Suchergebnisse

Argues that the antimodernist impulse of populism, which has historically been denigrated in mainstream culture, assumes greater legitimacy under postmodern conditions in which the concept of progress has been discredited. Against interpretations of populism as inherently xenophobic, modern defenders of populism are described as seeking a postmodern model of communal life in which the organicity of communities assumes special importance. It is suggested that this populist vision is an effort to reconstruct the kind of individuality that disintegrated in the face of modern conditions of social life. John Dewey's pragmatic theory of experience is considered as the closest approximation to this postmodern populist ideal. Finally, the work of Carl Schmitt (1950) is employed as a starting point for a more explicitly political theory of postmodern populism. D. M. Smith

Explores populism and neo-populism in Argentina, radical populist Right in Western Europe, "Lukashism" and authoritarian populism in Belarus, liberal reforms and institutional democracy in Argentina, election speeches and legislative practices of the Maurice Duplessis government in Quebec, and rise of the radical Right in Turkey; 6 articles. Summaries in English.

"Homophobic Populism" published on by Oxford University Press.

Populist political forces have played significant roles in Indian politics, and have varied in their vision of political community, in the social groups they targeted, in the policies they pursued, and in their impact on democracy. The Indian National Congress had populist aspects in the interwar period, and then again under Indira Gandhi's leadership from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. Movements and parties that represented particular language and caste groups also employed populist rhetoric and methods of mobilization, and pursued populist policies. The nature of the populist organizations influenced the effect of populism on democracy. While Indira Gandhi's populism weakened Indian democracy, leading to a period of authoritarian rule, the populism of many of India's language and caste parties strengthened democracy. Populism is likely to continue in Indian politics, and is particularly significant currently in the mobilization of the lower castes. Adapted from the source document.

Following the USA, in many Western countries over the last decade, prisons rates have increased while crime rates have been declined. This key book examines the role played by penal populism on this and other trends in contemporary penal policy.

Asserting that politics has the capacity to shift negative societal directions & revive democracy, it is contended that civic populism is required to merge everyday politics with electoral politics to foster that improvement. Civic populism calls for citizen participation & the blending of interest group bargaining with broader civic ideals, which requires work, a concept absent from theories of participatory democracy. Flaws in communitarian & liberal theories are laid out before presenting an alternative to underpin US civic life in civic populism. Civic populism embodies a conception of everyday politics, ie, the interaction of citizens with basically equal, horizontal relationships with each other across settings; this results in alliances of diverse citizen groups that organize based on a philosophical orientation to politics rooted in democratic & religious values. Attention turns to public work as a theme of civic populism. Public work is viewed as the sustained effort by a blend of citizens to create material or cultural goods of lasting civic value. It also sheds light on the democratic potential of knowledge power. It is concluded that civic populism stresses the productive & distributive aspects of politics as key resources for citizen empowerment. 37 References. J. Zendejas

Populists are making headway across Europe & from all points on the political spectrum. Their success is symptomatic of the weakness of European political parties & party systems. Some of these populists seek to reinvigorate European democracy & yet most -- with their xenophobic, anti-immigrant rhetoric -- seem intent on making matters worse. The challenge in Europe is to reconstitute national party systems as effective institutions for representing the popular interest. Such a challenge can be met only over the long term. For now, Europeans must deal with those populists who emerge at the national level. Some of these can be dealt with safely & others cannot. So far Europeans have succeeded in keeping the most unsavory populists from power. However, such success is not guaranteed. Indeed, failure to restrain European populism may be just a matter of time. Adapted from the source document.

La idea de populismo se caracteriza por una polisemia radical que en no pocas ocasiones debilita su capacidad explicativa. La presente voz tiene el objetivo de exponer un doble movimiento para ganar en su comprensión: por un lado, reconstruir la historia, semántica y tipología del concepto, por otro, exponer las líneas generales de la teoría política del filósofo del populismo Ernesto Laclau. Finalmente, sugerimos que el sentido de los populismos está asociado al «nuevo espíritu del capitalismo postmoderno» como una de las formas de expresión del malestar social contemporáneo y que su encarnación política puede dirigirse tanto en una dirección emancipatoria como de «revolución pasiva». ; The idea of populism is characterized by a radical polysemy that on many occasions weakens its explanatory capacity. The present entry has the aim of exposing a double movement to gain understanding: on the one hand, to reconstruct the history, semantics and typology of the concept, on the other, to expose the general lines of the political theory of the philosopher of populism Ernesto Laclau. Finally, we suggest that the meaning of populisms is associated with the «new spirit of postmodern capitalism» as one of the forms of expression of contemporary social unrest and that its political incarnation can be directed in both an emancipatory direction and a «passive revolution».

While the rise of populism in Western Europe over the past
three decades has received a great deal of attention in the academic and
popular literature, less attention has been paid to the rise of its opposite—
anti-populism. This short article examines the discursive and stylistic dimensions
of the construction and maintenance of the populism/anti-populism
divide in Western Europe, paying particular attention to how anti-populists
seek to discredit populist leaders, parties and followers. It argues that this
divide is increasingly antagonistic, with both sides of the divide putting forward
extremely different conceptions of how democracy should operate
in the Western European political landscape: one radical and popular, the
other liberal. It closes by suggesting that what is subsumed and feared under
the label of the "populist threat" to democracy in Western Europe today is
less about populism than nationalism and nativism.

Searches for a useful & accurate definition of Islamic movements in the Middle East. The often-used term "theocratic populism" is incorrect, as it incorporates concepts used to the explain events in other parts of the world. Similarly rejected are the ideas of Michel Foucault, who observed the 1979 Iranian Revolution first hand. He argued that it was neither antimodern nor populist, but rather, the injection of the spiritual into political life. In his romanticizing of the revolution, however, he downplayed repressive aspects of it & failed to understand the authoritarian cult of the personality. The ideas of Jurgen Habermas can also be used to understand the defense of the life world in the Middle East against further enroachments by the world system. It is argued here, however, that a historical understanding of the development of the Iranian state, Islam, foreign intervention, & nationalism must be pursued. The analysis emphasizes the need to retrieve the strain of participatory democracy in Iran from the demagogic populism of the power elite in order to check the rise of religious fascism, which threatens a more liberal path for the Middle East. J. Cowie

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.

International audience ; This chapter examines the supply and demand sides of populism in France. It looks at the two main populist actors i.e. the Front National (FN) and La France Insoumise (LFI). The FN exemplifies the typical radical right populist organization, primarily mobilizing grievances over immigration, while LFI shows a left-wing egalitarian and socially inclusive profile. Electoral support for populism in France is fuelled by economic instability and voter distrust of mainstream politics and of the EU. Both LFI and the FN increasingly converge on a common protectionist platform, opposing the EU and globalization. Populist voting in 2017 is found predominantly amongst the youngest cohorts and it is strongly correlated with populist attitudes. FN voters are primarily found amongst the so-called 'losers' of globalization in the lower social classes, who are typically more anti-immigrant and more authoritarian. LFI attracts on the other hand a broader coalition of secularized voters in the middle and lower social classes, who are primarily motivated by economic concerns. Both FN and LFI voters are more Eurosceptic than the mainstream, and they share similar concerns about globalization.