściśle powiązanych ze sobą kategorii, nacjonalizmu ekonomicznego oraz ekonomicznego populizmu. Obie kategorie przenikają się zarówno w realnej polityce, jak i w refleksji akademickiej. Mimo bardzo bogatego dyskursu naukowego na temat obydwu, ich badacze cały czas spierają się nie tylko na temat tego jak je wyjaśniać, ale nawet co do ich zasadniczych treści. Zaproponowana analiza stanowi odpowiedź na ten deficyt i próbuje skupić się na związkach ekonomicznego populizmu i nacjonalizmu. W pierwszej kolejności dokonana została rekonstrukcja podstawowych sposobów rozumienia nacjonalizmu ekonomicznego – jego elementów konstytutywnych, jego historyczności, periodyzacji, jak również podstawowych kategoryzacji. Następna część koncentruje swoją uwagę na populizmie, eksponując jednocześnie jego wymiar ekonomiczny. W części konkludywnej, podobnie jak w całym tekście, autor uwypukla zachodzące relacje pomiędzy nacjonalizmem i populizmem ekonomicznym, ich wzajemnie nachodzące na siebie elementy oraz elementy rozbieżne. Początki populizmu (jako ruchu) były z natury ekonomiczne. Populizm ekonomiczny (jako swego rodzaju "pusta" ideologia) przenika nacjonalizm, kreując wiele z jego współczesnych (re)inkarnacji. Zarówno ekonomiczny populizm, jak i nacjonalizm gospodarczy stają się coraz bardziej istotnymi kategoriami analitycznymi, w związku z rosnącym znaczeniem sił nacjonalistycznych i populistycznych, i z tego powodu wymagają zaawansowanej refleksji naukowej.

AbstractPopulism's electoral success has been linked to socio-economic crises and to inflammatory political discourse. However, little is known of populist attitudes in contexts in which these supply-side factors are not salient. The present article diverges from the conception of populism that sees it as being activated or fuelled by contextual factors and, rather, conceives populism as an ideological attitudinal dimension that can have an impact on vote choice when supply-side factors are not salient. Using the particular context of the 2015 Canadian federal election as a case to test this theory, empirical analyses support this conception of populism by demonstrating that populist attitudes can be relatively prominent and even impact vote choice in a setting in which the traditional supply-side factors to activate or fuel populism are not salient. Ultimately, populism is shown to be an important demand-side attitudinal dimension even when there is little or no fertile ground for it.

Populist parties and actors now govern various countries around the world. Often elected by the public in times of crises and over the perceived failure of 'the elites', the question stands as to how populist governments actually perform once elected, especially in times of crisis. Using the pandemic shock in the form of the COVID-19 crises, our paper poses the question of how populist governments handle the pandemic. We answer this question by introducing a theoretical framework according to which populist governments (1) enact less far-reaching policy measures to counter the pandemic and (2) lower the effort of citizens to counter the pandemic, so that populist governed countries are (3) hit worse by the pandemic. We test these propositions in a sample of 42 countries with weekly data from 2020. Employing econometric models, we find empirical support for our propositions and ultimately conclude that excess mortality in populist governed countries exceeds the excess mortality of non-populist countries by 8 percentage points (i.e., 98%). Our findings have important implications for the assessment of populist government performance in general, as well as counter-pandemic measures in particular, by providing evidence that opportunistic and inadequate policy responses, spreading misinformation and downplaying the pandemic are strongly related to increases in COVID-19 mortality.

This article focuses on the roots and mechanisms of Macron's success, arguing that in 2017 two conditions were essential in Macron's rise—the implosion of the established system of the French Fifth Republic in which the two main parties were alternating in power; and the rise of anti-establishment populist challengers on the right and on the left (cf. Stockemer, 2017; Zulianello, 2020). It was anti-establishment appeal that put Macron on the map, but the appeal to technocratic competence that won him the presidency. Technocratic populism transcends the left–right cleavage and, as a result, has a broader appeal than its left- and right-wing counterparts. Emmanuel Macron was an insider taking on the (crumbling) system and positioning himself as an outsider—refusing the traditional labels, including centrism, elite recruitment patterns, and mediated politics. Instead, Macron and La Republique en Marche attempted to create new forms of responsiveness by 'giving voice to the people,' while relying on technocratic competence as a legitimation mechanism. In power Emmanuel Macron attempts to balance responsiveness and responsibility (cf. Guasti & Buštíková, 2020).

"Common Hegemony, Populism, and the New Municipalism critically explores the global rise of an alternative democratic politics since the 1990s in both practice and theory, from the Zapatistas' insurrection to the 2011 cycle of democratic contestation and the ensuing municipalist movement in Spain. Staging an alternative to mainstream politics in both its statist and its activist variants, Alexandros Kioupkiolis combines a comprehensive and in-depth account of contemporary alter-politics with an extensive treatment of strategic challenges and broaches the question of strategy through theories of hegemony which are revisited and renewed by taking our lead from contemporary social movements and practices. Specific movements such as 15-M, and new municipalism, are examined to understand how these have transfigured the counter-hegemonic politics in the direction of egalitarianism, diversity, and grassroots self-government. Common Hegemony, Populism, and the New Municipalism will be of interest to researchers and students of contemporary political theory, democratic theory, and social movement studies"--

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. Populism and nationalism in China and its effects on the SCS dispute -- Chapter 3. Populism and nationalism in the Philippines and its effects on the SCS dispute -- Chapter 4. Nationalism in Vietnam and its effects on the SCS dispute: Chinese perspective -- Chapter 5. Populism and nationalism in Vietnam and its effects on the SCS dispute: Southeast Asian perspective -- Chapter 6. Populism and nationalism in Malaysia and its effects on the SCS dispute -- Chapter 7. Populism and nationalism in Indonesia and its effects on the SCS dispute -- Chapter 8. Populism and nationalism in Singapore and its effects on the SCS dispute -- Chapter 9. Populism and nationalism in Cambodia and its effects on the SCS dispute -- Chapter 10. Populism and nationalism in Myanmar and its effects on the SCS dispute -- Chapter 11. Evolution of US's SCS policy: domestic perspectives. .

AbstractPrompted by recent scholarly debates on the distinction between populism and nationalism, we elaborate on the Laclaudian understanding of populism as an antagonistic form of us‐building/community‐making that relies on the extension of equivalential chains between demands. From this heuristic perspective, populism can be understood as an empty form to be filled with different contents, such as nationalism. Our radically anti‐essentialist stance combines Laclau's formalist conceptualisation of populism and Brubaker's work on nationalism. We highlight the ontological dimension of populism, as a form of us‐building, and the ontic dimension, as an array of discursive repertoires that fill the form, such as 'the people' for peopleism. We explore the ontological–ontic distinction through the case of Narodism in Serbia. Conceptualising populism two‐dimensionally contributes both to debates on the 'core' of populism and to cases where articulations of 'the people' coincide with expressions of nationhood, civilisationalism and culturalism, rather than being entirely the same.

Abstract.  The scientific debate about populism has been revitalised by the recent rise of extreme‐right parties in Western Europe. Within the broad discussion about populism and its relationship with extreme‐right, this article is confined to three topics: a conceptual, an epistemological and an empirical issue. First, taking a clear position in the ongoing definition struggle, populism is defined primarily as a specific political communication style. Populism is conceived of as a political style essentially displaying proximity of the people, while at the same time taking an anti‐establishment stance and stressing the (ideal) homogeneity of the people by excluding specific population segments. Second, it is pointed out that defining populism as a style enables one to turn it into a useful concept that has too often remained vague and blurred. Third, drawing on an operational definition of populism, a comparative discourse analysis of the political party broadcasts of the Belgian parties is carried out. The quantitative analysis leads to a clear conclusion. In terms of the degree and the kinds of populism embraced by the six political parties under scrutiny, the extreme‐right party Vlaams Blok behaves very differently from the other Belgian parties. Its messages are a copybook example of populism.

Despite its remarkable growth in recent years, the study of populism has long suffered from the lack of a comprehensive theory about its causes, development, and outcomes. Yet, no such theory can be arrived at before previously having resolved what "populism" really is (and what it is not). Good definitions, therefore, require a prior conceptualization of the phenomena we classify as populist, and want explained. Like planets, which are hard to define but easier to conceptualize as the component parts of our solar system, modern populism is better understood as a novel political system that maintains electoral democracy while also working against the principles of political liberalism. Based on such a conceptualization, we may define populism simply as "democratic illiberalism," which opens the door for new empirical research and worthwhile theory-building. ; Peer reviewed

In article reviews phenomenon of populism as a product of political communication. An attempt to consider the destructive practice of communication in politics as the result of conscious and unconscious rejection of constructive policies. Analyzed variations paradoxical communication, which gives a deeper understanding of the causes of negative understanding of populism. Looking indicators to identify the phenomenon of populism ethical dimension of mass manipulation of consciousness.Key words populism, demagogy, political communication, manipulation, parapolitica, ethics ; Розглянуто феномен популізму як продукт політичної комунікації. Зроблено спробу дослідити деструктивні комунікативні практики в політиці як результат свідомого та несві-домого відхилення від конструктивної політики. Проаналізовано різновиди парадоксальної комунікації, що дає глибше розуміння причин негативного побутового ставлення до по-пулізму. Подано етичний вимір маніпуляції свідомістю мас як намагання знайти критерій для ідентифікації популізму. Ключові слова: популізм, демагогія, політична комунікація, маніпуляція, параполітика, етика.