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This article considers the relationship between culture wars and the politically divisive landscape being shaped by contemporary forms of right–wing populism. It argues that culture wars should be understood as a technique through which the current Conservative government is seeking
to shape and secure forms of what Stuart Hall termed 'authoritarian populism'. This mode of political intervention is being generated through mobilising particular spatial divisions and imaginaries. To develop this argument the article considers two particular elements within the culture–war
discourse in Conservative politics, each of which depends on and mobilises different spatial divisions. The first section deals with the role of 'Levelling Up' discourses, while the second part explores the Tories' increasing emphasis on 'impunity' for British soldiers.

After years of progress in terms of gender and sexual rights, since 2012 Europe is facing a so-called gender backlash – opposition directed to issues related to reproductive policies and abortion, violence against women, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer (LGBTIQ) rights and gay marriages, gender mainstreaming and sex education at schools as well as antidiscrimination policies. In this article, firstly, by taking the anti-gender developments as point of reference, I examine the emergence of anti-gender movement in Europe via the use of what I call troll science. Troll science is based on (distorted) scientific arguments moulded into populist discourse, creating an alternative narrative on the conceptions of gender equality. Similar to troll accounts posting provocative, superfluous and even off-topic messages on social media to start arguments and quarrels aiming to distract, troll science, I argue, creates an alternative narrative opposing the scientific facts and discourses (i.e. climate change, evolution, vaccination and gender theory). Later, I discuss the emerging conservative troll-scientific discourses and the gendered public normative order of Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP; Justice and Development Party) government, under the New Turkey. I previously argued that New Turkey and the society under the party's rule perpetuated by a new set of standards create an alternative narrative on the conceptions of gender equality through troll-science narratives. I concluded by showing how such ideological discourses help create emotional echo chambers – enabling its fast distribution and acceptance by the ideologically conservative groups. ; publishedVersion

En el 2007 la filósofa francesa Chantal Delsol realizó en la Universidad Simón Bolívar una conferencia titulada Populismo, democracia y república. En su participación, invitaba a la audencia a analizar la situación venezolana en el marco del populismo. Para aquel entonces, el gobierno de Hugo Chávez ya había madurado lo suficiente como para emitirle un juicio. En el presenolte escrito nos proponemos responder a la inquietud planteada por Delsol a la luz de su discurso. Por tal razón hemos estructurado el escrito en cinco partes: 1. El populismo en Venezuela: ¿Una desviación de la democracia o de la república?; 2. Las Misiones Sociales y cupos Cadivi como elementos que reafirman el idiotès y niega el noos; 3. El desprecio en Venezuela: ¿Quién desprecia a quién?; 4. Análisis de las reivindicaciones del populismo en el marco del chavismo; 5. Consideraciones finales sobre el populismo. ; In 2007 french philosopher Chantal Delsol made in the University Simon Bolívar a conference entitled Populism, democracy and republic. In her participation, she invited the audience to analyze the venezuelan situation in the framework of populism. By then Hugo Chávez's government had matured enough to issue it a judgment. In this work, we intend to answer the concern asked by Delsol in the light of her speech. For this reason, we have structured this work in five parts: 1. Populism in Venezuela: ¿A deviation of democracy or a deviation of the republic?; 2. Social Missions and Cadivi quotas as elements that reaffirm idiotès and deny nous; 3. Despise in Venezuela: ¿Who despises whom?; 4. Analysis of populism's claims in the framwork of chavismo; 5. Finals considerations about populism. ; 367-374 ; Cuatrimestral

The translation of electoral pledges into the executive's agenda is all but a linear process. Parties that take office have to compromise on what issues will be prioritized in the governmental agenda, which never exactly matches parties' electoral platforms. Populists may further challenge this mechanism, as they pursue a more direct link with people and claim to be different from non-populist parties. This study, bridging the party mandate model and agenda-setting scholarship, analyses the congruence between electoral manifestos and the prime minister's investiture speech in Italy, both at the aggregate and individual-issue levels. By comparing the behaviour of parties in government (1994–2021), the analysis reveals that populist parties do not reinforce the 'transmission belt' from electoral pledges to the executive agenda.

Populism has been a major political phenomenon in liberal democracies throughout the last decade. Focusing on economic distress as one of the basic triggers of populism, we proposed a model integrating individual‐level indices of economic distress and status‐based identity threat (i.e., frustration of identity motives) as predictors of populism. We conducted two survey studies operationalizing populism as an individual‐level thin ideology among members of the general French population (Study 1: N = 458; Study 2: N = 1,050). Structural equation models supported status‐based identity threat as a partial mediator in the links between indices of relative deprivation and populism (Study 1). Additional analyses revealed frustrated belonging (i.e., feelings of social exclusion) as the central identity motive in this pattern. Reproducing the same model with belonging frustration instead of global‐identity motive frustration gave similar results (Studies 1 and 2). These findings provide the first evidence implicating identity threat—and belonging threat in particular—in the development of populist thin ideology and showed how identity motives are related to the economic distress pattern that predicts populism.

The article examines the role of public opinion during the California governor's recall in 2003 compared to partisanship and ideology. In the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) Statewide Surveys, most Californians reported that their state was headed in the wrong direction, whereas relatively few said that they trusted state government, and most said that they disapproved of the way the governor was handling his job. Californians reported that they liked the recall process in concept, and about one half said that they were pleased with its current use and satisfied with the replacement candidates. The author finds that public support for the recall was consistent over time and related to negative political attitudes and positive recall attitudes when controlling for other factors. The implications for the future use and success of recalls and on what political science has to say about the role of populism and partisanship in the direct democracy movement are discussed.

Eine bedeutende, aber unterentwickelte Erklärung für den Aufstieg des Populismus verweist auf das Gefühl, von der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft "abgehängt" zu sein. Im Kern steht die These, dass die Unterstützung des Populismus von der Wahrnehmung getrieben wird, nicht die gesellschaftliche Anerkennung zu erhalten, die man verdient. Dieser Beitrag baut auf der Erkenntnis auf, dass das Gefühl mangelnder Anerkennung auf unterschiedliche Weise und aus unterschiedlichen Gründen auftreten kann. Wir argumentieren, dass - aufgrund dieses facettenreichen Charakters - die gemeinsame Wahrnehmung einer fehlenden gesellschaftlichen Anerkennung ansonsten heterogene Bevölkerungsschichten in ihrer Unterstützung für den Populismus vereint. Basierend auf Daten aus der Vorwahlbefragung der German Longitudinal Election Study zur Bundestagswahl 2021 untersucht unsere präregistrierte Studie die multiplen Wurzeln populistischer Einstellungen in Gefühlen mangelnder gesellschaftlicher Anerkennung. Erstens weisen unsere Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass - von Individuen in ländlichen Regionen über solche mit soziokulturell konservativen Einstellungen bis hin zu solchen mit niedrigem Einkommen - scheinbar unverbundene Segmente der Gesellschaft Wahrnehmungen fehlender Anerkennung teilen - allerdings aus unterschiedlichen Gründen. Zweitens ist, wie erwartet, jedes dieser distinkten Gefühle fehlender Anerkennung mit populistischen Einstellungen assoziiert. Diese Ergebnisse unterstreichen die Relevanz scheinbar unpolitischer, tief in der menschlichen Psyche verwurzelter Faktoren, um gegenwärtige populistische Stimmungslagen zu verstehen. Durch die Integration zuvor auseinanderlaufender Perspektiven auf den Aufstieg des Populismus bietet die Studie eine neue Konzeptualisierung des "Abgehängtseins" und erklärt, wie Populismus - über traditionelle Cleavages hinweg - zu ungewöhnlichen Allianzen führen kann.

Intro -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Chapter One. Surveying the Barnyards: Tennessee Farmers in the Age of Agrarian Reform -- Chapter Two. Organizing for the Grand Work -- Chapter Three. Building Cooperativism -- Chapter Four. Farm Issues in the Political Economy -- Chapter Five. From Nonpartisan Politics to Populism -- Chapter Six. Up from the Mudsills of Hell: Farmers in the Progressive Era -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.

El siguiente artículo presenta un recorrido histórico y conceptual de la categoría populismo en la obra de Laclau, desde sus primeros trabajos inscriptos en el marxismo hasta su teoría madura del populismo en el campo postmarxista. La teoría política del populismo de Ernesto Laclau es una de las más sofisticadas y polémicas respuestas a la pregunta sobre el origen de esta categoría. El estudio que se propone el autor muestra las potencialidades de la categoría para el análisis político y también las dificultades teóricas que debe resolver para consolidarse en un mundo en constante evaluación de sus criterios de organización y participación en los ámbitos político, económico y social. ; The following article presents a historical and conceptual overview of the populism category in Laclau's work from his earliest works inscribed in Marxism to his mature theory of populism in the postmarxist camp. The political theory of populism by Ernesto Laclau is one of the most sophisticated and controversial answers to the question about the origin of this category. The study proposed by the author shows the potential of the category for political analysis and also the theoretical difficulties that must be solved to consolidate in a world in constant evaluation of its criteria of organization and participation in the political, economic and social spheres. ; Fil: Retamozo, Martin. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Centro Científico Tecnológico Conicet - La Plata. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales. Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación. Instituto de Investigaciones en Humanidades y Ciencias Sociales; Argentina

Chapter 1. Introduction: Looking at the Relation between Feminist Politics and Left-Wing Populism through the Bolivian Case -- Chapter 2. Legislation on violence against women in politics, a pioneer policy on gender equality -- Chapter 3. Pragmatism in the formation of policy-making coalitions -- Chapter 4. Women's Movements Institutionalisation and Impact on Policy -- Chapter 5. Conclusions.

The past few years have seen an emerging discourse on Chinese social media that combines the claims, vocabulary and style of right-wing populisms in Europe and North America with previous forms of nationalism and racism in Chinese cyberspace. In other words, it provokes a similar hostility towards immigrants, Muslims, feminism, the so-called 'liberal elites' and progressive values in general. This article examines how, in debating global political events such as the European refugee crisis and the American presidential election, well-educated and well-informed Chinese Internet users appropriate the rhetoric of 'Western-style' right-wing populism to paradoxically criticise Western hegemony and discursively construct China's ethno-racial and political identities. Through qualitative analysis of 1038 postings retrieved from a popular social media website, this research shows that by criticising Western 'liberal elites', the discourse constructs China's ethno-racial identity against the 'inferior' non-Western other, exemplified by non-white immigrants and Muslims, with racial nationalism on the one hand; and formulates China's political identity against the 'declining' Western other with realist authoritarianism on the other. The popular narratives of global order protest against Western hegemony while reinforcing a state-centric and hierarchical imaginary of global racial and civilisational order. We conclude by suggesting that the discourse embodies the logics of anti-Western Eurocentrism and anti-hegemonic hegemonies. This article: (1) provides critical insights into the changing ways in which self–other relations are imagined in Chinese popular geopolitical discourse; (2) sheds light on the global circulation of extremist discourses facilitated by the Internet; and (3) contributes to the ongoing debate on right-wing populism and the 'crisis' of the liberal world order.